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Historically, creative change has been viewed by the

opposing theoretical perspectives of "Holism" and "Reductionism.

"

Viewed by Reductionism creative change produces

continuous, incremental composite and therefore

plicable trivial novelty.

is

a

an ex-

Viewed by Holism creative change

produces a discontinuous, nonincremental gestalt and therefore is an inexplicable radical novelty.

This theoretical

rivalry has resulted in the impoverished view of creative

change as either "trivially novel in structure"
ism)

or "inexplicable in genesis"

(Holism)

.

(Reduction-

We are propos-

ing an enriching "Metaphoric" perspective in which creative

change is both "genuinely novel in structure" and "explicThe Metaphoric perspective itself is a

able in genesis."
|

paradoxical integration of the mutually opposing perspectives of Holism and Reductionism at a higher order meta-

phoric level.

From the Metaphoric perspective the creative

process is seen as

a

paradoxical integration of mutually

vi

opposing concepts producing
perspective.

a

higher order metaphoric

In short creative change is a paradoxical

tension in search of a metaphoric resolution.

The goal of

this dissertation is neither to reduce away the paradoxical

tension of creative change

(

Reductionism) nor to leave its

generation unexplained (Holism) but rather to demonstrate
the metaphorical beauty of the paradoxical nature of crea-

tive change.

This metaphorical beauty aesthetically and

epistemologically resolves the inherently necessary paradox
by showing the greater cognitive unity of opposing concepts

"because of" their contrasting differences and not merely
"in spite of" or from the

"lack thereof."

Thus, metaphor

functions to creatively resolve the necessary paradoxical

tension by incorporating and transforming it at
level of unity through diversity.

Vll

a

higher
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The general goal of this dissertation is to explore

the development of a more adequate conceptualization of the

creative process.

We are operating on the fundamental

assumption that all data is "theory laden" either implicitly
or explicitly and furthermore that "theory" strongly influ-

ences the way we interpret and construct datum (Piaget,
1976a)

(Polanyi, 1975)

Hence "theory" may inform and

.

reform as well as misinform and deform our research and
educational practice.

As Abraham Moslow has stated,

"If all

you have is a hammer then everything looks like a nail"
(Maslow, 1968).

Data interpreted from a reductionistic

theory will provide
creativity.

a

reductionistic understanding of

If we are to understand the creative process

better, then a more epistemologically adequate theory of

creativity is necessary.

Furthermore a more adequate theory

of creativity would greatly contribute to the development of
a

science of education because of its potential implications

for guiding, informing and reforming research, assessment,

curriculum and teacher-student interaction.

1

2

Statement of Problem
The explication of the paradoxical nature of the gene-

sis of genuinely novel structures in creative change has

been

perennial problem.

a

Various writers have identified

at least one of three interrelated aspects of the paradoxi-

cal nature of creative change (Barron, 1968)
(May,

1975)

1979a).

The

(McMullan,

1976)

(Piaget,

1971)

(Bruner, 1962)

(Rothenberg,

"structural" aspect is concerned with the

structural integration of mutually opposing images, ideas,
or concepts which are simultaneously equally operative and

valid (Rothenberg, 1979a).

As a documented example Rothen-

berg (1979b, p. 41) shows from the metaphoric visualization
that an observer in free fall is both at rest and in motion
at the same time,

Einstein was able to postulate the rela-

tivity of motion in coordinate systems.

(Note:

If the

observer releases any objects, they will remain, relative to
him, in a state of rest and thus the observer is justified
in considering his state as one of rest.)

The

"process"

aspect is concerned with the holistic creation of novel
gestalts of knowledge which are incomprehensible and nonre-

ducible to the precedent state of knowledge (Piaget, 1970)
(Rothenberg, 1979a)

.

For example from the metaphoric visu-

alization of the simultaneous integration of the opposites
of "rest" and "motion" for a free falling body Einstein

.

3

derived the novel concept of relativity in physics which was
logically nonderivable and incomprehensible to the preceding

Newtonian theory of classical physics (Kuhn, 1970).

Rather,

classical physics is a special limiting case of the more
general theory of relativity.

The "purpose" or "intention-

al" aspect is concerned with the simultaneous commitment to

and doubting of a new creation (Barron, 1968)

(May,

An example taken from Einstein's correspondence,

1980).

"Recently

you have probably received my new publication on relativity
and gravitation which

I

have at last finished after unending

labor and painful doubts"

(Holton,

1973, p.

228).

Related

to this is Holton's characterization of Einstein as both the

"wisest of old men" with the ability to critically and

relentlessly question his own concepts and at the same time
"an almost childlike person" who openly and persistently

wondered about incredibly new concepts of space and time
(Holton, 1973, pp.

356-357)

In this dissertation, we shall

confront the "structural," "process" and "purposive" aspects
of the paradoxical nature of creative change with a theory

which epistemologically accounts for the paradoxical complexity of creative change as well as provides an intelligible resolution.

Toward this end we shall abstract and

elaborate from the constructive theories of Piaget and
others a "metaphoric dialectic" with the functional capacity
to integrate opposites and explicate the holistic creation

4

of novel structures of knowledge.

Thus we define creativity

as a paradoxical tension in search of a metaphoric resolu-

tion

.

From the perspective of various "Reductionistic
Theories" such as Cultural Transmissionism, Behaviorism and

Logical Positivism creative change is the continuous incre-

mental production of a trivially novel composite completely

explicable from its precedent.

From the perspective of

various "Holistic Theories" such as Romanticism, Gestaltism
and Neo-Freudianism creative change is the discontinuous

nonincremental emergence of

a

plicable from its precedent.

radically novel gestalt inexThe theoretical question

arises which of these two opposing views of the creative

process is the right one?
asking the wrong question.

According to Maruyama we are
"Americans who believe in the

existence of one truth will inevitably ask:
different views which one is right?
lowing:

If you have

But consider the fol-

In the binocular vision it is irrelevant to raise

the question as to which eye is wrong.

Binocular vision

works, not because the two eyes see different sides of the
same object, but because the differential between the two

images enables the brain to compute the invisible dimension"
(Maruyama, 1977, p. 84).

We propose that the supposedly mutually exclusive

monocular views of Reductionism and Holism have created

a

5

conflicting double vision in the form of

a

false dilemma

that creative change is characterized as either

a

"trivially

novel" composite with an "explicably ordered" genesis
(Reduction)

or a "radically novel" gestalt with an "inexpic-

ably ordered" genesis

(Holism)

is totally wrong nor right.

.

Paradoxically neither view

The Reductionistic view is

limited because it can only explain the composite of novelty
in terms of the incremental accumulation of precedent know-

ledge.

Hence it trivializes the gestalt quality of genuine-

ly novel knowledge.

The Holistic view is limited because it

accepts the gestalt quality of genuinely novel knowledge but
at the expense of leaving unexplained its genesis from pre-

cedent knowledge.

Hence the appropriate question is not

which view, Reductionism or Holism, is right or wrong:
are incompletely monocular.

Nor is the question how can we

additively combine the two monocular views to produce
complete monocular view.

both

a more

Rather the central question is how

can we integrate the difference of their views to construct
a

genuinely novel binocular vision of the creative process

which is paradoxically hidden to either view alone or to
both when additively combined?

We propose that binocular

vision metaphorically exemplifies how oppositional differences are "metaphorically coordinated" toward
of unity through diversity.

a

higher level

Hence the problem of this dis -

sertation is how to incorporate the mutually opposing views

:
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of Holism and Reductionism into a new metaphoric vision of

creative change.

Furthermore to show how this new metaphor-

ic vision paradoxically goes beyond the single sightedness

of Holism and Reductionism to reveal a deepened theoretical

vision which both "is" and "shows how" creative change is

simultaneously characterized by

a

"genuinely novel structure"

and an "explicably ordered genesis."

Proposal of the Thesis
In order to validate conceptually and corroborate em-

pirically

a

metaphoric theory of the creative process which

"genuinely novel" and "explicably ordered" in gene-

is both

sis we propose the following theses
1

.

Creativity is fundamentally

a

paradoxical process.

The paradox of constructing an epistemologically adequate

theory of creative change is that we can neither explicate
the genuine novelty of that which is already created nor

that which is not created previously.

created is merely

a

That which is already

trivially extended novelty of past com-

binations appearing gradually (Reductionism)

.

That which is

not created previously is an irreducible gestalt inexplicably derived from its precedent (Holism)

.

If we can neither

change
explicate the genuinely novel structure of creative
that which is
for that which is "previously created" nor for

how can we explicate
"not previously created" then when and

7

the creation of a genuinely novel structure?

The resolution

of this paradox requires the explication of how the opposing

conceptual differences of Reductionism and Holism are simultaneously integrated (structural paradox) to go beyond the
linear sequential conceptualization of creative change as

occurring either "previously"
ously"

(Holism)

.

(Reductionism) or "not previ-

We propose that creative change is funda -

mentally a paradoxical process of constructively coordinat ing mutually exclusive but equally necessary first-order

oppositional differences to generate

a

second-order simul-

taneous reintegration of the oppositional differences.

We

shall illustrate the "structural" and "process" aspect of
the paradox of creative change with the literary metaphor

"Society is a sea."

In this metaphor the primary

(society)

and the secondary (sea) categorical subjects are mutually

exclusive first order oppositional differences which create
a

paradoxical category mistake when literally identified

with each other by the copula "is."

However when metaphor-

ically reinterpreted the oppositional differences between
the separate categories of "society" and "sea

grated at

a

are reinte-

genuinely novel second-order figurative level

which resolves the logical absurdity of the literal inter

oretation of the oppositional differences into an aesthetic
harmony of oppositional differences.

At this new figurative

away to
level the oppositional categories are not reduced

.
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pre-existing similarities as in the simile,
a sea,"

"Society is like

but rather are highlighted to novelly enrich the

greater whole of the metaphor itself.

Thus in a fundamental

sense the new metaphoric meaning does not represent an

elimination of the oppositional differences of its categories but rather is a transformative enhancement of the

paradox of their irreducible opposition into aesthetically
contrasting differences which enrich the whole.
Fundamentally creative change is an irreducible

second-order qualitative process shift (process paradox)

generated from the simultaneous integration of structurally
irreducible oppositional differences (structural paradox)

Furthermore this second-order shift

is a

paradoxical leap of

uncertainty out of place and time betwixt and between the
stable structures of two cognitive levels (Rothenberg, 197819 79)

.

Labouvie-Vief writes "Yet between those two (cognilevels, certainty is at its minimum.

tive)

Werner (1948),

for example, remarks on the moment of behavioral disorgani-

zation or instability which marks stage transitions.

make the transition requires a leap of faith,

a

To

tolerance

for temporary disorganization, a surrendering to uncertainty.

1956)

Whether it be called ego strength (Gill and Brenman,
,

tolerance of intra-self inconsistencies (Duval and

9

Wickland, 1972)

,

openness to disquietude (Dabrowski, 1970)

or creative discomfort (Gruber, 1973)

,

many writers have

commented on this ability to endure and even embrace uncertainty as a mechanism by which the self creates an impetus
for change"

(Labouvie-Vief

,

1982, p. 168).

We propose that

the paradoxical uncertainty of the second-order qualitative

shift results from the indeterminate transition between the

de-structuring of the first-order oppositional differences
and the re-structuring of the second-order integration of

oppositional differences.

This indeterminate transition is

neither directly predictable nor derivable from the pre-

existing attributes or relations of the first-order oppositional differences any more than the process of binocular

vision is either directly predictable or derivable from the

opposing monocular views either singularly or additively
combined.

Furthermore the indeterminate transition is not

a

spatial ordination of place but rather a mental coordination

which takes place.

Beyond this the coordination which takes

place through the indeterminate shift is "out of time" since
the normal linear sequence of events is suspended with the

simultaneous (nonsequential) integration of differences

which are neither before nor after each other (Rothenburg,
1979a, pp.

336-339).

Hence the second-order shift is

a

paradoxical leap of uncertainty both nonsequentially "out of
time" and mentally "out of space."

Rollo May describes the

.

.
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psychological anxiety inherent to the uncertainty of the
creative act,

"The breakthrough carries with it also an ele-

anxiety

rnsnt of

For it not only broke down my previous

.

hypothesis, it shook my self-world relationship.
time

At such

a

find myself having to seek a new foundation, the ex-

I

istence of which

I

as yet don't know

.

This is the source of

the anxious feeling that comes at the moment of the break-

through it is not possible that there be a genuinely new
idea without this shakeup occurring to some degree"
1980

,

p.

(May,

63)

The ability to seek and embrace paradoxical uncertainty can provoke an impetus for change and provide a well-

spring for creativity when further inspired and directed by
a

higher order purpose.

This is the "purposive" aspect of

the paradox of creative change in which uncertainty and

doubt contribute to

a

higher order commitment to resolve

a

problem and the higher order commitment to resolving the

problem intensifies the crisis of uncertainty and doubt.
Holton in his study of the creative achievements of Einstein
states,

"It is precisely their special sensitivity to con-

traries that has made it possible for them (creative scientists such as Einstein)

to do so and it is an utter neces-

sity that has made them demand nothing less for themselves"
(Holton,

1973, pp.

375-376)

As implied by Einstein,

in a

description of Planck, his own inner necessity (higher order

.
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purpose) was "the longing to behold that pre-established

harmony

.

.

."of which

he was a creative part (Holton,

1973, p. 377)
2

.

The paradoxical process of creativity is ultimate-

ly resolved by a second-order reconstruction or reframing of

the paradoxical opposition

construction" or

a

.

The creative process is a "re-

"re-framing" in that it involves

a

re-

organization and re-defining of the precedent structure of
knowledge.

It is a

"second-order" process in that it is not

merely the actualization of existing potential or the recombination of "first-order" possibilities which Reductionistic
theories account for but is the re-creating of potentiality
or the opening up of the "possibility of new possibilities"
at a more coherent level of construction.

Furthermore since

the paradoxical problem of irreducible oppositional differ-

ences requires a "second-order reconstructed solution,'

which utilizes and transf ormatively enhances the irreducible
oppositional differences, we use the terms "problem resolving" or "paradox resolving" rather than "problem solving" or

"paradox solving" which indicates a first-order reducing

away of the oppositional differences or merely the trivial

recombination of nonopposi tional differences as in the solution of simple arithmetic problems.

In the review of liter-

such as
ature we consider various constructive theories

creative
Duckworth (1979) and Petrie's (1979) theories of

12

learning, Koestler (1969) and Rothenberg's (1979) theories
of creative production,

Piaget's

theory of cognitive

(1977)

development, and Kuhn (1977) and Hesse's (1980) theories of
"theory change.

"

The main purpose of the review of litera-

ture shall be to show how each of these constructive theories resolves the paradox of creative change by a second-

order reconstructive integration of the oppositional differences of the first-order level.
3

The second-order reconstruction (reframing) of the

.

paradoxical process of creativity is essentially

a

metaphor-

ic process guided by a higher order integrative purpose.

Creativity is a paradoxical process of constructively coordinating oppositional differences toward

a

second-order

metaphoric reintegration of oppositional differences.

In

other words creativity is a paradoxical tension in search of
a

metaphoric resolution.

Furthermore this intense search

through the paradoxical leap of uncertainty is sustained and

guided by a higher order commitment to some integrative purpose of meaningful coherence which can serve as a greater

context for mediating the metaphorical reintegration of the

oppositional differences.
creative process,
p.

101)

.

As Perkins states concerning the

"Purpose shapes process"

Creative change is not just

metaphorical process but also involves

(Perkins,

1981,

special paradoxical/

a
a

special higher

encompasses and
order integrative purpose which coherently

13

directs the oppositional differences while remaining sealed
off from their incoherence.

As Parnes states,

"The creative

person usually doesn't know what he/she is going to do next,
but most probably knows why"

(Parnes,

1977).

Furthermore

"purpose" gives the creative process personal relevance

without which novelty may become merely silly or shocking

without significance.

The metaphoric resolution of the

creative process is provoked from within by the paradoxical
tension of its oppositional differences and evoked from

without by the lure of

a

higher order integrative purpose of

meaningful coherence such as "beauty," "goodness," "truthfulness," "utility," etc.

Furthermore the higher order

commitment to an integrative purpose with personal coherence
is not an

absolute commitment but

a

dynamic commitment that

paradoxically develops best with detachment and doubt.
May writes,

"To believe fully

(commitment) and at the same

moment to have doubts is not at all
presupposes

a

As

a

contradiction:

it

greater respect for truth, an awareness that

truth always goes beyond anything that can be said or done
at any given moment"

(May,

1980, p.

14).

In place of

"truth" we could substitute any integrative purpose of

meaningful coherence such as "beauty," "goodness," etc.
The creative resolution is "metaphoric" in that it is

not a homogeneous fusion, an additive composite or

a

hier-

archy of oppositional differences but rather is the second-

15

Co-ref lexivity is similar to Bohr's concept of "complemen-

tarity" in which the opposing perspectives of "light" as

either a "continuous wave" or a "discrete particle" are

mutually exclusive but equally necessary to

fuller under-

a

standing of the phenomena of light (Holton, 1973, pp. 115161).

The difference between "co-ref lexivity

and "comple-

"

mentarity" is that while Bohr maintains the mutually opposing perspectives of the "continuous wave" and the "discrete

particle" cannot be integrated simultaneously into one

conceptual picture without causing literal ambiguity and so
must be applied sequentially to yield

a

fuller approximate

understanding "co-ref lexivity " allows for the simultaneous
integration of mutually exclusive perspectives into

a

greater cognitive perspective which transforms the literal

ambiguity into

a

metaphoric enrichment.

For example binocu-

lar vision may be defined as co-reflexive since the right

eye's object of perception is co-defined in terms of the
left eye's contrasting perspective and vice-versa simultaneously.

Through the simultaneously cross-referenced differ-

ential of the contrasting monocular perspectives the deeper

more comprehensive perspective of binocular vision
structed.

Another example of co-ref lexivity

with the literary metaphor "society
metaphor the primary subject,

is

is a sea."

is

con-

provided
In this

"society," is explicitly per-

ceived in terms of the secondary subject,

'sea,

and

,

:
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implicitly vice-versa simultaneously.

Through the differen-

tial of these mutually contrasting perspectives new meta-

phoric insights are generated.
The metaphoric dialectic begins with the non-

dif ferentiated global unity of diffusely related co-

reflexive opposites and hierarchically returns with

a

second-order reintegration of the co-reflexive opposites at
a

higher level of differentiated unity.

The dialectical co-

ordination of the co-reflexive opposites is the process

whereby the opposites become defined and redefined more
coherently in terms of one another.

metaphoric dialectic involves

a

Hence each step of the

progressive delineation of

the oppositional differences of the co-reflexives toward
The metaphoric

greater levels of synchronous coherence.

dialectic is different from the Hegelian dialectic in that
it is a

"qualitative dialectic" in which the irreducible

qualitative differences are aesthetically transformed into
harmonious synchrony of contrapuntal qualities rather than
being clashed together in

a

fused synthesis.

(For sources

concerning "qualitative dialectics" to which the author is
indebted see Plato (1964)

,

and especially Murti (1968)

Mullen (1981)
.)

,

Slaatte (1968)

We offer a brief outline of

the five steps of the dialectical coordination of the co-

reflexive tendency toward metaphoric resolution which is

followed by examples

a
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I*

Global coordination

pressed as

a

.

The co-reflexive tendency is ex-

global interdependence of diffuse oppo-

sites which are seemingly randomly related.

The con-

fusion of this level leads to the absolute fixation of
the next level.
II.

Absolute differential coordination

.

The co-reflexive

tendency is expressed as the unilateral dependency of

disjoint polar opposites in which one predominates to
the neglect of the Other.

The one-sided incomplete-

ness of this level leads to the fuller completeness of
the next level.
III.

"Either/or" coordination

.

The co- reflexive tendency

is expressed as the negative independence of mutually

exclusive opposites which discontinuous ly interact.
The conflicting inconsistency of this level leads to

consistency of the next level.
IV.

"Both/and" coordination

.

The co-reflexive tendency is

expressed as the conditional dependence of relative
opposites which are continuously related to form
composite.

a

The bland consistency of this level leads

to the enriching coherence of the next level.
V.

"Neither/nor" metaphoric coordination

.

The co-

reflexive tendency is expressed as the second-order

interdependence of metaphoric opposites which are
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simultaneously reintegrated within

a

greater context

of synchronous coherence.

Prototypical Examples of the
Metaphoric Dialectic
-

Next we shall consider four prototypical examples

which exemplify the five steps of the metaphoric dialectic.
The first two prototypes are an idealization of the five

steps of progressively complex perception leading to binocular vision and the five steps of interpretation leading to
full metaphoric insight.

The second two prototypes are

psychologically researched examples of the five steps of
Piagetian equilibration leading to the integrated understanding of the simultaneous backward spinning and forward

projection of a ping pong ball and the five steps of the
terminally ill patient coming to fully accept dying as an
integral part of living.
In the first example we shall consider how the co-

reflexively opposing perspectives of the front view of

a

cylinder as circular versus the side view as rectangular are
dialecticaly coordinated toward the more complex three di-

mensional perspective (binocular vision) of

a

metaphorically

integrated cylinder:
I.

Global coordination

:

The co-reflexive perspectives of

the rectangular and circular views are diffusely inte-

grated in a blurred vision of the anomalous cylinder.
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*

Absolute differential coordination

;

The blurred

vision of the anomalous cylinder is absolutely
differ-

entiated into

a

static monocular perception of the

cylinder as a circular shape to the neglect of its

rectangular shape or vice-versa.
111

•

"Either/or" coordination

:

The incomplete "circular"

view of the anomalous cylinder leads to

a

conflicting

monocular perception of the cylinder as "either"
circular "or" rectangular to the discontinuous mutual

exclusion of each other.
IV.

"Both/and" coordination

;

The paradox of the conflict-

ing monocular views leads to a relative monocular view
of the anomalous cylinder as "both" circular "and"

rectangular in continuous additive composition.
The anomalous cylinder is monocularly perceived as

merely the additive composite of the two different
flat views of the same object.
V.

"Neither/nor" metaphoric coordination

.

The metaphoric

binocular perception of the anomalous cylinder is
"neither" a flat circular view "nor" a flat rectangu lar view either singularly or in additive composition

but rather the simultaneous reintegration of their

interdependent differences within the fuller perspective of the cylinder's three dimensional depth.

higher-order commitment to

a

The

greater perspective of

:
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coherent perception compells the search for

a

meta-

phoric reintegration of the paradoxically contrasting
perspectives.

The second-order perspective of object

depth that is paradoxically invisible to the other
levels of perception is fully visible through

a

meta-

phoric reintegration.
In the second example we shall consider how the co-

reflexive opposites of "hands" versus "bandage" in the literary metaphor,
hurt?"

"How long can my hands be a bandage to his

(Plath, 1971, p.

50)

are dialectically coordinated

through a second-order level of genuinely novel metaphoric
insight
I.

Global coordination

.

The co-reflexive opposites of

the primary subject, hands, and the secondary subject,

bandage, are diffusely integrated with the initial
global impression.
II.

Absolute differential coordination

neglect of the secondary subject,

HI.

The primary sub-

"hands," is differentially fixated on to the

ject,

versa

.

"bandage," or vice-

.

"Either/or" coordination

.

The differentiated primary

subject category of human "hands" is literally identified with the differentiated secondary subject cate-

gory of nonhuman "bandage" thus provoking

a

logical

paradox because of their categorical differences.

The
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metaphor is interpreted as "either" hands "or" bandage
in mutually exclusive, discontinuous conflict.
"

Both/and " coordination

The logical paradox of the

.

previous literal interpretation

is

rationally reduced

to a simile interpretation in which the pre-existing

hidden points of similarity are merely made more explicit.

The metaphor restated as a simile becomes,

"How long can my hands be like a bandage to his hurt."
This simile interpretation provides for logical con-

sistency but at the expense of reducing the tensive
richness of the metaphor to a bland additive composite
of the common attributes shared by

"and" bandage

.

"both" the hands

For example the hands are interpreted

as like the bandage in terms of the pre-existing

common physical attributes of color and texture and
the abstract functions of holding and protecting.
V.

"Neither/nor" metaphoric coordination

.

The metaphoric

interpretation is not merely reducible to pre-existing
common points of similarity between the "hands" and
"bandage" but rather through their aesthetically

contrasting differences

a

genuinely novel restructur-

ing of their similarities is provoked.

A new meta-

phoric meaning is not created in spite of their

antagonistic differences in category as with the
"both/and" level but because of their highlighted
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differences in category.

The

"hands" are not merely

like a bandage but rather there is a simultaneous

interpenetration or inter— ref lection of their enhanced
differences at

which

"...

a

more coherent aesthetic level in

the hands take on some of the soft,

swathing and encircling qualities of the bandage, and
the bandage takes on the strength and adherence of the

hands"

(Rothenberg, 1979, p.

257).

Through this

interpenetrating reflection of opposites

a

genuinely

novel metaphoric identity is conceived which is para-

doxically reducible to "neither" the identity of the
hands "nor" the bandage either separately in discontinuous conflict or together in a continuous additive

composition but rather is the simultaneous reintegration of their interdependent differences within the

greater context of aesthetic unity.

commitment to

a

The higher-order

greater context of coherent meaning

compels the search for

a

metaphoric reintegration of

the paradoxically opposing categories.

The second-

order figurative insight that is paradoxically invisible to the other levels of interpretation is fully

visible through

a

metaphoric interpretation.

In the next example we reinterpret an experiment by

Piaget (1976, pp. 46-81) of how five to twelve year old

children come to fully equilibrate the paradoxical movement

.
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of a pingpong ball which is projected forward with
backward
spin,

stops
I*

so that it returns to its base once the forward motion
:

Global coordination

(Piaget's equilibration stage IA)

The child's pushing and pulling finger action on the

ball are not differentiated.

The ball magically

returns by itself.
II.

Absolute differential coordination (Piaget's equili-

bration stage IB).

The child's pushing is differenti-

ated to the neglect of pulling.

The returning of the

ball is somehow connected with the child's pushing.
III.

"Either/or" coordination (Piaget's equilibration
stages IIA to IIB)

.

The differentiation of the

child's pushing and pulling finger action leads to

a

paradoxical conflict between the child's action and
the object's motion.

The child's description of the

supposed forward roll of the ball is in contradiction

with the description of the actual pulling back of the
fingers which causes a backward spin on the ball.

In

the beginning the subject distorts this conflict by

continuing to misperceive the motion of the ball as
rolling forward to the neglect of its forward slide

with a backward spin.

As the child perceives how

their fingers pulling back action causes a back spin
on the ball the conflict between "either" the actual
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backward spin "or" the supposed forward roll in
mutual

exclusion becomes apparent.
IV

*

"Both/and" coordination
IIB)

.

(Piaget's equilibration stage

The further coordination of the child's pushing

and pulling leads to the reciprocal influence of the

child's action on the object's motion.

The child

causally understands that the pushing and pulling
action results in "both"

a

sliding forward "and"

a

sliding backward motion which are combined in continuous succession by the turning around of the ball at
its furthest outreach.

The ball successively spins

backward, slides forward, turns around and finally
slides back in one continuous movement.
V.

"Neither/nor" metaphoric coordination (Piaget's equi-

libration stage III)

.

In the final coordination the

subject's pushing and pulling are understood as two

simultaneously opposing aspects of one cojunct action.
The movement of the ball is "neither"

a

sliding for -

ward "nor" a sliding backward in discontinuous conflict or continuous succession but rather the per-

ceived backward spin of the ball is simultaneously

reintegrated with the perception of the forward
sliding within the greater context of

conserved movement.

a

singularly

We further maintain that the

child's higher order commitment to the meaningful

s
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coherence of the applied motion to the ball, implied

within the context of the experiment, compels the
search for a metaphoric resolution to the paradoxical

movement of the ball.

The second— order cognitive

insight that is paradoxically invisible to the other

cognitive levels is fully visible through

a

metaphoric

reconstruction.
The final example is a reinterpretation according to

the metaphoric dialectic of the stages of dying taken from

Kubler-Ross
Ross,

'

s

1969).

research with terminally ill patients (KublerThis example depicts how patients developmen-

tally coordinate the oppositional differences between their

attitudes of living versus dying to

a

final stage of accept-

ing dying as an integral part of living:
I.

Global coordination (Kubler-Ross
"Oh no!"

'

s

stage 1A,

shock).

When the patients first receive the over-

whelming news of their terminally ill disease they go
into a state of shock, confusion and numbness.
II.

Absolute differential coordination (Kubler-Ross
stage IB, denial).

"No,

not me, it cannot be true."

The patients deny dying and cling to living.

patients may maintain that there is

a

The

mistake in the

diagnosis or a case of mistaken identity.

The aware-

ness of dying is isolated or split off from the

awareness of living.

'

At one time the patients

s
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acknowledge dying and at another time unconsciously
forget it.

HI*

"Either/or" coordination (Kiibler-Ross
anger).

"Oh yes,

why me?"

it is me,

'

s

stage

2,

it is not a mistake, but

The patients angrily confront the discon-

tinuity of the seemingly mutually exclusive conflict
that "either" they are dying "or" they are living

.

The patients displace their anger with resentment that

others will remain healthy and alive while they must
die prematurely.

God is a special target for the dis-

placed anger, since He is regarded as imposing, arbitrarily, the death sentence.
IV.

"Both/and" coordination (Kiibler-Ross
"Yes me, but."

ing).

'

s

stage, bargain-

The patients accept "both" the

desire to live "and" the fact of dying but strike bargains to postpone dying.

They want the convenient

sequential continuity of first extending their life
then lastly facing the inevitability of death.
V.

"Neither/nor" metaphoric coordination (Kubler-Ross
stage

4,

preparatory depression, stage

5,

'

acceptance),

"yes, me

...

right."

First the patients mourn past losses, things

my time is very close now and it's all

not done, wrongs committed.

But then they enter a

state of "preparatory depression," mournfully letting
go of all attachments and getting ready for the
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arrival of death.

This preparatory phase of letting

go allows the second-order shift from bargaining
to

the full acceptance of death.
is

With acceptance there

"neither" a clinging to life "nor"

of death

a

postponement

Kubler-Ross describes it as "not

.

stage, but neither is it unhappy.

happy

a

It's devoid of

feelings but it's not resignation, it's really
tory"

(1975, p

.

10).

a

vic-

The patients at this final stage

accept dying as an integral part of living.

contemplate their coming end with

a

They

quiet expectation

that allows them to die with peace and dignity.

Throughout the stages and especially important for the
shift from bargaining through preparatory depression to ac-

ceptance the patients maintained a higher-order commitment
to a meaningful resolution to their conflict.

This higher-

order commitment takes on many forms such as hoping for

miracle cure by

a

a

greater power such as medical technology

or God or trusting in the greater fullness of life or the

fulfillment of God's greater will.

Within the greater con-

text of this higher order commitment the patients came to

accept dying as a precondition for fully living.
Kiibler-Ross
of dying that

I

(1975, p.

145)

further writes,

"The stages

have described apply equally to any signifi-

cant change (e.g., retirement, moving to

a

new city, chang-

ing jobs, divorce) in a person's life and change is a
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regular occurrence in human existence."

We may experience

the stages of shock, denial, anger, bargaining and
finally

creative acceptance of change for any significant change.
In a deep structural sense the stages of dying may be taken

as symbolic of all creative change.

Kiibler-Ross along with

Imara (1975, pp. 147-167) writes that in order to creatively

change and grow we must continuously die to the old and be
reborn to the new, much as
fly.

a

caterpillar becomes

a

butter-

Thus in coming to creatively accept our ultimate

physical death as the final stage of earthly growth we can
also learn to creatively accept the lesser symbolic death of
an old way of being or doing as a key to a new way of life.

We must die to stereotypical conditioning and societal

expectations that we may become more fully our uniquely
original selves.

Furthermore the qualitative shift from the

destruction of an old form to the restructuring of a new
form requires creative courage especially when that form is

central to our self-construct.

higher-order commitment to

a

This creative courage is a

more meaningfully coherent

resolution which allows detachment from the old conflicting

differences and the reintegration of
embraces the differences.

a

new form which

We propose that the creative

process of symbolic death (de-structuring) and rebirth (restructuring) may be delineated and explicated according to
the metaphoric dialectic.

The metaphoric dialectic
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maintains that we are simultaneously dying to the old and
being reborn to the new each moment but do not actively
realize this creative capacity.
phoric
the

dialectic offer

a

The five steps of the meta-

developmental path for realizing

higher-order nature of our creativity

.

From the naive

global awareness of the incoherence of living and dying to
an old way of being (awakening of the urge for creative

change)

to the denial or neglect of the need to die to an

,

old way of being (resistance to creative change), to the

conflict of living versus dying for an old way of living
(confronting the inherent conflict of creative change)

,

to

the reductionistic compromise of postponing dying to the old

way of being (rationalizing away the conflict of creative
change)

,

to the final reintegration of dying to an old way

of being while simultaneously living or being reborn to a

new way of being (fully accepting the conflict of creative
change)

,

much as

a

baby dies to the womb of the mother and

is reborn to the mother's open embrace.

Rationale
The vital significance of the study of creativity for

education has been documented by various researchers
(Parnes,

1967)

(Torrance, 1965, 1967)

(Guilford,

1967).

creaGuilford stresses that the educational implications of

culture
tivity go beyond the mere transmission of the given

—

:
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with its growing problems to the transformation of
culture
and the ongoing resolution of its societal problems.

Guilford states,

Thus creativity is the key to education in

its fullest sense and to the solution of mankind's most

serious problems"

(Guilford,

1967, p.

13).

Whitehead acclaims the fundamental epistemological importance of creativity as,

".

.

.

the ultimate behind all

forms, inexplicable by forms, and conditioned by its crea-

tures

.

.

.

.

'

Creativity

'

is

the universal of universals

characterizing ultimate matter of fact" (Whitehead, 1960,
pp.

30-31).

Creativity as the "universal of universal"

epistemological form cannot be reduced to or explained by
other forms than its own.

Rather creativity itself is the

fundamental epistemological form by which the creation of
all knowledge is explicated.

Concerning the epistemological genesis of novel creations Piaget writes
I consider the main problem of genetic epistemology to be the explanation of the construction of novel
The central
ties in the development of knowledge.
problem of genetic epistemology concerns the mechanism
of this construction. ... A great deal of work remains
to be done in order to clarify this fundamental process
of intellectual creation, which is found at all the
levels of cognition, from those of earliest childhood to
those culminating in the most remarkable of scientific
inventions (Piaget, 1971, pp. 77-78).
.

.

.

.

.

.

The main rationale for doing this dissertation is to "clarify this fundamental process of intellectual creation," that
is,

provide an explication of the epistemological mechanism

,
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of the construction of novelties by further abstracting
the

metaphoric process inherent to the constructive theories of
Piaget and others.

Method of Inquiry
The method of this inquiry shall be the theoretical

construction and validation of

a

more epistemologically ade-

quate theory of the creative process.
have proposed the need for

a

Various researchers

more comprehensive epistem-

ologically adequate theory of creativity rather than piecemeal reductionistic approaches
1971,

chapter

5)

(Bateson, 1979)

(Pascal-Leone, 1974, p. 89)

(Maslow,

(Piaget,

1970).

We shall construct an epistemologically comprehensive defi-

nition of the central paradox of the creative process and

propose

a

general metaphoric resolution.

Literature con-

cerning the creative process of learning, production,

development and theory change shall be reviewed to further

exemplify the epistemological paradox of creativity in terms
of the polarization of theories into Reductionistic and

Holistic camps and the resolution of this paradoxical

controversy by various constructive theories which are
essentially metaphoric in nature.
The validity criteria for a more epistemologically

adequate theory of the creative process are:

(1)

the coher-

ent resolution of the paradox of the creative process
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(2)

the generalizability of the resolution across the di-

verse domains of creative learning, production, development
and theory change as indicative of a higher order unitary

process with diverse expressions, and

(3)

the self-

consistency of the formulation of the "metaphoric theory"

with its own formulation of the "metaphoric process."

More

concisely the criteria of conceptual validity are "coherence,"

"

comprehensiveness "

consistency

.

"

(generalizability) and

In order to provide a

"

self -

"coherent resolution"

of the epistemological paradox of the creative process the

proposed theory shall account for both "genuine novelty" and
"explicable order" in the creative process.

We shall pro-

pose a theory of creativity which coherently accounts for

both "genuine novelty" and an "explicable order" and

is

general izable across diverse domains of creativity.

Fur-

thermore this theory is self-consistent in that it is
"metaphoric theory" about a "metaphoric process."

a

Both the

"metaphoric theory" and the "metaphoric process" satisfy the
same metaphoric requirements of coherently integrating

oppositional differences.
"metaphoric theory" is

a

Just as the formulation of the

coherent integration of the opposi-

tional differences of Holism and Peductionism the formulation of the "metaphoric process" is

a

coherent integration

of the oppositional differences of conceptual opposites.

The self-consistency requirement allows us to explicate the
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metaphoric form of creativity according to its own metaphoric form without reducing it to a lesser explanatory form

which is epistemologically inadequate (Whitehead, 1960, pp.
30-31)

.

Additionally we shall provide an interpretive

application of the metaphoric dialectic to various domain
examples to indicate its functional utility and empirical

corroboration.

The goal of the proposed method of inquiry

is neither to

"Reductionistically " eliminate nor "Holistic -

ally" mystify the fundamental paradox of the creative process but rather to transformatively resolve and enhance the

paradox with

a

more elegant, metaphoric theory which is co-

herent, comprehensive and self-consistent.

.

:

CHAPTER

I

I

PROPOSAL OF THE PARADOX AND CONSTRUCTIVE
RESOLUTION OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS
A central question concerning creative change is,

does genuinely novel knowledge come into being?"

question has created

a

This

fundamental paradox in epistemology

and psychological theory (Kaplan 1981)
77-78)

"How

(Piaget, 1971, pp

(Plato, Meno 80E; Jowett translation).

To Plato be-

longs the classical statement of this paradox:
You argue that a man cannot enquire about that which he
knows or about that which he does not know; for if he
knows, he has no need to inquire; and if not, he cannot;
for he does not know the very subject about which he is
to inquire.
(Plato, Meno 80E, Jowett translation)
This has been called the mystery /mastery complex by modern

psychologists (Kaplan, 1981) for it appears to be

a

mystery

as to how radically new knowledge is mastered.

Consider the following restatement of Plato's paradox
in terms of the creative process

We can neither inquire into the genuine creativity of
that which is already created nor into that which is not
yet created.
If it is already created then all we can
do is make trivial recombinations and extensions which
If it is not created in some
are not genuinely novel.
created "ex nihilo" and
is
pre-existing form then it
from happy coinciresulting
hence is a radical novelty
dence or mysterious inspiration into which we can not
Hence we can neither inquire into the
further inquire.
genuine creativity of that which is already created for
it is merely a trivially novel composite nor into that
which is not created previously for it is an inexplicable radically novel gestalt.
34
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This paradox of the creative process may be
further

elaborated in dilemma form:
The creative process is either continuous (Reductionism)
or discontinuous (Holism)
If continuous then it is an
explicable but trivial extension or recombination of its
precedent.
If discontinuous then it is a radical novelty but inexplicably related to its precedent.
Therefore, the creative process is either a trivially novel
composite with an explicable transitional order or a
radically novel gestalt with an inexplicable transitional order.
.

This dilemma is similar to Zeno's dilemma of "motion"
in which the arrow either trivially never reaches the target

because it is always sequentially halfing the remaining distance (Reductionism) or it simultaneously merges with the

target and its transition is inexplicable (Holism)
1975)

(Le Guin,

.

The ancient controversy of "Reductionistic Continuity"

versus "Holistic Discontinuity" appears to represent comple-

mentary themes which cut across

a

variety of disciplines

concerned with the conceptualization of creative change such
as geology

(

uniform! tarianism versus catastrophism)

,

physics

(uniform wave distribution versus indeterminate quantum
jumbs)
tion)
tion)

,

,

biology (gradual adaptation versus spontaneous muta-

political science (gradual progress versus revoluand the history of science

versus paradigm shift)

(accumulation of knowledge

(Bochner, 1973)

(Holton,

1973)

.

Most

recently Brim and Kagan (1980) have revived this controversy

with the new book. Constancy and Change in Human Development
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which argues that "continuity" and "discontinuity" are
convenient cultural constructs not necessarily inherent to the

phenomena of human development itself.
Before going further it is important to clarify the

different conceptual implications of the "paradox" statement
and "dilemma" statement concerning the problematic nature of
the creative process.
darned if

The dilemma is a "damned if you do,

you don't" condition.

Whether we conceptually

chose "continuity" or "discontinuity" we are caught by one
of the dilemma's horns of "trivial novelty" or "inexplicable

genesis."

We suffer a negative consequence by either choice

but at least we have a choice.

On the other hand the para-

dox rejects the limited choice and states neither possibility is tenable and thus provokes the search for a higher

order possibility which is

a

more adequate reconstruction of

the problem.

Given the logical soundness of the dilemma, ironically,

both positions are "true" and correct in their respec-

tive criticisms of each other.

However, their "either/or"

relationship becomes "false" with the arbitrary assumption
that the creative process is absolutely limited to a dicho-

tomous relationship between continuity and discontinuity

which is mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive.

We re-

ject the absolute limitation of the dilemma and accept the

validity of the paradox which provokes the consideration of
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a

higher order possibility which is not merely

a

"both/and"

compromise of middle range possibilities between the incom-

mensurate extremes of continuity and discontinuity but

is a

genuine second-order reintegration of their irreducible

oppositional differences.

This second-order possibility

which we shall term "constructive" creativity

is

neither

absolutely continuous nor absolutely discontinuous.
it is neither a mere

Hence

"trivial novelty" with an "explicable

generation" nor an absolute "radical novelty" with an "inexplicable generation.

"

Rather constructive creativity

escapes the horns of the dilemma of either "trivial novelty"
or an "inexplicable generation" by constructively harnessing

the paradoxical bull of a "genuinely novel structure" with
an "explicable generation."

The new definition of the theory of "constructive"

creativity is itself a "reconstruction" of the opposing
theories of "Reductionistic Continuity" and "Holistic Dis-

continuity."

Hence the theory of constructive creativity is

self-consistently defined by its own process of constructive
creativity.

This is not a vicious circularity but rather a

confirmation of the adequacy of the definition to account
for its own constructive creation.

As Whitehead states

creativity is the "universal of universals" explanatory
forms

(I960,

p.

31).

It cannot be reduced to a more funda-

mental explanation but rather must be explained in its own

.
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terms.

In the review of literature we shall consider vari-

ous constructive theories of creativity from the domains of

learning, production, development and theory change which

represent a paradoxical reconstruction of the theoretical
dilemma of Reductionism versus Holism within their respective domain.

Piaget in conclusion to the Genetic Epistemology

stresses the fundamental importance of providing an explanation for the construction of novelty,

"...

I

consider the

main problem of genetic epistemology to be the explanation
of the construction of novelties in the development of know-

ledge"

(Piaget, 1971, p.

77).

Furthermore, the explanation

of novelty presents certain dilemmas concerning "genesis"

(Piaget, 1970, pp.

8-9)

and the irreducible structural

property of knowledge (Piaget, 1970, pp. 60-62).

Basically

these dilemmas elaborate the dilemma of the creative process

already presented.

They are concerned with how to under-

stand the coming into being of genuinely novel structure

without reducing the creative process to

a

novelty which is

explicably trivial and structureless in genesis (Empiricist)

,

trivial and nonexplainable by genesis

Matura tionis t

)

,

(Nativist and

or radical and inexplicable in genesis

(Radical Emergentist)
The empiricist explains novelty as the genesis of

atomistic associations.

However this novelty is trivial and
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structureless.

Piaget states,

view, a 'discovery'

"From the empiricist point of

is new for the person who makes

it,

but

what is discovered was already in existence in external
reality and there is therefore no construction of new

realities"

(Piaget,

1971, p.

77).

The nativist and maturationis t assume the preformation
of structure.

For instance, Plato posits universal ideas,

Kant--a priori ideas, Husserl

— essences,

syntactic laws genetically hard wired.

and Chomsky

— innate

However, these

structures are nonexplainable by genesis and hence are trivial novelties with a predetermined nature.

Piaget states,

"The nativist or a priorist maintains that the forms of

knowledge are predetermined inside the subject and thus
again,
1971

,

strictly speaking, there can be no novelty"
p.

77)

(Piaget,

.

The vitalist and emergentist explain novelty in terms
of the radical emergence of new knowledge.

For instance the

Gestaltists such as Kohler and Wertheimer assume the pre-

existence of perceptual and cognitive wholes which emerge in
totality from a complex field without preparatory genesis.
This process is equivalent to the radical emergence of a

preformed hidden figure from a figure/ground complex.
you don't see it, now you do.

Piaget writes,

".

.

Now

Concerning the Gestaltist

.by viewing

the whole as prior to its

elements or contemporaneous with their 'contact,' they

"
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simplified the problem to such an extent as to risk
bypassing the central questions— questions about the
nature of a

whole's laws of composition" (Piaget, 1971,

p.

8).

For the

"radical emergent" theory of Foucault's archeology of ideas

Piaget writes,
is,

"The message of this

'archaeology' of reason

in short, that reason's self-transformations have no

reason and that its structures appear and disappear by fortuitous mutations and as a result of momentary upsurges
(Piaget,

1971, p. 134).

Piaget further likens this fortui-

tous process to the early vitalist theories of evolution.

Hence the theories of emergence reduce the creative process
to a radical novelty which is either inexplicable or left

unexplained.
In contrast to the previous theories Piaget writes

concerning constructivism:
for the genetic epistemologist knowledge results
from continuous construction, since in each act of
understanding, some degree of invention is involved; in
development, the passage from one stage to the next is
always characterized by the formation of new structures
which did not exist before, either in the external world
The central problem of geneor in the subject's mind.
tic epistemology concerns the mechanism of this con(Piaget, 1971, pp. 77-78)
struction of novelties
.

.

.

,

.

.

.

Hence for Piaget the creative process is essentially char-

acterized by

a

genuinely novel structure which did not

previously exist in the world or the subject's mind and an
explicable mechanism of genesis.

mechanism of construction is

a

For Piaget this explicable

dialectical process of
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"equilibration" or "reflexive abstraction.

"

Piaget dis-

tinguishes the dialectics of equilibration from the Hegelian

dialectic (Vuyk, 1981, pp. 183-4).

Whereas the Hegelian

dialectic is concerned with the clash of opposites and their
synthesis the Piagetian dialectic is more concerned with the
fusion of integrated differences which may not necessarily
clash.

For example, according to Piaget numbers are con-

structed by the integrative fusion of the different schemes
of class-inclusion and ordering.

This "fusion" of two

different but nonclashing schemes creates an integration of
differences which goes beyond the characteristics of the

previous relation of the schemes.

Hence genuinely novel

structures are constructed by the explicable mechanism of

dialectical equilibration.

Furthermore, according to Piaget

all structures are fundamentally characterized as logico-

mathematical (Piaget, 1971, Chapter II).
Thus far we have reviewed the fundamental problematic

nature of the creative process in terms of the paradox and
falsely limiting dilemma that it presents for theorists.

We

have proposed a theory of constructive creativity which

escapes the horns of the "false dilemma" of "trivial novelty" and "inexplicable sequential genesis."

Negatively

defined constructive creativity is the generation of genuine
novelty which is neither reducible to the trivial novelty of
repetition, displacement, recombination, extension,
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addition, cumulation, or discovery nor the opposing
terms of

radical novelty such as rupture, replacement, mutation,
emergence, substitution, sporadic episode, or invention.

Positively defined constructive creativity resolves the

paradox of creativity by proposing the essential preconditions of both ""genuinely novel structure" and an "explicable genesis."

We shall next consider the functional nature

of this explicable order.

The Second-Order Resolution
- of
the Paradox of Creativity
As Piaget states constructive creativity is essentially
a

second-order process of reconstructing previous structures

or recreating previous creations

(Piaget,

1972,

p.

17).

This second-order process of recreating does not merely

actualize a given potential for creativity but rather dynamically creates new potential for creativity.

Furthermore,

according to Piaget constructive creativity is an "interactive" relation between the subject and environment (Piaget,
1969, pp.

703-4).

Recreating our relation with our environ-

ment, personal or impersonal, is the
tivity.

"

central act " of crea-

Through the central act of recreating our relation

with our environment we and our environment are recreated.
This recreating is not a creation ex nihilo, rather it is a

recreation of a previous creation.

Moreover,

it is not the

mere discovery of pre-existing patterns, rather it

is

the
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recovery and reconstruction of patterns through
interacting
with our environment.
Next we will examine how second-order recreating is

constructed through and beyond first-order creating.

First-

order creating constitutes the creative possibilities for

change within a first-order system.

Second-order recreating

constitutes the recreating or expanding of the creative possibilities of the first-order system.

Second-order recreat-

ing opens up the possibility of new possibilities that did

not exist previously.

Hence the second-order recreating

appears paradoxically impossible from the perspective of

first-order creating because a new order of possibilities

opened up.

is

Genuine creativity is not merely a matter of low

probability or low frequency but rather

is

an impossible

second-order occurrence unpredictable in its originality
from first-order antecedent conditions.

Hence we can begin

to account for the qualitative discontinuous changes in

"aha" experiences, cognitive transitions and paradigm shifts
in science in terms of second-order recreating.

second-order recreating is not

a

This

linear sequential ordering

of trivial novelty nor an inexplicable rupture of radical

novelty but rather an explicable second-order of genuine
novelty.

The full explanation of this second-order recreat-

ing will need to await our consideration of dialectics and

metaphor.
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Figure

1.

Nine dot problem.
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A simple example of second— order recreating is
given
by Watzlawick (1974, p.
(see figure

1)

.

in terms of the nine dot problem

24)

The problem is to connect the nine dots by

four straight lines without lifting the pencil from the

paper.

The reader who is not familiar with this problem may

find it instructive to try the solution on a piece of paper

before reading on, and especially before turning to the
solution (see Figure 2).
As Watzlawick states:

Almost everybody who first tries to solve this problem
introduces as part of his problem-solving an assumption
which makes the solution impossible.
The assumption is
that the dots compose a square and that the solution
must be found within that square, a self-imposed condition which the instructions do not contain.
His failure, therefore, does not lie in the impossibility of the
task, but in his attempted solution.
(1974, p. 25)
Hence, based on a limited interpretation of this open ended

problem the problem solver may try all the possible combinations within the square and yet always finish with one un-

connected dot.

This means that all the first-order creative

possibilities generated by this limited interpretation are
insufficient to resolve the problem.

Furthermore, as

Watzlawick states the attempted solution has become the
problem and merely attempting more of the same first-order
change keeps one from recreating the problem which is necessary for the resolution.

Through sensitivity to and a re-

construction of the conflicting ambiguity of the instructions concerning the limits of the solution within the self-
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Figure

2.

The solution of the nine-dot problem.

:
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imposed square versus not just within the square there
is a
shift from attempting impossible first-order problem solutions to constructing possible second— order problem resolutions.

This second-order shift represents a breaking out of

the square of inadequate possibilities into a new field of

possibilities outside the square.

The possibility of new

possibilities is opened up with the second-order "reframing"
of the problem and hence resolution becomes possible at this

new more inclusive level.
As Watzlawick states

The analogy between this and many a real-life situation
is obvious.
We have all found ourselves caught in comparable boxes, and it did not matter whether we tried to
find the solution calmly and logically or, as is more
likely, ended up running frantically around in circles.
But, as mentioned already, it is only from inside the
box, in the first-order change perspective, that the
solution appears as a surprising flash of enlightenment
In the second-order change perspecbeyond our control.
tive it is a simple change from one set of premises to
The one set includes
another of the same logical type.
the rule that the task must be solved within (assumed)
In other words, the solusquare; the other does not.
tion is found as a result of examining the assumptions
(Watzlawick,
"about" the dots, not the dots themselves.
1974 pp. 25-6)
,

Through

a

.

second-order reframing of the ambiguous opposi-

tional differences of the assumptions "about" the limiting

square of dots versus the nonlimiting dots "themselves" a

new field of possibilities is opened up which integrates the
inner square with the outer expanse.

What is impossible

from the first-order assumed possibilities becomes possible
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with

a

second-order reframing of the ambiguous terms of the

problem.

For a further discussion of how the exploration

and reframing of inherent ambiguities in the meaning of sup-

posedly absolute terms such as "parallel lines" and "solid
mass" may lead to new higher order creations such as non-

Euclidean geometry and the mathematical equivalence of
"mass" and "energy" with Einstein's E=mc
(1971, pp. 126-128)

see Bronowski

.

We may conclude that constructive creativity as a

second-order process of recreating (reconstructing) the inherent conflictive ambiguities of first-order structures is

neither trivially novel nor inexplicably radical.

Rather

constructive creativity resolves the paradox of creativity
by opening up the possibility of new possibilities with a

genuinely novel structure which is explicable by
order process.

a

second-

What is paradoxically impossible from the

combinatorial possibilities of the first-order becomes
explicably possible and genuinely novel with the secondorder transformation of constructive creativity.

CHAPTER

III

LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE PARADOX AND CONSTRUCTIVE
RESOLUTION OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS
In this chapter we shall examine how theories of crea-

tive learning, creative production, cognitive development

and scientific theory change have fallen prey to the false
dilemma of the creative process as either "trivial novelty"
(

Reduct ionism) or "inexplicable radical novelty"

(Holism).

Furthermore, we shall examine how the paradox of this false
dilemma is resolved by various theorists with constructive

models of the creative process.

The main purpose of this

review of literature is to show that essentially all the

constructive resolutions of genuine creativity involve the
functional coordination of first-order opposites leading to
a

second-order reintegration of the opposites

.

More specifically in section "A" we shall review how
the Romantic open school and the traditional cultural trans-

mission school have reduced "creative learning" to either
radical self-knowledge or trivial conditioning respectively.
Then we shall consider how the Progressive school inclusively resolves the paradoxical one-sidedness of the preceding

theories with constructive theories of learning such as

Duckworth's (1979) which proposes the constructive interplay
of conflicting differences between perceptions, actions, and
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words and Petrie's (1979) which proposes the constructive

interaction of metaphoric words and applied actions in tri-

angulating anomalies.
In section "B" we shall review how the psychological

theories of Behaviorism, Neo-Freudian and Gestaltism have

reduced "creative production" to trivial remote association,
radical irrational production, and radical emergent production respectively.

Then we shall consider how the paradoxi-

cal one-sidedness of the preceding theories is resolved by

constructive theories of creative production such as Koestler's

(1969)

which proposes the coordination of the oppo-

sites of bisociation or the intersection of incompatible

frames of reference which generate multiple levels of meta-

phoric insight and Rothenberg's

(1979a) which proposes the

active conception of opposites simultaneously in the Janusian thought processes and the assisting of homospatial

processes which generate new metaphoric integrations of the

Janusian opposites.
In section "C" we shall review how the developmental

theories of the Maturationists and Behaviorists have reduced

creative development to either radical spontaneous unfold-

ment or trivial incremental accumulation.

Then we shall

consider how the developmental theory of Piaget (1972) in-

clusively resolves the paradoxical one— sidedness of the

preceding theories with a constructive theory of development
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which proposes the progressive equilibration of asynchronous
schemes leading to

a

second-order reconstruction.

In section "D" we shall review how the theories of

scientific change of the Logical Positivist and the Historical Gestaltist have reduced scientific theory change to

either
shift.

a

trivial incremental change or a radical gestalt
Then we shall consider how the paradoxical one-

sidedness of the preceding theories is resolved by constructive theories of "theory change" such as Kuhn's revised

theory (1977) which proposes the "essential tension" between
old and new paradigms and propaedentic role of thought ex-

periments in exposing and harnessing the paradoxical anomalies of old paradigms and Hesse's

(1980)

which proposes the

functional explanation of metaphor to account for the necessary conflict of meaning in theory change.

Creative Learning
In this section on creative learning we raise the

question,
new?"

"How is it possible to learn something genuinely

We shall consider this question of creative learning

in terms of Plato's Paradox:

You agree that a man cannot inquire either about that
which he knows or about that which he does not know; for
if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he
cannot; for he does not know the very subject about
(Plato, Meno 80E; Jowett transwhich he is to inquire.
lation)
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This is a classical statement of the essential
paradox of
the creative process posed in terms of the learning of new

knowledge.

In terms of this paradox genuinely new learning

is reduced to either some trivial form of new learning such

as rote memorization or more generally associative learning

which is just

a

trivial extension however complex of what we

already know or some radical form of new learning such as

inspiration or more general gestalt types of learning which
emerge suddenly and totally without explainable precedence.
The Traditional and Romantic Schools
The educator's quest for intelligible principles and

techniques for understanding, stimulating and guiding the
creative learning process has become polarized by this
dilemma into two groups

:

the Traditional teacher-centered

classroom with its externally reinforced learning and
emphasis on cultural transmission and the Romantic student-

centered classroom with its subjective freedom for personal
discovery and emphasis on individuation.

The image of the

first classroom is that the pupil is an empty vessel pas-

sively waiting to be filled with new knowledge from the

master teacher.

The opposite image of the second classroom

is that the pupil is a flower which the teacher waters but

all the growing and learning comes from within.

In other

words the teacher may supply the pupil with what he is already interested in but the pupil is his own teacher and
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learning takes place through an internal process of selfdiscovery.

These two extreme theories appear to create an

unbridgeable dichotomy between the learning of new knowledge
as a passive impression imposed externally and as a subjec-

tive experience personally discovered from within.
The extreme one-sidedness of either of these theories

renders them incapable of explaining or developing an ade-

quate pedagogy for genuine creativity.

The "traditional"

school eliminates genuine creative learning and replaces it
with rote- memorization which is externally reinforced by the

authority of the teacher.

The

"free" school practically

eliminates the teacher and reduces creative learning to

a

vague subjective process of following one's inner impulses.
Plato's paradox indicates that if we only have what we sub-

jectively know then how can we know what we don't already
know, unless we admit unexplainable radical learning resulting from mysterious intuition.

In this case the paradox is

created by the conceptually contrived split between the subjective and objective worlds.

In other words the Rousseau-

ian pupil cannot get out of his subjective world to learn

what is objectively new.

How can we intelligibly bridge

this conceptual gap between the extremes of the externally

determined objective world of the "traditional

school and

the self-directed subjective world of the "Free" school?
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(For a related paradoxical problem of "freedom"
versus "dis-

cipline" in education see Schumacher (1979, pp. 120-128).
Neither school alone is able to account for truly creative learning because of their conceptual inadequacies.

Both perspectives of the inner and outer world are partially
valid and necessary for a genuine theory of creativity.

The

question remains as how to conceptually accommodate both
these contrasting views into an interactive theory of
(genuine creative)

learning that goes beyond merely objec-

tive rote memorization or subjective imagination.

Because we have presented

a very

concise review of the

distinguishing qualities of the Romantic and Traditional
schools it might be argued that we have contrived a simplistic polarization which serves as an easily demolished

strawman not really true to the complex nature of either
theory.

The purpose of the review is not to provide an

exhaustive account of the complexities and variations of
each theory but to focus on the essential qualities of each

and to show that these essential qualities when consistently

applied result in a false dilemma which

is

solving the paradox of creative learning.

incapable of reEclectic theories

which merely mix both qualities of the Romantic and Traditional theories result in epistemologically confused the-

ories of learning which are inconsistent with themselves.
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The Progressive School

Kohlberg and Mayer (1972, pp. 449-93) in "Development
as the Aim of Education" offer a third educational ideology,

"progressive," following Dewey (1938) which resolves the

dilemma of the Traditional school's trivially new complex
learning versus the Romantic school's radically new but un-

explainable learning.

Kohlberg and Mayer quote Dewey:

Only knowledge of the order and connection of the stages
in the development of the psychical functions can insure
the full maturing of the psychical powers.
Education is
the work of supplying the conditions which will enable
the psychical functions, as they successively arise, to
mature and pass into higher functions in the freest and
fullest manner.
(Dewey and McLellan, 1895, p. 207).

Kohlberg and Mayer go on to comment:
In the progressive view, this aim requires an educational environment that actively stimulates development
through the presentation of resolvable but genuine problems or conflicts.
For progressives, the organizing and
developing force in the child's experience is the
child's active thinking, and thinking is stimulated by
Educative exthe problematic, by cognitive conflict.
perience makes the child think--think in ways which
Although both the
organize both cognition and emotion.
cultural transmission and the progressive views emphasize "knowledge," only the latter sees the acquisition
of "knowledge" as an active change in patterns of think ing (italicized) brought about by experiential problemsolving situations.
(1972, pp. 454-5)

For progressives genuinely new learning is "an active

change in patterns of thinking" which arises through cognitive conflict with problematic situations.

Where the tradi-

tional cultural transmissionists are primarily concerned

with the content of the "patterns of thinking" the progressives are concerned with second-order recreating of the

.

"
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"patterns of thinking" themselves.

This second-order re-

creating of the "patterns of thinking" is genuinely new
since it entails an abrupt and total restructuring of the

thinking process which cannot be accounted for by gradual,
piecemeal, associative chaining.

However, this second-order

creative learning is not radically unexplainable from previous learning.

Rather it arises from the recreating of the

previous "pattern of thinking.

"

Furthermore the locus of

emergence is from cognitive conflict with

a

problematic

situation which challenges the old "patterns of thinking.
The Progressive School According to Duckworth

Duckworth (1979, pp

.

297-312)

offers a restatement of

the creative learning dilemma in terms of applying Piaget's

theory of cognitive development to education and provides
several excellent examples of genuinely creative learning in
the progressive sense.
is,

The dilemma as Duckworth states it

"Either We're Too Early and They Can't Learn It or We're

Too Late and They Know It Already

..."

(1979,

p.

297)

For Duckworth this dilemma of matching a specific closed

ended learning task with a diagnosed level of readiness is
futile not only because of the unmanageable complexities of

adequately accessing the child's readiness but because it
rests on falsely limiting assumptions about what "It" is and

how "It" is they should learn.
knowledge.)

(The

"It" refers to new

Whereas American educators, especially of the

"

.
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cultural transmission ideology, are primarily

concerned with

how fast we can help intelligence grow,

Piaget is more concerned with "how far we can help it grow"
(1979, p.

303)

Whereas the cultural transmissionists

attempt to engineer complex learning tasks that externally
reinforced preset rules of learning the progressivist

a

la

Duckworth style provide open ended problems which challenge
the child to generate their own new rules of learning.

For

Duckworth's open ended tasks the child is neither too early
to learn it nor too late and already knows it.

Rather they

find their own optimum level of entry from which to explore

multiple paths of resolution.

This stimulates the child to

"think of thinking about" the problem in alternative ways

and to generate new questions and rules from the interaction
These various inter-

of these alternative interpretations.

pretations may result from "the interplay among the various
access routes to knowledge--perception
or formulas"

(Duckworth, 1979, p.

311)

,

.

actions, and words
The interplay

between these various accesses broadens and deepens the
child's knowledge.
The process of stimulating the child to "think of

thinking about" the task in alternative conflicting inter-

pretations which broaden and deepen the child'

s

knowledge

is

well illustrated by a learning experiment of Greco's (1959)
as cited by Duckworth

(1979, pp.

301-3).

The task set-up

:

.
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consisted of three colored beads, black, white, and red,
threaded on a stick and inserted into a tube from left to
right.

Through clinical interviewing questions were posed

to stimulated cognitive conflict.
if red goes in first,

The children were asked

which color is at the right-hand end;

if the tube is rotated 180 degrees which color is at the

right-hand end, if the tube is rotated 180 degrees twice
which color is at the right-hand end?

Of course the ques-

tion which generated the cognitive conflict concerned the
double rotation since it brought the tube back to the original position with no change as opposed to the single rota-

tion which reversed the order of the beads.

The children

were stimulated to think of thinking about why the double
rotation and single rotation were opposite and why the
double rotation and nonrotation were the same.

The learning

experiment was carried out with four and five-year-olds who
did not initially understand the relationship between the

number of rotations and the positions of the beads.
Duckworth contrasts the children who trivially learn
the rule for double rotation with a child who genuinely

learns the rule

Since the data are so simple, all the children finally
But for many of them, the
do manage to get the rule.
rule for double rotation remains just that--a rule.
The one rule they understand
They see no sense in it.
is that, when the tube is turned once, the color changes
The double- rotation is learned only as an exception to
this rule, for some reason when you turn it twice, it

.
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doesn't change.
It is not a matter of changing twice,
and thus coming back to the original position.
It is—
for some inexplicable reason— a matter of not changing
at all.
The rule is formulated and remembered without
understanding
Other children do come to understand, but their understanding is clearly the result of their own struggle
to make sense of the data.
Dan (5 years, 5 months)
makes six wrong predictions in seven items of double
rotation.
He himself counts his mistakes on his fingers, and he declares, "I still made six mistakes."
"You haven't got it yet?"
"No, because when you turn
once, I know it changes color; but when you turn two
times, it's the same color, so I don't get it." At the
next session, the whole series is answered correctly,
and Dan exclaims:
"Oh yeah, when you turn two times
At the end of the session, Greco
it's the same color 1"
"Because the black that came there (to
asks him why.
the left end) comes back here (to the right end) when
you turn it the second time" (Greco, 1959, p. 129)
(Duckworth, 1979, pp. 301-2).
In this learning experiment Dan's conceptual predic-

tion is in conflict with his perceptual assessment of the

double rotation.

In the beginning this discrepancy no doubt

evokes surprise but with repetition the surprise gives way
Forman and

to a memorized rule for the double rotation.

Fosnot (1982, pp. 196-7) explain that mere surprise is not
in itself sufficient

(as

this case also illustrates)

to pro-

Rather the child must

exper-

voke cognitive restructuring.

ience" the task as a paradox unresolvable from the "given"

rules and structures of understanding.

Dan

s

learning of

verbal rule was not sufficient to resolve this paradox.
"hadn't gotten it yet."

a

He

He had merely learned the verbal

for the
rule for double rotation as an exception to the rule

single rotation.

The paradoxical conflict between the
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verbal rule that he memorized and his conceptual understanding brought him to the self-realization,

"I

don't get it."

He was still grappling with the discrepancy of how it is

possible for

a

double rotation to not change the order of

the beads when only a single rotation totally reverses the

order.

How can the beads be rotated so much yet remain

the same as before ?
By the beginning of the next session he had made a

second-order shift in his understanding of the rule.

Dan

had creatively gone beyond making correct predictions to

a

deepened understanding of why it "ought" to be that way.
This new knowledge incorporated both the verbal formula

which represented the perceptual assessment of the double

rotation and his initial conceptual prediction into

a

new

integrated scheme which was transferable to similar tasks.

According to Duckworth, in

a

later series of experiments

Greco showed that those who accomplished the second-order

learning were better able to transfer their learning to

similar tasks than those who merely memorized the rule.
In the first-order verbal learning the children merely

learned the double rotation as an exception to the rule of
the single rotation.

In the second-order learning Dan

learned the rule for the exception to the rule of the first
order rule.

.

.
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Second-order creative learning is not merely the
learning of new rules as the traditional cultural transmissionists propose.

Rather it is the learning of second-order

rules for the exceptions to the 1st order rules which result

from paradoxical conflicts in their interpretation and

application

.

Dan "got it" when he made this second-order

creative learning.

This second-order creative "got it with

understanding" resolves and goes beyond the dilemma posed by
the first-order associatively chained "it" of the tradition-

alists and the inexplainable "aha" of the Romanticist.
The Progressive School According to Petrie

Another proponent of the progressive school, Petrie,
offers the following response to the dilemma of creative
learning.
It can be claimed that the very possibility of learning
something radically new can only be understood by presupposing the operation of something very much like
This is not just the heuristic claim that
metaphor.
metaphors are often useful in learning, but the epistemic claim that metaphor, or something like it, renders
(Petrie,
intelligible the acquisition of new knowledge.

1979, p. 439)
He further indicates the constructive nature of metaphor:

"Thus understanding the process involved in construing meta-

phor is what makes intelligible the ability to learn some
and
thing new while admitting we must always start with what

how we already know"

(Petrie, 1979, p.

461)
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According to Petrie most learning occurs within
"context of rules or schemata"

(Petrie, 1979, p.

a

and

442)

genuinely novel learning changes the context of understanding itself.

Thus genuinely novel learning is a second-order

recontextualizing of the first-order rules or schemata of
learning.

Furthermore, metaphor or something functionally

like it is used to perform the second-order recontextuali za-

tion of learning.

For example, from the point of view of

the student just beginning atomic physics, the metaphor,
"the atom is a miniature solar system" may create a new con-

text for understanding both the atom and the solar system.
The literal interpretation of the metaphor creates an anom-

aly which either can or cannot be assimilated to the stu-

dent's cognitive structure.

If it can be assimilated to the

student's pre-existing cognitive structures then it is merely a comparative metaphor

(or first-order learning)

which

extends or transfers the literal features and analogical
relations of the orbits of the sun to the orbits of the
atom.

However, if it cannot be assimilated its anomalous

character may entail an interactive recreating of the cognitive relation of the atom and solar system.

For the inter-

active metaphor the similarities between "atom" and "solar

system" are not pre-existing.

Rather the similarities are

created and restructed through the interaction of both the
concept of "atom" and the concept of "solar system.

"

This
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interaction leads to

a

second-order recreating of the anom-

alous contextual relation of "atom” and "solar system" into

genuinely new metaphoric context of understanding.

a

This

new expanded metaphoric context incorporates both "atom" and
"solar system" into

a

higher order cognitive integration

without losing their distinctiveness.
According to Petrie the creative process of learning
something genuinely new in science

is

similar to the way

that a scientist resolves the anomalies of the traditional

paradigm with
states

a

new metaphoric exemplar or model.

Petrie

:

The main difference between the scientist on the frontiers of knowledge and the student is that in the
student's case the metaphor provided by the teacher, if
it is a good one, is likely to be more immediately helpful than are the variants tried out by the scientist.
(Petrie, 1979, p. 445).

The student's learning of relevant scientific metaphors is a

reenactment of the creative process the scientist used to
make the original discovery.
Stressing the interactive nature of metaphor Petrie

offers five steps in the contriving of an educational metaphor which leads to new knowledge:
1.

Sensing the problematic situation or anomaly.

2.

Providing the appropriate metaphor.

3

Conceiving the problematic situation in terms of the
provided metaphor.

.
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4.

Acting on the problematic situation in terms of the
new
metaphoric characterization.

5.

Modifying the provided metaphor to find

a

better fit.

These steps may be exemplified with the creative learning of
the scientific metaphor of "frames of reference.

The stu-

"

dent is initially introduced to the two opposing conditions
that on earth a chair may be understood as not moving yet
the chair is on the earth's surface and the earth is moving,
so isn't the chair moving.

How can the chair be moving and

not moving at the same time becomes the anomaly.

Of course

it is only an anomaly to the student provided the student

understands both of the conditions separately, and together
is not able to

resolve the discrepancy given his current

conceptual scheme.

To intensify the discrepancy the anoma-

lous situation may be generalized to other examples such as

how can a book be at rest on the seat of

a

car yet moving

from the point of view of someone outside the car.

student is provided with the metaphor,

Next the

"frame of reference."

Thirdly the anomalous situation is conceived in terms of the

metaphor as "the book's moving and not moving seem strange
only because the book is being observed from two different
frames of reference."

Fourthly, to creatively grasp the im-

plications of the metaphor and not merely memorize

a

verbal

formula the student will need to interact with the anomalous

situation using the new metaphor as a guide.

This may
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require thought experiments in imaging the chair
on the

earth's surface and the book on the car's seat as moving.
Or it may lead to an actual experiment of riding in a car

with a book.

Driving up a steep hill may cause the book to

slide back on the seat.

However from the frame of reference

of the outsider the car may merely appear to have moved

forward to where the book was.

This discrepancy between the

"book falling back on the seat"and "the car lunging forward"

will demand that the student decenter from his own frame of

reference and recognize the outside frame of reference also.
This may be further clarified with the thought experiment of

riding upward in an elevator and dropping a book.

Does the

book fall or does the floor of the elevator merely rise?

Through the student's guided interaction provided by the

metaphor of "frames of reference" with the anomalous situa tion of "dropping" a book in a "rising" elevator genuine new

knowledge is generated which resolves the anomaly.
dent may say,

"Ah,

The stu-

it depends on how you look at it."

This interactive process is more than the literal ap-

plication of the explicit definition of "frame of reference"
which assumes the student already grasps the concept of
"frame of reference" as an alternative point of view.

Rather it is a metaphoric application of the partial under-

standing of "frame of reference" which is reconstructed in
the process of interacting with the anomalous situation.

.
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Essentially this is

a

process of triangulating the anomalous

experience with the conceived metaphor and applied action.
This interactive process of metaphoric construction of new

knowledge may be judged not according to its truth or falsity but rather according to its success in resolving the

anomaly
Duckworth and Petrie in Comparison
Both Duckworth and Petrie propose interactive secondorder processes of resolving cognitive conflict and con-

structing new knowledge.

Duckworth stresses the construc-

tive interplay of differences between perceptions, actions,
and words in resolving cognitive conflict while Petrie

similarly stresses the interaction of metaphoric words and

applied actions in triangulating the anomaly.

For Duckworth

the constructive interplay of differences broadens and deepens knowledge while similarly for Petrie the interaction of

metaphor and applied actions expands the context of knowledge.

For Duckworth the broadening and deepening of know-

ledge causes the child to "think of thinking about the

world" in new ways.

For example in Greco's learning experi-

ment Dan learned to think of
the old rule of thinking.

a new rule to the exception of

Specifically he learned to simul-

tane ously coordinate the opposition of the changing order of
the beads with a single rotation with the nonchanging order
of the beads with a double rotation in terms of the second-
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order novel construction of the reversibility of double
rotation.

For Petrie the expanded context of knowledge is

termed a new metaphoric construction.

For example the

physics student learned to simultaneously coordinate the

opposition of the falling book with the rising elevator in
terms of the second-order metaphor of the relativity of the

double frame of reference

.

Both Duckworth and Petrie propose functionally similar

processes of constructing second-order knowledge.

We may

term this creative learning process the paradoxical interplay of differences between perceptions, actions and words

through which

a

second-order reintegration of these differ-

ences is constructed.

Creative Production
In this section on creative production we raise the

question,
new?"

"How is it possible to produce something genuinely

We shall consider this question in terms of the

dilemma of the creative process.

Various psychologists in

their quest for theoretical principles and techniques for

understanding, stimulating and controlling creative production have fallen prey to the false dichotomy of this dilemma.

They have either reduced creative production to

a

tri-

hidden
vial process of remote association of pre-existing,

similarities

(Behaviorists)

,

or a radical involuntary state

:
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of regression during which totally new ideas may
irrationally emerge from the unconscious

(Neo-Freudians), or a radical

gestalt shift of abrupt and total appearance of
duction without explicable genesis

(Gestaltist)

a
.

new proWe shall

contrast the indequacies of these three psychological
theories and present two other alternatives consistent with
the constructive definition of creative production.

The Behaviorists According to Mednick

According to Mednick of the behaviorist school an

associative interpretation of creativity may be given as
follows
We may proceed to define the creative thinking process
as the forming of associative elements into new combinations which either meet specified requirements or are in
some way useful.
The more mutually remote the elements
of the new combination, the more creative the process or
solution.
(Mednick, 1962, p. 221)

From this perspective creative production is the making of
new combinations with remote association.

Hence creativity

is generally reduced to the uncovering of hidden similari-

ties or terms of mediation between elements which are not

frequently associated.

For instance Mednick has developed a

test for measuring this ability called the Remote Associate
Task (RAT)

,

which is based on the ability to find

a

particu-

lar associate that is related on a purely associative basis
to each of three words which are presented

blue, cottage;

(2)

go,

poke, molasses;

(3)

(e.g.,

teen,

(1)

rat,

heart,

69

cookies.

Answers:

cheese,

(1)

(2)

slow,

(3)

sweet.)

Ac-

cording to Mednick the ability to find remote or obscure
similarities between these terms
production.

is

a

measure of creative

Mednick theorizes that the ability to fluently

generate multiple associates to each word increases the

likelihood of deriving

which lead to

a

a

continuous chain of associations

remote association.

From this behaviorist perspective creative production
is specifically reduced to measures of associative fluency

and uniqueness.

Associative fluency

is

the ability to re-

combine elements in multiple ways or the ability to break
old connections and make new connections and associative

uniqueness refers to the ability to find combinations which
are remote or statistically infrequent.

duction is essentially

a

Hence creative pro-

process of producing large quan-

tities of associations from which may be derived various

continuous chains which lead to remote associations with

pre-existing attributes of similarity.

The content of these

remote associates are judged to be unique based on some sta-

tistical measure of frequency of selection.

While the num-

ber and length of these continuous associative chains may be

quite large and complex they are unable to adequately
account for qualitatively discontinuous productions such as
the abrupt emergence of full blown insights from periods of
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incubation.

For an account of these discontinuous produc-

tions we turn to the Neo-Freudian school.
The Neo-Fredudians According to Kris
The Neo-Freudian School as expounded by Kris attempts
to explain creative production as a

"regression in the ser-

vice of the ego."

—

Central to artistic--or indeed, any other creativeness,
is a relaxation ("regression") of ego functions.
The
word "fantasy" conveys just this disregard of external
stringencies in its reference to the process and product
of creative imagination.
In fantasy and dreams, in
states of intoxication and fatigue, such functional
regression is especially prominent; in particular, it
(Kris, 1952,
characterizes the process of inspiration.
p.

253)

The inspiration process appears similar to the other regres-

sive processes; however, in "creative" regression the ego is

not overwhelmed by the id forces while the other forms of

regression are.

Hence, Kris has identified it as "regres-

sion in service of the ego" because of its adaptive function

.

May (1980, pp. 36-7)

argues that the concept of "re-

gression in the service of the ego" reduces creativity to
lesser process associated with neurosis.

Kubie

(1975)

argues that the primary processes of the unconscious tends

toward instinctual fixations and biases which are not con-

ducive to the clear flexibility of the creative process.
Arieti makes the following criticism of Kris's theory:

a
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My main difficulty in accepting Kris’s formulations
concerns the way he tries to explain how this "service of
the ego" takes place.
To me, it is not enough to say
that such mechanisms as displacement and condensation
occur or are made congruous with ego functions; we must
understand how this congruity is carried out.
(Arieti
1976, p.

24)

Kris fails to give a functional account of the interaction
of the ego and the primary processes.

Hence the production

of creative insights is no more clear than the production of

dreams.

Furthermore the functional dynamics of how the pri-

mary processes such as condensation, displacement, and

symbolism constructively coordinate to produce
insight are not explained.

a

dream or

Rather creative insights appear

to sporadically emerge full blown and radically shift like

episodic dream sequences.
The Gestaltists According to Wertheimer

Gestaltists such as Wertheimer (1945) offer

a

struc-

tural account of the sudden total emergence of insight solutions.

Wertheimer argues that the structure of

a

solution

is a gestalt whole which is more than the sum of the given

parts.

Furthermore this gestalt structure is pre-existent

to or co- temporaneous with the parts it forms.

Problem

solving begins with a "problem" which has an unstable

gestalt structure.

The problem is solved when the unstable

structure of the problem radically shifts to
structural solution.

a

more stable

This radical shift is exemplified in

.
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the equivocal figural gestalt of a profiled vase (see
Figure
3)

.

We shall assume that the initial condition for this

visual problem is the unstable perception of the equivocation as a "vase."

With the visual search for

a

more stable

structure tension builds up in the unstable structure until
suddenly a radical gestalt shift occurs resulting in the

more stable perception of the "profiled faces."

abrupt shift

a

With this

new way of perceiving the gestalt yields

radically new insights not previously seen from the previous

unstable structure.
Piaget (1971, p.

criticizes the Gestaltist for

8)

assuming the greater whole (more stable structure) preexists in the greater field prior to or cotemporaneously

with the parts of the unstable structure.

Thus the Gestalt-

ist are unable to "explicate" the developmental genesis of
the whole from the parts.

For example in the equivocal

gestalt example the more stable structure of the "profiled
faces" is assumed to co-exist in the background with the

lesser structure of the "vase.

"

Thus the radical gestalt

shift of the (pre-existing) profiled faces from the back-

ground to the foreground lacks an explicable functional
genesis

Although the Behaviorist, Neo-Freudians and Gestaltists appear partially valid for the limited area of creativity which they address,

they are inadequate to explicate how

.
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Figure

3.

Gestalt prof iled-vase
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genuinely new productions are generated.

The Behavorists

skirt the question of genuinely new production by reducing
it to the trivial novelty of remote association.

The Neo-

Freudians evade the question of functional genesis with general explanations of inspired regression which fail to

account for how the unconscious generated the full-blown
solution in the first place.

The Gestaltist are unable to

explicate this question of functional genesis because they
assume the pre-existence or co-temporaneous existence of the

greater structural solution with the parts of the lesser
structure of the problem.

Productive Creativity According to Koestler
Next we shall offer two alternative formulations of
"genuine" creativity by Koestler

(1969)

and Rothenberg

(1979a) which resolve the dilemma of creative production.

Both propose paradoxical second-order definitions of crea-

tivity which involve the coordination of opposites.

Accord-

ing to Koestler the creative birth occurs through the creative act of thinking on two mental planes simultaneously or

what he calls the process of bisociation which is defined
as

:

the perceiving of a situation or idea "L, " in two
self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of
reference "Ml" and "M2." The event in which the two intersect is made to vibrate on two different wavelengths
While this unusual situation lasts, "L" is
as it were.
not merely linked to one associative context, but biso(Koestler, 1969, p. 35)
ciated with two.
.

.

.

.
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He further states that this bisociative process is,

"a

double-minded, transitory state of unstable equilibrium

where the balance of both emotion and thought
(Koestler, 1969, p.

disturbed"

is

36)

Hence for Koestler creative production begins with the

paradoxical intersection of two diverging frames of reference or matrices which may denote any two seemingly incom-

patible abilities, habits, skills or patterns of behavior,
each of which is governed by its own code of fixed rules.
Normal associative processes are carried on within one frame
of reference but creative production involves the paradoxi-

cal intersection of two frames of reference which generate

new insights not reducible to either frame alone.

Koestler

proposes this general bisociative process as the fundamental
process underlying the three domains of creativity:

scien-

tific discovery, artistic originality, and comic inspiration.

Each of these three creative processes begins with an

unstable intersection of diverging frames of reference which
are meaningful to the particular creative process and which

evoke an appropriate response of gratification according to
the type of process.

Hence within the context of humor the

relevant paradoxical bisociation evokes "HA-HA,

"

within the

context of science the relevant paradoxical bisociation
evokes "AHA" and within art the relevant paradoxical bisoci-

ation evokes "AH

..."

Through the interplay or clash of
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the incompatible frames of reference creativity is initially

®^P^®ssed as

a

comic simile in humor, as a hidden analogy in

science, as a metaphor in art.

Each of these bisociations

(e.g., comic simile, hidden analogy, metaphor)

are intersec-

tions of incompatible matrices of thought which allow the

creator to experience reality on several planes at once.
The elaboration and evaluation of these bisociations takes

different forms according to the specific requirements of
the domain but all three domains of creativity share a com-

mon birth in the paradoxical bisociative process.

Further-

more the common bisociative process of the three domains

varies along

a

bipolar continuum from "self-assertiveness"

or self-differentiation to "self-transcendence " or integra-

tion (see Figure

4)

(Koestler,

1978, p.

Each domain

110).

of creativity is a Janus faced joining of both bipolar ten-

dencies but humor accentuates "self-assertiveness" and art

accentuates "self -transcendence " and science lies in between

.

An example of the bisociation of two frames of refer-

ence or matrices of thought within comic inspiration may be

presented as follows:

"A convict was playing cards with his

On discovering that he cheated, they threw him out

jailers.
of jail."

The comic effect of this joke results from the

paradoxical interplay of two systems of rules.
(1)

:

a

convict is serving time in jail and

is

Rule System

guarded by
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Humor

HA-HA

Science

4

<

comic simile

>

<

Sel f- assertiveness

AHA

+

>

<

Chidden analogy

Art

±

<

>

AH

metaphor

Self -transcendence

Koestler's bipolar continuum of three
Figure 4.
domains of creativity.
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jailers.

Rule System (2):

for some reason they play cards;

the convict cheats, and the other players expel him
from the

gaming hall.

This would be quite plausible if the first

part of the joke did not tell us that the gaming hall is
jail and the convict's fellow players are his wardens.

cheater can be thrown out of

a

a

A

card game but a convict can-

not be released from prison for committing a criminal

offense.

Each of the rules taken alone is normal and self-

consistent and evokes no laughter.
interplay of the two rules within

However the paradoxical
a

humorous situation pro-

vokes comic inspiration.

Koestler illustrates the bisociative process with

other creative processes such as the example of KoKo, the
chimpanzee, locked within a cage trying to grasp a banana

outside of arm's reach.

Finally in

KoKo breaks off the branch of
the banana.

a

a

moment of inspiration

tree to extend his reach to

Koestler hypothesizes:

"Before the chimpanzee

actually broke off the branch there must have been
when he perceived it as

a

(Koestler,

1969, p.

moment

member of 'both matrices at the

same time' --still a part of the tree but already

tool"

a

104).

a

detached

Through the ambiguous

interplay of branch as both "part of the tree" and "detached
tool" emerged the solution to the practical problem.

Another example of the bisociative process within the
domain of science concerns the story of Archimedes

-
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discovering how to measure the volume of an irregularly
shaped crown.

Reportedly Archimedes was given the assign-

ment to determine whether an alleged crown of pure gold had
been adulterated with silver.

He knew the weight per volume

of gold but didn't know how to find the volume of the

irregular crown.

Of course he figured he could melt down

the crown into a regular shape but that was not permissible.

After trying a number of different ways to measure the
volume of the crown he finally gave up for the day and

decided to relax with

a

While immersing himself

hot bath.

in the basin he noticed the change in the water level-

Eureka!

He made the bisociation between the finding of the

volume of the crown and the rise of the water level with the

immersion of his body.

Through that bisociation emerged

some verbal interpretation such as,

"rise of water-level

equals melting down of my solid body just as it would the

melting down of the solid crown.

"

During that equivocal

moment of bisociation his body became
just like the crown.

a

melted down object

Later came the mathematical expression

and verification of the tenuous insight.

Before the biso-

ciation the matrix of thoughts concerning the habitual
attempts to find the volume of the crown were on an independent plane different than the matrix of thoughts for ex-

periences related to taking

a bath.

According to Koestler

they are not just remote associates but represent divergent
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planes or frames of reference which equivocally intersect
in
the act of bisociation.

No doubt Archimedes had some

practical knowledge of how much water to pour into the basin

before it would overflow with the immersion of his body but
until that knowledge was bisociated with the habitual

attempts to measure the volume of the crown neither matrix
of thought was sufficient to make the creative leap which

changed the habitual approach to the problem.

Productive Creativity According to Rothenberg
Next we shall consider Rothenberg'

s

paradoxical con-

cepts of janusian aned homospatial thinking which are similar to Koestler's bisociative process and to Kris's primary

processes although they are more functionally defined and
substantiated.
(1979a)

For more than fifteen years Rothenberg

carried out

a

series of psychiatric interviews and

experiments with fifty-seven individuals who were selected
as being highly creative in either science,

or music.

Rothenberg'

creative process is

a

s

literature, art

evidence led him to propose that the

special secondary process which mir-

rors or is the obverse of the primary dreaming processes.

While dreaming uses primary processes to keep the dreamer
asleep by disguising and censoring anxiety provoking wishes
of the unconscious,

the creative process uses similar pro-

cesses to keep the creator wide awake in the anxiety ridden

process of giving birth to new insights.

By emphasizing the
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intentional anxiety stimulating process of creativity he

distinguishes it from the involuntary anxiety disguising
processes of dreaming.

Although creativity utilizes pro-

cesses which are structurally similar to the primary process
they are distinctively more intentional and abstract in

their functioning.

According to Rothenberg the creative

processes are not identical with or directly caused by the

primary processes as claimed by Kris in his theory of
regression rather they structurally mirror each other.

This

is a critical difference which helps distinguish the primary

processes of mere wishful thinking and schizophrenic fantasy
from genuine creativity.

Going beyond simplistic definitions of the primarylike processes of creativity as merely symbol, ambiguity,

multiple implication, condensation or displacement he proposes two functionally complex processes central to creativity:

"janusian" thinking involving an atemporal use of

opposites, and "homospatial

"

thinking involving a spatial

super imposition.

More specifically,

"Janusian thinking consists of ac-

tively conceiving two or more opposite or antithetical
ideas, images, or concepts simultaneously"
1979a, p. 55).

(Rothenberg,

This paradoxical structure of antagonistic

opposites is the seed structure from which genuinely new
ideas are born.

The distinctive qualities of this janusian

,

.
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process are that the opposites maintain their individual

identities and are actively opposed simultaneously.
examples which Rothenberg (1979a) gives are,

cluded that

a

"Einstein con-

person falling from the roof of

motion and at rest at the same time"

(p.

Some

a

house was in

and "O'Neil

56),

(playwright) was obsessed by the suicide of a friend whose

wife had been unfaithful
58),

and

"...

— and

he had wanted her to be"

(p.

Pasteur need to formulate the concept that

the surviving animals were both diseased and not-diseased at
the same time"

(p.

Each of these examples of janusian

124)

thinking served as the initial seed structure from which
either scientific theories or artistic productions were
developed.

Rothenberg defines,

"Homospatial thinking consists of

actively conceiving two or more discrete entities occupying
the same space, a conception leading to the articulation of

new identities" (Rothenberg, 1979a, p. 69).

Homospatial

thinking is the spatial integration of images to produce
The distinctive qualities of

genuinely new complex images.

the homospatial process is that the individual images are

reciprocally transformed into
their distinctiveness.

a

new whole without losing

Furthermore for Rothenberg the

imagetic space may either be visual
etc.

auditory

,

,

kinesthetic

Some examples of the homospatial process are "In

(Picasso)

first sketch of 'Guernica,

'

a female

figure was

,:
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looking into a room and out to a courtyard at the
same time"
(p.

60)

and "Shifting segments of a DNA molecule in his

hands, Watson realized it could consist of identical but

spatially opposed chains"

account of

a

(p.

62)

and Poincare's personal

mathematical discovery,

surging in my head;

I

"A host of ideas kept

could almost feel them jostling one

another, until two of them coalesced, so to speak, to form

stable combination"

(p.

117)

.

a

These examples indicate how

homospatial thinking gives an integrated imagetic expression
to discrete entities.

According to Rothenberg the janusian process and the
homospatial process are functionally related in the creative

process
Either at the moment of formulation or at some later
time, homospatial thinking operates in conjunction with
janusian thinking to produce integrated entities such as
artistic and scientific metaphors or more fully developed paradigms and models.
By means of homospatial
thinking, opposites and antitheses in a janusian construct are superimposed or otherwise fused in space and
(Rothenberg, 1979a, p. 268)
integrations are produced.
An example of the concomitant interaction of Janusian thinking and homospatial thinking is how Einstein's janusian con-

cept of how a person can be in motion and rest at the same
time is expressed in the spatial image of

from the roof of a house"

(Rothenberg, 1979a, p. 269).

Using material from an ongoing interview of
process of constructing

a

man falling

"a

a

poet in the

poem Rothenberg documents the

emergence of a kernel janusian concept,

a horse as

both

:
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beastly and human, followed by the homospatial representation of a riderless horse together with the horse and

rider— "His rider— he had never had

a rider"

(Rothenberg,

1979a, p. 68) the functional relation of janusian processes

and homospatial processes is such that janusian thinking

serves to capture the paradoxical tension of

a

problematic

situation which homospatial thinking in turn surmounts and
expresses in metaphoric terms.

Janusian and homospatial thinking as distinguished
from Hegelian dialectics is a simultaneous integration of

opposites rather than a succession of opposites (Rothenberg,
1979a, pp

.

255-56)

.

It is an integration which incorporates

and maintains the opposition rather than reconciling and

synthesizing the opposition.

These qualities of homospatial

thinking may be illustrated with Rubin's double profiles
(see Figure 5).

"According to gestalt principles, the two

faces in this drawing can only be seen successively.

The

homospatial perception involves seeing both on the same
visual plane, and interacting with one another"
1979a, p. 275).

metaphor,

(Rothenberg,

Another example is Sylvia Plath's poetic

"How long can my hands be a bandage to his hurt?"

As Rothenberg comments

there is interaction between, and mutual modification of elements: the hands take on some of the soft,
swathing and encircling qualities of the bandage, and
the bandage takes on the strength and adherence of the
(Rothenberg, 1979a, p. 257)
hands.
.

.

.

Figure

5.

Rubin's double profile

:
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In both examples the opposites are simultaneously
integrated

and maintained thus enriching the whole.

Rothenberg further explains that this simultaneous
integration is a genuine discontinuity with what preceded
it

When two or more elements are conceived as operating
simultaneously, they come neither before nor after.
Nothing in this is repeated, but all occurs at once.
When two or more elements operate simultaneously, they
are outside the continuing process of repetition,
change, and flux we refer to as "time"; the janusian
conception is out of time.
(Rothenberg, 1979a, p. 339)
Perhaps this accounts for the sense of timelessness reported
by many highly creative people during intense creative per-

iods (Ghiselin, 1952).

As conceptualized and documented the

janusian and homospa tial processes are the generative structures and processes which account for "genuine" creativity.

Once the homospatial metaphor has been expressed other

processes such as dialectics and analysis may come into

operation to elaborate, refine and evaluate the new recreation.

Koestler and Rothenberg in Comparison
Rothenberg distinguishes his janusian and homospatial

processes from Koestler'
ing points:

s

bisociative process on the follow-

where Koestler is concerned with

a

single act

Rothenberg is concerned with a process, while Koestler
emphasizes the association of incompatibles Rothenberg
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emphasizes the reciprocal interaction of opposites, where

Koestler posits merely two incompatibles Rothenberg examines
a

complex of interacting opposites, where Koestler talks

about diverging incompatibles on different planes Rothenberg
is

concerned with opposites which are specifically different

and resistant within the same category, and where Koestler

posits

a

random concatenation of incompatibles Rothenberg

hypothesizes an active intentional process of constructing
opposites (Rothenberg, 1979a,

p.

12).

definition of the creative process
elaborate as Rothenberg'

s

is

While Koestler's
not as functionally

it would be a mistake to label the

bisociative process as merely

a

remote association.

Biso-

ciation is the equivocal intersection of two incompatible
systems of thought.

It is not merely an association by

contiguity, similarity or mediation within

system of thought.

a

single stable

Rather bisociation is the transitory

experience of reality on several planes simultaneously which
is much more like the Janusian process than association.

Koestler writes,

"There is no point-to-point correspondence

between the two places; they are bisociated as wholes
(Koestler, 1978, p.

141).

.

.

."

Hence we are not talking about an

associative process of finding pre-existing similarities but
rather

a

bisociative process that recreates the relationship

between the planes without destroying their distinctiveness.
The most notable difference between the bisociative process
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and janusian thinking is that the bisociative process
is

described as the equivocal intersection of two incompatibles
and janusian thinking as a polar continuum of opposites.
Perhaps these are two ways of describing the same paradoxical process.

However, Koestler's notion of bisociation

which could be interpreted as an equivocal intersection of
diverging continua appears more interesting and inclusively
useful than a single "hot-cold" type of continuum.

In any

case both Koestler and Rothenberg's concepts of the creative

process are compatible and mutually enriching.

Koestler

stands to gain from Rothenberg's functional conception and

detailing of the creative process and Rothenberg from
Koestler's more complex notion of intersecting planes of

opposition rather than

a

single continuum of opposition.

In conclusion both Koestler and Rothenberg explain the

creative process as

a

second-order transformation which is

generated by the mutual coordination of first-order opposites.

Koestler terms this mutual coordination of first-

order opposites the bisociation or intersection of incompatible frames of reference which generate multiple levels of

metaphoric insight.

Rothenberg terms this mutual coordina-

tion of first-order opposites the Janusian active conception
of opposites simultaneously.

Janusian works in conjunction

with homospatial processes to generate genuinely new metaphoric integrations.

Thus both Koestler and Rothenberg
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provide functionally similar explications of the secondorder generation of genuinely novel productions in terms of
the metaphoric integration of opposing concepts.

Cognitive Development
In this section on cognitive development we raise the

question,

"How is it possible for genuinely novel cognitive

development to occur?"

In this section the paradoxical

dilemma of the creative process takes on the form of the

nature-nature controversy in which two mutually exclusive
developmental theories, nativism and behaviorism, offer alternative explanations of how creative development primarily
occurs.

Nativism as the underlying psychological theory of

the Romantic pedagogy reduces creative development to

spontaneous unfolding of

a

fixed genetic poten-

tial according to a preset time table.

Whereas behaviorism

primarily

a

as the underlying psychological theory of the traditional

school of cultural transmission reduces creative development
to primarily a cultural engineering of continuous chains of

associated skills which become incorporated into higher
order skills.

Basically the dilemma is that creative devel-

opment is reduced to either the behavior ist

'

s

trivial

novelty of incremental cumulation or the nativist's radical
novelty of spontaneous unfoldment of prefabricated genetic
potential.

(Although Piaget defines Nativism as a

.
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structural theory of preformation and thus trivial novelty
we shall primarily be concerned with how it spontaneously

unfolds and not its preformed nature.)

While the behavior-

ist's concept of trivial novelty is insufficient to explain

genuine novelty the nativist concept of radical novelty

merely

a

is

genetic addition or substitution which does not

account for the constructive order of genuine creative

development
Nativist Development According to Gesell

According to the Nativist creative development is fundamentally a process of biological maturation in which

behavior matures just as we physically grow.
development is

a

spontaneous unfolding of instincts, emo-

tions, sensori-motor

according to

a

Hence creative

,

perceptual and language patterns

predetermined genetic time table.

Each new

development is merely an addition or substitution of what

went before.

For instance the more advanced motor skill of

walking may become substituted for crawling and walking
additionally enriched with the skipping pattern.

Some be-

haviorists have accused Piaget of reducing development to

maturational process where a more primitive stage
replaced or substituted for by

a

a

is merely

more advanced stage.

True

developmental nativists such as Gesell (1974) are concerned

with chronological checklists of development in which there
is a first year stage,

second year stage and so on.
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Development or maturation proceeds according to

a

genetical-

ly preset schedule in which the environment merely activates

and nourishes the spontaneous unfoldment of biological potential.

The lack of environmental nourishment may frus-

trate or fixate this natural unfoldment.

However the

enrichment of the environment merely serves to integrate and
consolidate what has already unfolded.

Hence Gesell is pri-

marily concerned with maturational checklists which indicate
biological readiness for behavioral tasks such as reading.
For example one indicator of reading readiness is the

visual-motor ability to copy
Gesell would maintain this is

diamond shaped figure.

a

a

genetic-physical potential

that unfolds spontaneously and can be consolidated by behavioral training but cannot be trained beyond the maturational

level of readiness.
a

Hence creative development is primarily

"natural" process in which the "nuturement" of the envi-

ronment plays an interactive role during the consolidative

period of readiness but

a

limited secondary role during the

spontaneous unfolding of maturation to the next level of
genetic readiness.

Behavioral Development According to Gagne
On the other hand behaviorist claim that the behavioral nuturement of the environment plays a predominant role in

creative development and that the natural biological potential is merely a supportive resource to be culturally

92

exploited.

Where according to the matura tionists develop-

is spontaneous,

it is controllable,

preset and fixed for the behaviorists

directable and malleable.

Behavioral

developmentalists such as Gagne (1968, pp. 177-91) claim
that children can learn any intellectual thing we want them
to learn, provided they have learned the prerequisites.

According to Gagne creative development
engineering task of connecting
associated skills into

a

a

is a

behavioral

continuous chain of

more complex higher order skill.

Creative development is fundamentally an incremental cumulative process moving from simple stimulus-response connections to chains to multiple discriminations to concepts to

simple rules to more complex rules.

incorporates the previous step into

plexly associated whole.

Each incremental step
a

more inclusive com-

For instance to teach the concept

of the area of a rectangle Gagne would behaviorally rein-

force prerequisite concepts of length, width and rectangle.

With the mastery of these prerequisite skills the child is

prepared to recall and additively associate them into

complex concept that the area of
by length and width.

a

a more

rectangle is determined

According to Gagne the vertical trans-

fer to superordinate concepts results from overlearning or

high repetition of the additive integration of the subordinate concepts.

Where for the nativist creative development

is limited by fixed genetic structures which unfolds
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spontaneously according to preset schedules for Gagne creative development is limited only by the prerequisite mastery
of the additive components of the composite structure of the

learning task itself.
The nature-nature dilemma of the Nativist and behav-

iorists dichotomizes the nurturing environment and the
natural organism.

Furthermore it reduces genuine novelty to

either the behavior ist

'

s

trivial novelty of gradual modifi-

cation and continuous incremental cumulation or the nativist 's radical novelty of spontaneous genetic unfoldment of

prefabricated structures which lack constructive order.
Piaget resolves the superficial split of the nature-nature
dilemma by postulating

a

fundamental interaction between the

natural organism and the nurturing environment and goes be-

yond its reductionism with a theory of development which is

both genuinely creative and constructively ordered.

In

resolving this dilemma Piaget provides the underlying psy-

chology for the progressive pedagogy just as Nativist and

behaviorism provide the underlying psychology for the romantic and traditional pedagogies

(Kolhberg, 1972, pp

.

449-95).

Constructive Development According to Piaget
According to Piaget one of the central goals of

a the-

ory of cognitive development is to explain the construction
of both genuine novelty and order.

It is the genius of

Piaget's revised theory of equilibration (Piaget, 1977) to
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attempt to give the necessary and sufficient conditions for
both these factors of creative development.

Development is

the novel transcendence of "natural contradictions" toward

higher levels of logical coherence.

These natural contra-

dictions, i.e., conflicts or oppositions, do not merely

arise through a probabilistic encounter with the environment, as Piaget had previously supposed, but rather through
the "central act" of equilibration itself.

For example

Piaget previously viewed the equilibration of conservation
of clay as the child's chance centration on some overt

attribute such as length.

Another chance encounter with the

clay might lead to a centration on another attribute such as

width which would conflict with the previous centration.
These two conflicting variables would require coordination
at a higher level of equilibration.

According to Piaget's

revised theory of equilibration the focus is not on the

mental coordination of two separate variables but rather the

necessary polarization of the central act itself into an

affirmation and negation.
transforming

a

The central act of a child

piece of clay can take on many states where

one dimension of the clay such as height is affirmed as
"tall" at the expense of its negation "not tall," the

dimension of width.

This inherent imbalance of the central

act leads to a progressive equilibration toward conservation

where the affirmation of height is finally compensated by
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the negation of width in a necessarily reciprocal relation.

Where the old notion of equilibration merely emphasizes the

increasing probabilistic complexity of coordination the new
theory emphasizes the progressive compensation of the inherent polarity of the central act toward a novel and necessary

balance of the affirmation and negation.

This novelty of

equilibration is genuine because it constitutes

a

second-

order recreating of the opposites of affirmation and nega-

tion at qualitatively higher levels according to the laws of
formal logic.

According to Piaget (1972, pp. 15-17) cognitive systems function through three forms of equilibration:
(1)

those between the subject and object which lead to the

assimilation of schemes of action and the accommodation of
these to the objects;

(2)

those between the differentiated

schemes of the partial subsystems which lead to reciprocal

assimilation and accommodation
tion)

;

and

(3)

(or a

horizontal integra-

those between the partial subsystem with

their differentiations and the total system with its inte-

gration which results in the vertical reintegration of the

differentiations of the partial subsystems into

a

genuinely

new totality.
These three forms may be interpreted as three dimen-

sions of the ongoing equilibration process.

The first form

refers to the adaptive coordination of the subject with the
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object (for instance

a

child attempting to judge the rela-

tive lengths of two sets of sticks)

The second form refers

.

to the horizontal coordination of various asynchronous

schemes involved in adaptive coordination (for instance the

discrepancy between

a

child's perceptual estimation scheme

and counting scheme in judging the relative lengths of the

two sets of sticks)

.

The horizontal integration of these

differentiated schemes may lead to the vertical reintegration of the differentiated schemes with the totality (for

instance the horizontal integration of the scheme of perceptual estimation and number counting may lead to the vertical

reintegration of the two schemes into
of conservation of length)

establishes

a

a

generalized scheme

The new vertical reintegration

.

new level of adaptive coordination with the

subject and object.
Hence equilibration moves from

a

global coordination

of subject and object to a differentiation of this coordina-

tion into asynchronous schemes which in turn are horizontally integrated through the ongoing coordination of subject

and object and finally vertically reintegrated with the

totality thus establishing

with object (see Figure

6)

a
.

new recoordination of subject
Thus equilibration appears to

be a shifting balance between the differentiations of the

child's interaction with the environment and the reintegration of these differentiations into

a

new totality.

.

97

I.

II

Global Coordination of Subject and Object

Differentiated Schemes (Asynchronous)
Coordinating Subject with Object

i
Horizontally Integrated Schemes (Reciprocal
Assimilation and Accommodation) Coordinating
Subject and Object

III.

Vertically Reintegrated Schemes Recoordinating
Subject and Object

The three dimensional phase of the
Figure 6.
Piagetian equilibration cycle.
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According to Piaget the third form of
equilibration which
vertically reintegrates the differentiated schemes
into a

new totality is the source of genuine creative
development:
At the level of cognitive functions, there is a
fundamental form of equilibrium because integration, as
a
function of differentiation, poses new problems.
These
new problems lead to the construction of new actions
upon the previous actions, or new operations upon the
previous operations.
The construction of operations
upon operations is probably the secret of development
and of the transition from one stage to the next
(Piaget,

1972,

p.

17)

This construction of operations upon operations constitutes
a

second-order recreating of the cognitive operations.

This

is a genuine creativity because it constitutes a discontinu-

ous qualitative shift in the structural system which is

constructively generated out of what preceded.

Thus the

preceding structures are transformed and incorporated into
the second-order structure.

This process of second-order

inclusion is quite distinct from Gagne's inclusion by vertical transfer.

Gagne's "vertical transfer" is a continuous

cumulation of collective horizontal components into more
complex superordinate composite structures resulting from

repetitive overlearning.

Piaget's "vertical reintegration"

is a discontinuous integration of horizontal first-order

conflicting schemes into qualitatively novel second-order
structures resulting from equilibrating interaction.
Piaget (1977, Chapter

I)

further explains the process

of constructing operations on operations in terms of
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reflexive abstraction.

Reflecive abstraction is

a

process

which does not necessarily require the presence of physical
objects.

It is based on the coordination of actions or

operations and is therefore constructive.

There are two

fundamental characteristics of reflexive abstraction:
1.

Projection or reflection in the physical sense, that is,
a transposing to a higher level of what was borrowed
from a lower level.

2.

Reflection in the sense of mental organization or reconstruction of what has been projected to the higher level
in order to incorporate it into the new totality.
We may more fully understand the process of coordinat-

ing conflict in terms of reflexive abstraction.

The con-

flict coming from the contradictioon between the (horizontally integrated)

subschemes propels the projection up to

higher endogenous level where

a

a

process of vertical integra-

tion or reflection occurs in order to subordinate the new

scheme to the higher level.

According to Piaget it is at

this higher level that the construction of genuine novelty

appears.

What exactly causes the conflict in the first

place is not very important to Piaget.

He attributes the

initial nonbalance to the deficiency of the early structures
and the spontaneous attraction to overt properties of objects (affirmations)

(Piaget,

1977, p.

15)

and to the tem-

poral lags or asynchrony between the schemes
p.

9).

(Piaget,

1977,

With these considerations of the initial nonbalance

the central task becomes to explain how the conflicting
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disturbances are brought into equilibrium at
by reflexive abstraction.

a

higher level

Furthermore this equilibrium of

reflexive abstraction is defined as converging toward the

higher level of formal non-contradiction (Piaget, 1980,
304)

p.

.

In order to more clearly understand the process of

reflexive abstraction as expressed through the three dimensions of equilibration we shall consider an example of the

equilibration of the conseration of length taken from the
learning experiments of Inhelder, Sinclair, and Bovet
(1974).

In this learning experiment they made two lines of

match sticks:

one a shorter zigzag line with eight matches

and the other a longer straight line with only seven matches
(see figure 7).

The children were asked if the lines were

the same length or if one was more, or less, than the other.

When non-conservers of length responded that that bottom
line was longer, the experimenters asked them to count the

match sticks.

Thus they were both saying b is longer be-

cause "it goes out further" and a is longer because "eight
is more than seven."

This polarization of the children's

interaction with the match sticks was successful in facilitating conservation of continuous length in those who were
at the transition level.

Drawing upon Piaget's terminology of affirmation and

negation and his analysis of the reciprocal equilibration of
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b

f

Figure 7
Presentation of conservation of length
learning experiment.
.

,
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asynchronous schemes we shall further consider the learning

experiment of conservation of length.

According to Piaget:

although the accommodation of schemes to the outer
reality is interrupted by many unexpected obstacles, the
reciprocal assimilation of two valid subsystems and
their reciprocal accommodation succeed sooner or later
and lead to mutual conservation. ... To coordinate the
two subsystems,
and S ~ is to discover a common
operative part, S, *S
which is opposed to S,*non-S and
2
to S 'non-S,.
Hence, we see that partial negations 2 are
2
indispensable
to the coherent stability of this coordination.
(Piaget, 1977, p. 9)
.

.

.

,

The child has two subsystems or schemes, a number counting

system (S^) and

a

system for measuring length

based on perception.

Therefore

(S

)

2

in this task,

,

which is
is

polar-

ized into an affirmation that a is longer than b since eight
is more than seven

(a>b by counting)

and its negation, b is

not longer than a since seven is not more than eight (b<a
by counting)

longer than

.

a

is polarized into an affirmation that b is

since b goes out further (b>a by perception)

and its negation, b is not longer than

S

2

is

,

a

since seven is not

When the experimenter

more than eight (a<b by perception).
suggests that the child make

a

correspondence between

and

the child's "central" interaction with the match sticks

paradoxically cross-polarized with the simultaneous con-

sideration of both opposing systems of

and

S

.

2

Through

the simultaneous consideration of the contradictory affirma-

tions of

(a>b by counting)

,

and

S

2

(b>a by perception)

new common operative S^'S 2 is generated from the cross-

,

a
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polarized intersection of the two schemes (see Figure
8).
This cross-polarized interaction is the horizontal integra-

tion (reciprocal assimilation and accommodation) of the two

conflicting systems which projects them to

higher level of

a

vertical reintegration (reflection) with the totality as the
new mutual conservation of length.

This new mutual conser-

vation of length is not merely the simple composite relationship between the collaterals of
a

S

1

and

S

2

Rather it is

.

second-order process of reflexive abstraction which para-

doxically projects the contradictory differences to
level of reorganized common operativity.

a

higher

This common

operativity is opposed to the contradictory differences of
S^'non-S 2 and

S

2

*non-S^ yet it incorporates their trans-

formed commonality at a second-order level.

common operativity of S^*S
a is

2

Hence the

P ro<3uces a new affirmation that

longer than b and new negation that b is not longer

than a not merely by counting but by the mutual conservation
of number and length.
tem,

S

1

,

In essence the number counting sys-

and the perceptual measurement system,

S

2

,

are

paradoxically cross- integrated and reflectively reintegrated
at a higher vertical level of conservation of discontinuous

length.

An additional example of reflexive abstraction and the

three dimensions of equilibration may be given with another

learning experiment by Inhelder et al.

(1974)

.

Young

Figure

8

.

Cross polarization of the central act os
through which the common operative

S]_*non S2 and S^’non
S^*S2 is generated.
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children unable to do the classical conservation of
clay
task were selected for the learning task.

were shown a ball of clay.

These children

A piece of the clay was taken

from the top of the ball and they were asked if it was still
the same amount.

They responded that no it was less.

The

piece of clay was put back on one of the ends and they were

asked if it was the same amount now?
(see Figure

9)

.

They responded yes

This was a judgement by correspondence

between the subtracted piece and the added piece.

In this

experiment the children understood that the negative space

which was subtracted and the newly added affirmation were in
balance by a one-to-one correspondence.

This process of

taking from the top and adding to the sides continued with
the children maintaining the correspondence until the clay

ball had been transformed into a cigar shape.

most of the children experienced

a

At this point

conflict from the polari-

zation between the gradual build up of the one to one corre-

spondence scheme and their perceptual estimation scheme.
The correspondence scheme implied equivalence and the per-

ceptual estimation scheme implied inequality because the

cigar shaped clay appeared to have more clay than the ball
shaped clay.

The conflict experienced with the polarization

of these two schemes was successful in advancing children,

even three years, in some cases.

Three quarters of the

"
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A "ball" of clay being transformed bitFigure 9
by-bit into a "cigar.
.
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children from five and one-half years on learned to conserve
and generalize to the classical experiment of conservation.

Using Piaget's terminology we may further analyze this

learning experiment.

Through the intervention of the exper-

imenter a paradoxical polarization was induced in the children's multi-schematic interaction with the clay task.

The

children were simultaneously confronted with the conflicting

correspondence scheme
scheme

(

S

^

)

•

(S.^)

and the perceptual estimation

The affirmation of the correspondence scheme

indicated that the cigar shaped clay was equal in quantity
to the negated ball shaped clay.

The affirmation of the

perceptual estimation scheme indicated that the cigar shaped
clay was more in quantity than the negated ball shaped clay.
Hence many children experienced a cross-polarized contradiction between the affirmation and negation of the two schemes
(see Figure 10).

Most of the children were able to experi-

ence the paradoxical polarization of the cross-integrated

schemes and to vertically reintegrate the schemes at a new

second-order level of conservation of continuous quantity.
At this new level both the scheme of one-to-one correspon-

dence and the scheme of perceptual estimation were trans-

formed and incorporated into

a

new scheme of functional

compensation between the affirmation and negation.
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perceptual estimation)
Figure 10.
Cross polarization of conservation of
"continuous quantity" as S]/non S 2 and S 2 'non Sj through
which the common operative Si*S2 is generated.
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Of course not all the children achieved conservation.

Perhaps those children who did not achieve conservation

negotiated the confrontation with the cross-polarization in
different ways.

Piaget (1977) explains three ways in which

children negotiate or regulate cognitive conflict.

The

"alpha" regulation of conflict is simply to reject, neglect
or suppress the conflict.

Hence some of the children who

did not achieve conservation in the learning experiment may

have merely rejected, neglected or suppressed the conflict

between the correspondence scheme and the perceptual scheme.
These children probably made no advancement in terms of better understanding conservation.

The next level of regulat-

ing conflict is "beta" behavior which takes the discrepancy

into account but can only partially coordinate it.

Children

using "beta" regulation of the conflict were probably able
to partially coordinate the conflicting schemes of corre-

spondence and perceptual estimation into

a

functional

relationship without understanding exact compensation of the
functional relationship.
conflict,

The final level of regulating

"gamma" behavior, anticipates the conflict and is

able to fully coordinate the differences within

interrelated possibilii tes

.

a

system of

The children using the "gamma"

regulation of the conflict between the correspondence and

perceptual estimation scheme were able to fully recognize

.

.

.

:

.
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the implications of the conflict and recoordinate the dif-

ferences into a new scheme of functional compensation.
In order to further consider children's regulation of

cognitive conflict which appears to result from cross-

polarized schemes we may examine Forman's fine grain analysis of the developmental levels leading to conservation of

continuous substance (Forman, 1981)

(see Figure 11)

Developmental Levels for Conservation of Clay
1.

Absolute differences
The child transforms A into an
oblong shape which he assumes is completely different
from B.
The child compares the two shapes but does not
see any similarity (affirmation) between A and B.
This
creates the perception that both are absolutely different (alpha regulation by neglect)

2.

At this level the incomplete affirmation of
Opposition
absolute differences of the previous level leads to the
negation of absolute differences resulting in a new
affirmation of the transformation of tall and not tall
(the initiation of "beta" regulation)

3.

Discrete degrees: At this level the incomplete affirmations of tall and not tall are further negated resulting
in the construction of a new affirmation of "a little
tall A."

4.

Variations: The incomplete affirmation of "a little
tall " Is further negated resulting in a continuum of
affirmations of continuous variation. Affirmations of
variation are constructed for both height and width but
are not coordinated until the next stage.

5.

Function: At this level the child negates the incomplete affirmation of height and width and accepts their
The child understand the more
functional relationship.
but not simultanevice-versa
and
width the less height
ously (end of beta regulation)

6.

:

;

Exact compensation: Finally the incomplete affirmations
of the inverse functional relations of height and width
are negated resulting in exact compensation or conservaThis last level results in the complete
tion of clay.

Ill

Opposition

CIO
not-tall A

Discrete Degrees

s

(

tall A

Variations

a little

non-tali A

tall A

not-short A

COO
short A

more

Height

not-tall A

^

less

Function

Height

le ss

more

Figure 11.

*

030

Forman's Developmental Levels.
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and necessary compensation of affirmation and its negation by reciprocity.
(Gamma regulation anticipates the
incompleteness of the functional relations and coordinates them into a functional compensation.)
This analysis illustrates how natural contradictions
or incomplete compensations of affirmation and negation are

regulated and transcended at each level.

The interpretation

of affirmation and negation and their relationship changes

at each level.

The affirmations are portrayed as overgen-

eralized absolutes that progressively become more qualified.
The negations are weak in the beginning but progressively

become more self-compensatory.

The relative relation of

affirmation and negation moves from affirmation dominating
and leading negation through the early levels of absolute

differences, opposition and discrete differences to the

mutual assistance of both in the levels of variation and

function to finally the necessary coordination of affirmation with negation in exact compensation or reversibility.
In summary,

equilibration is progressively regulated

by the alpha, beta and gamma regulators which result in dif-

fering coordinations of cognitive conflict according to

developmental level.

Equilibration is not merely an escape

from the tension of natural contradiction, rather it is a

novel and necessary transcendence toward the coherence of

complete compensation.

The cognitive conflict resulting

from the cross-integration of asynchronous schemes such as

one-to-one correspondence and perceptual estimation creates

.
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paradoxical tension or imbalance which

^

is

progressively

coordinated by beta regulations until gamma regulation takes
over to achieve a complete vertical reintegration of the

opposing schemes into

a

new second-order scheme of exact

compensation
Creative Paradigm- Shi ft
In this section on the creative paradigm-shift we

raise the question,

"How is it possible for a genuine

paradigm-shift to occur?"

Various scientists, historians of

science and philosophers of science have sought orderly and

intelligible methods for creating and critiquing new advance-

ments in scientific theories.

This quest has led to two

polarized theories of scientific development.

One tradi-

tional theory of science development claims that the creative advancement of science is a gradual accumulation of

knowledge which is methodically checked at each point.
(

1970

)

Kuhn

calls this the puzzle building phase where the gaps

in the structural framework of a theory are deductively

filled in with the missing puzzle pieces.

However, when

this structural framework is called into question with a

growing number of anomalies unexplainable by the current
theoretical framework

a

paradigm shift or restructuring of

the theoretical framework may occur.

This paradigm shift
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creates a radical departure from the previous theory such as
the shift from Newtonian physics to Einsteinian physics.
This polarization of theories of science development

has created a controversial dilemma in terms of understanding the creative process of theory change.

Logical empiri-

cist or positivist such as Carnap (1936) and Hempel (1948)

maintain that all theory change in science may be explained
as a gradual cumulative process characterized by a static

deduc tive-nomological structure which provides for "consistency," "meaning invariance" and "objective evaluation."

Opposing the logical positivist are writers such as Kuhn
(1970)

and Feyerabend (1977) who maintain that major theory

changes in science may be explained as non-cumulative

paradigm shifts characterized by

a

changing gestalt struc-

ture which creates "incommensurability," "meaning variance"

and "theory-laden evaluation.

"

The polarization of these

two explanations of theory change poses a dilemma for under-

standing the creative process.

The logical positivists pro-

vide a rational explanation of theory change but reduce it
to a trivial process of gradual cumulation by hypothetico-

deductive methods.
theory change as

a

Kuhn (1970) provides an account of

radical process of paradigm shift but

characterizes this radical shift as an irrational subjective

conversion experience according to his critics (Shapere,
1964),

(Kordig,

1971)

and (Siegel, 1980).

Hence creative
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theory change is reduced to either a trivial change of
rational accumulation or a radical change of irrational
replacement.
Kuhn maintains that his critics have misinterpreted
his following statements on theory change and choice:

conversion experience that

I

have likened to

a

"The

gestalt

switch remains, therefore, at the heart of the revolutionary

process"
.

.

.

(Kuhn,

1970, p.

204);

"Scientific revolutions are

non-cumulative episodes in which an older paradigm

is

replaced in whole or part by an incompatible new one (Kuhn,
1970, p.

11); and "That process is persuasion

choice)

but it presents a deeper problem.

,

(theory

Two men who per-

ceive the same situation differently but nevertheless employ
the same vocabulary in its discussion must be using words

differently.

They speak, that is, from what

incommensurable viewpoints"
sponds,

1970, p.

"My critics respond to my views

of irrationality,

234).

.

.

have called

200).
.

Kuhn re-

with charges

relativism, and the defense of mob rule.

There are all labels which
1970, p.

(Kuhn,

I

I

categorically reject"

(Kuhn,

Kuhn goes on to explain his controversial

concept of "incommensurability":

Most readers of my test have supposed that when I spoke
of theories as incommensurable, I meant that they could
But "incommensurability" is a term
not be compared.
borrowed from mathematics, and it there has no such
The hypotenuse of an isosceles right tri
implication.
angle is incommensurable with its side, but the two can
What
be compared to any required degree of precision.
in
length
of
unit
is lacking is not comparability but a

:
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terms of which both can be measured directly and exactly.
(Kuhn, 1976, pp
190-1)
.

Kuhn goes on to explain,

ability' to theories,

I

"In applying the term 'incommensur-

had intended only to insist that

(there was) no common language within which both could be

fully expressed and which could therefore be used in a

point-by-point comparison between them"
191)

(Kuhn,

1976, p.

.

He further elaborates on this lack of a common neutral

language
I simply assert the existence of significant
limits to what the proponents of different theories can
communicate to one another.
The same limits make it
difficult or, more likely, impossible for an individual
to hold both theories in mind together and compare them
That
point by point with each other and with nature.
sort of comparison is, however, the process on which the
appropriateness of any word like "choice" depends.
.

.

.

(Kuhn,

1977, pp.

338-9)

In addition to the limits of communication and the impossi-

bility of a neutral comparison language Kuhn maintains that
"good reasons" such as accuracy, scope, fruitfulness, sim-

plicity and consistency are not absolute arbiters in theory
choice.

Rather Kuhn states,

"...

such reasons constitute

values to be used in making choices rather than rules of

choice"

(Kuhn,

1970, p.

262).

Hence two scientists may

share the same value of "simplicity" but differ as to the

"simplicity" of competing theories.
Kuhn's replies to his critics provide more than a

simplistic view of theory change as an irrational,
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uncommuni cable conversion experience.

Rather he defines

certain limits to the strictly rational rules of discovery,

communication and evaluation in theory change and choice.
His critics

(Siegel,

1980, p.

373)

agree that there are no

rational rules or algorithms for making discoveries.

How-

ever, they object to the radical "meaning-variance" of

common terms from theory to theory since it poses

a

problem

for strictly rational communication and to the value laden

characterization of "good reasons" such as accuracy, fruitfulness, scope, simplicity and consistency.

Kuhn does not

reject the intelligibility of the discovery process nor the

discussability of "meaning variance" nor the comparison of

competing theories in defending the process of paradigm
shift.

Rather he rejects any formally defined logic of

discovery, the "neutral invariance of meaning" in paradigm
shifts and the absolute evaluation of competing theories.

Kuhn maintains that the discovery process, the variance in

meaning and the evaluation of this variance constitute

a

genuine shift in the theoretical structure of knowledge.
Furthermore this structural shift is characterized by an
"essential tension" which cannot be reduced to either mere

irrationality or strict formal rationality.

We shall fur-

ther consider Kuhn's account of this paradoxical

essential

tension" of the discovery process and later Hesse's account

:
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of "meaning variance" which provides a metaphoric explana-

tion for paradigm shifts.
In addressing a conference on the identification of

creative scientific talent Kuhn states
both my own experience in scientific research and
my reading of the history of sciences lead me to wonder
whether flexibility and open-mindedness have not been
too exclusively emphasized as the characteristics
requisite for basic research.
I shall therefore suggest
below that something like "convergent thinking" is just
as essential to scientific advance as is divergent.
Since these two modes are inevitably in conflict, it
will follow that the ability to support a tension that
can occasionally become almost unbearable is one of the
prime requisites for the very best sort of scientific
research.
(Kuhn, 1977, p. 226)
.

.

.

Kuhn goes on to write that this essential tension of the

joining of convergent and divergent thinking characterized
the scientific revolutions of Copernicus, Darwin, Einstein

and many others.

These great creators were able to make

divergent discoveries which contributed to

a

paradigm shift

by virtue of being great convergent thinkers in the tradi-

tional paradigm that preceded the revolution.

Through their

firm commitment to the old paradigm they were able to

detect the tension provoking anomalous gaps which could not
be filled by any of the currently possible convergent puzzle

pieces and to flexibly and openmindedly confront this
"essential tension" to divergently reframe the puzzle to

accommodate the anomaly.

Kuhn further states:

119

only investigations firmly rooted in the contemporary scientific tradition are likely to break that
tradition and give rise to a new one.
Very often
the successful scientist must simultaneously display the
characteristics of the traditionalist and the icono.

.

.

.

clast.

(Kuhn,

1977, p.

.

.

227)

Hence paradigm shifts do not arise "de novo."

Rather they

emerge from the traditional paradigm and are characterized
by the essential tensions of commitment and open mindedness,

convergent and divergent thinking, traditionalist and iconoclast which must be balanced and reconciled both within the
individual and group.
Kuhn (1977, pp. 240-65) further explores the creative

dynamics of the "essential tension" which characterizes

paradigm shifts in terms of the paradox provoking "thought
experiments" which creative scientists have historically
utilized.

According to Kuhn "thought experiments" such as

Einstein's train struck by lightning at both ends, Bohr-

Heisenberg's microscope and Galileo's dialogue on falling
bodies have historically functioned to transform vaguely
felt anomalies within the traditional paradigm into vividly

explicit paradoxes which call for
lution.

a new

paradigmatic reso-

The explicit paradox of these thought experiments

have both served to express the conflict implicit in the

scientist's thought and also as an "essential propaedeutic"
to the elimination of this conflict

(Kuhn,

1977, pp.

260-1).

Kuhn presents an extended example of Galileo's

"thought experiment" expressed as an imaginary dialogue on
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the implicit contradictions involved in the
Aristotelian

velocity of falling bodies and compares it with

a

similar

example of Piaget using dialogical questioning to provoke

cognitive conflict in children's concept of velocity.

Both

the learning experiment and the "thought experiment" show

how paradox pushes conflicting opinions to their extreme and

provokes a new understanding of velocity.

Thus according to

Kuhn both examples present the same dynamics of learning.
The main functional difference being that for Galileo his

questions were self-generated and for Piaget's learning

experiment the questions were generated through

a

clinical

interview (Kuhn, 1977, p. 243).
We shall present Piaget's example and then Galileo's
for comparison.
(Piaget,

1946,

In a series of learning experiments Piaget

Chapters

6

and

7)

asked questions designed to

induce cognitive conflict in the child's undifferentiated

cognitive schemes concerning the comparative speed of
and blue car.

a

red

In the first experimental condition the blue

car left the starting line first but the red car arrived at
the finish line at the same time as the blue car.

The child

was asked if one of the two was faster or if the same.

child responded that the blue car went more quickly.

The

Kuhn

calls these the "goal-reaching" criterion for the applica-

tion of faster.

.
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In the second experimental condition the apparatus
was

readjusted so that the red car started very late and had to
move especially rapidly to catch the blue car at the goal.
In this case the child responded that the red car moved more

quickly because he watched it.

This direct perception of

motion Kuhn calls "perceptual blurriness."
If the child had employed either criterion of velocity

singly and consistently there would have been no conflict.

However with these two experimental conditions the child's

cognitive criterion for velocity are brought into conflict.
The red and blue cars finish at the same time in both condi-

tions but paradoxically the red car is both faster, slower
or the same as the blue car depending on whether the percep-

tual blurriness or goal reaching criterion is used.

In the

beginning the children attribute the differences to minor
differences in the experiment arrangement and in the wording
of the questions.

Those at the transition level finally

become aware of their arbitrary oscillations and construct

a

more advanced concept of "faster" which clearly differentiates instantaneous velocity from average velocity
In Galileo's "thought experiment" Galileo constructed

an imaginary dialogue which brought the previous Aristotel-

ian paradox concerning velocity to a fore.

Previously

Aristotle had defined velocity as equal when the same change
is accomplished in an equal time.

However, on occasion
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Aristotle made direct judgements of velocity without
regard
to endpoints,

distance covered or time elapsed.

On those

occasions he appeared to be confusing instantaneous velocity
with his main definition of velocity as an average.

Galileo

sensed this anomaly and constructed a "thought experiment"
to fully generalize its paradoxical conditions.
In this

"thought experiment" two bodies are rolled

along the frictionless surface of "CB" and "CA"
12)

.

(see Figure

It is assumed that when the falling bodies reach A and

B they will have

acquired the same speed to carry them back

to their starting positions.

When asked which body is

faster the untutored response is usually the one along the

perpendicular.

It appears quicker because it is "more

blurred" in its movement and reaches its goal first.

How-

ever, the dialogue reminds us that the faster of two motions
is usually defined as the one that covers the same distance

in a lesser time.

Hence we cannot directly compare "CB" to

"CA" because "CB" is shorter.

We must mark off an equal

distance of "CB" along the incline of "CA" in order to make
a

comparison.

Paradoxically if we mark off the distance of

"CB" from the beginning point "C" then the perpendicular

body is faster and if we mark off the same distance from the

end point of "A" then the incline body is faster and if we
mark it off in the appropriate place in between then the

perpendicular and incline body are the same speed.

Hence

B

Figure 12.

Galileo's incline plane.

124

motion along the perpendicular is simultaneously faster
than, equal in speed to, and slower than the motion along

the incline.

The impact of this paradox was to make the

reader realize that speed ought not be attributed to the

whole as Aristotle and everyone else had done up until that
time but rather to its parts.

In effect it magnified the

anomaly of the undifferentiated concepts of average velocity
and instantaneous velocity into

a

full blown paradoxical

conflict which prepared the way for clearly differentiating
the two.

Both Galileo's "thought experiment" and Piaget's

learning experiment function to magnify the vaguely felt
anomaly, if sensed at all, of the undifferentiated concept
of instantaneous velocity and average velocity.

appropriately posed questions

a

Through

paradoxical condition was

constructed which confronted both the child and the adult
with the conflict inherent in their interaction with the
phenomena.

This paradox served to prepare the way for the

construction of

a

more advanced concept of velocity which

differentiated average velocity and instantaneous velocity.
Kuhn appears to propose that the development of the child's

concept of velocity recapitulated the historical development
of the concept in that both shared a similar paradoxical

quality of discovery.
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Kuhn goes on to discuss how a brilliant logician and

physicist such as Aristotle could have proposed such an

undifferentiated concept of velocity.

While his concept of

velocity may appear confused and self-contradictory to us it
was quite consistent with his world view of motions which

were uniform or quasi- uniform.

In Aristotle's world of uni-

form motion his definition of average velocity functioned so

successfully that conflict rarely occurred.
trinsic defect existed in the concept itself.

Hence no in-

Kuhn states:

Its defect lay not in its logical consistency but in its
failure to fit the full fine structure of the world to
which it was expected to apply.
That is why learning to
recognize its defects was necessarily learning about the
(Kuhn, 1977, p.
world as well as about the concept.
258)

Hence the paradoxical defect or inadequacy was not inherent
in the concept itself but in the interactive application of

the concept to the varied conditions of the world.

Both

Galileo's increased experimental scrutiny and paradoxical
"thought experiment" appear to have been necessary condi-

tions for reformulating a new concept of velocity and

acceleration.

This reformulation constituted a new way of

seeing the world in more depth.
Kuhn's discussion of the "essential tension," "anomaly," "paradoxical thought experiment," and gestalt "new way
of seeing" all serve to more adequately conceptualize the

creative process of paradigm shift.

However, the criticism

raised earlier concerning "meaning variance

between

126

theories has not completely been answered.

Kuhn maintains

that with the radical gestalt shift from one paradigm to

another

a

radical translation occurs in the common vocabu-

lary between paradigms such as "force," "mass," "inertia,"

"motion," "length," "space," "time," etc.

For example the

term "motion" developmentally shifts from Aristotle's global
term of "average velocity" to Galileo's more complete term
of "average velocity" and "instantaneous velocity" on to the

even more complete advances of Newton's concept of absolute

acceleration and Einstein's concept of relative acceleraAristotle's concept of "average velocity" and Gali-

tion.

leo's concept of "average velocity" may seem comparable.

However, Aristotle's concept of "average velocity" was in-

terpreted more globally in terms of

a

different world view.

Hence there is no one-to-one literal correspondence between
the two.

Rather it was the genius of Galileo to show

through an imaginary "thought experiment" the paradoxical

implications which occur when Aristotle's global concept of

average velocity is translated into

a

same may be said of Piaget's children.

new world view.

The

They did not merely

learn a more precisely differentiated definition of velocity, rather they constructed a qualitatively new meaning of

velocity which incorporated and redefined the preceding concepts

.
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Kuhn's critics
(Shapere, 1964

,

pp

.

(Achinstein,

1964, pp

.

497-509)

383-94) maintain that theory laden radi-

cal shifts in "meaning" from theory to theory pose the irre-

solvable paradox of "unintelligibility."

The paradox of

unintelligibility is:
that if meaning variance is taken literally to be
true, then it would be impossible to understand a new
theory since the new terms in it would be unrelated to
the meanings they had in previous theories.
The meanings of these terms rested upon their context in the
theory but one could never understand the theory without
first knowing the meaning of the constituents terms and
this is impossible without understanding the theory.
(MacCormac, 1971, pp. 145-59)
.

.

.

In other words,

if we accept that the meaning of a theory's

basic vocabulary is theory dependent then a radical shift in
the theory would create a qualitative variance in the meaning of the basic vocabulary which in turn would make precise

literal communication impossible.

According to Hesse (1980, pp. 111-25) and MacCormac
(1971, pp.

145-59) metaphoric meaning serves the explanatory

function of providing "meaning variance" and hence resolves
the paradox of unintelligibilty in paradigm shifts:
If the interaction view of scientific metaphor or model
is combined with the claim that the referent of the
metaphor is the primary system (that is, the metaphor is
then it follows that the
true of the primary system)
thesis of meaning-invariance of the literal observationFor, the
descriptions of the primary system is false.
origithe
interaction view implies that the meaning of
by
changed
nal literal language of the primary system is
(Mary Hesse, 1980, p.
the adaption of the metaphor.
,

119)
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In other words we have no direct
perception of nature as the

realist would claim.

The primary observational referent of

"nature" is always understood in terms of an implicit
or ex-

plicit secondary metaphoric model.
nature in the likeness of

a

Plato conceived of

human organism.

ceived of nature in the likeness of

Newton con-

a machine.

The adoption

of the Newtonian metaphor of "machine" no doubt helped to

resolve many of the anomalies created by the Platonic meta-

phor of "nature as

a

human organism."

With the advent of

the Newtonian metaphor of "nature as a machine" the primary

observational language system we used to describe "nature"
was changed.

However it would be false to say that nature

literally became

a

"machine" any more than we would say it

was a "human organism."

To do so would be to falsely reify

the metaphor and reduce it to a static myth.

There is no

one-to-one correspondence between "nature" and "machine" nor
can we deduce the laws of nature a priori from the laws of
the machine as the logical positivist claim.

Rather there

is an interaction between the meanings of both the primary

observational language system of "nature" and the secondary
model of "machine."
a

Hesse states,

"Nature becomes more like

machine in the mechanical philosophy, and actual, concrete

machines themselves are seen as if stripped down to their
essential qualities of mass in motion"
117).

(Hesse,

In other words the secondary model,

1980, p.

"machine," is
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redefined in terms of "nature" and the primary observational
language of "nature" is redescribed in terms of the "machine."

Hence with the adoption of the scientific term of

"machine" as a metaphor not only does its new metaphoric

application change our world view but the old usage of
"machine" is redefined as well.

Thus the metaphoric re-

definition of the old usage of "machine" and its new interpretive redescription of "nature" accounts for "meaningvariance" in paradigm shifts.

Hence the word "machine"

takes on a qualitatively new meaning compared with its old

animistic meaning.

There is no one-to-one correspondence

between the new usage and the old usage.
not "unintelligibly unrelated.

constitutes

a

"

However, they are

Rather their relation

metaphoric transformation which is intel-

ligible and empirically testable.

Hesse argues that from

the deductive view of the logical positivist there is no

strong sense of prediction because they cannot account for
the addition of new correspondence laws between the primary

observation system and the secondary theoretical system for
a

developing science.

She states:

In the metaphoric view, on the other hand, since the
domain of the explanation is redescribed in terminology
transferred from the secondary system, it is to be ex-

pected that the original observation language will both
be shifted in meaning and extended in vocabulary, and
hence that predictions in the strong sense will become
They may not of course turn out to be true,
possible.
or
but that is an occupational hazard of any explanation
They will however be rational, because,
prediction.
rationality consists just in the continuous adaptation
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of our language to our continually expanding world and
metaphor is one of the chief means by which this is
accomplished.
(Hesse, 1980, p. 123)
The concept of interactive metaphor allows us to

account for intelligible "meaning variance" in paradigm
shifts.

The paradigm shift from understanding motion as

Aristotle's velocity to Galileo's velocity was

a

metaphoric

transformation of the meaning of "motion as velocity."
Galileo both exposed the paradoxical anomaly of Aristotle's

metaphor of velocity and proposed

a new

metaphoric resolu-

tion which incorporated and redefined the paradoxical ele-

ments of Aristotle's metaphor.

constructed

a

Likewise Piaget's children

new metaphor for velocity which resolved the

paradoxical conflict of their previous concepts.

This new

metaphoric construction of velocity incorporated and redefined the previous paradoxical concepts of "goal reaching"

and "perceptual blurriness."

Both Piaget's children and

Galileo's metaphoric constructions of velocity resolved

paradoxical anomalies with genuine novelty and intelligible
order.

Summary
In final summary of the review of literature we shall

briefly recapitulate the constructive theories presented.
For learning, production, development and theory change we

have presented the theoretical poles of "trivial

and

radi-

cal" creativity which are expressive of the general dilemma
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of the creative process and various second-order resolutions
of "genuine" creativity.

Essentially all the constructive

second-order resolutions of genuine creativity involve the
functional coordination of first-order opposites leading to
a

second-order reintegration of the opposites

.

Concerning

creative learning Duckworth proposes the constructive interplay of conflicting differences between perceptions, actions, and words.

Petrie proposes the constructive interac-

tion of metaphoric words and applied actions in triangulating anomalies.

Concerning creative production Koestler

proposes the coordination of the opposites of bisociation or
the intersection of incompatible frames of reference which

generate multiple levels of metaphoric insight.

Rothenberg

proposes the active conception of opposites simultaneously
in the Janusian thought processes and the assisting of

homospatial processes which generate new metaphoric integrations of the Janusian opposites.

Concerning creative cogni-

tive development Piaget proposes the progressive equilibra-

tion of asynchronous schemes leading to a second-order

reconstruction.

Concerning creative theory change Kuhn

proposes the "essential tension" between old and new parain
digms and the propaedeutic role of thought experiments

old
exposing and harnessing the paradoxical anomalies of

paradigms.

Hesses proposes the functional explanation of
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metaphor to account for the discrepancy of meaning variance
in theory change.
In the next chapter we shall further develop a general

model of constructive creativity which incorporates and extends the reviewed theories.

More specifically we shall de-

fine constructive creativity as the functional coordination
of first-order opposites leading to a second-order reinte-

gration of opposites.

Furthermore we shall essentially

characterize the second-order reintegration of opposites as
a

metaphoric process.

CHAPTER

I

V

THE METAPHORIC RESOLUTION OF THE

PARADOX OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS
In this chapter we propose that the process of

"meta-

phoric reframing" coherently resolves the paradox of creativity by providing an explicable genesis for the "genuine"

novelty of second-order recreating.

Many writers have

expounded upon the fundamental importance of metaphor and

analogy as symbolic vehicles for the creative process in
science and art (Aristotle, 1941)
1973)

(Gordon,

1973)

(Koestler,

(Bronowski,

1969)

1975)

(Bruner,

(Samples, 1976).

Aristotle praises the importance of metaphor for expressing
the similarity of the dissimilar,

"...

the greatest thing

by far is to be a master of metaphor; it is the one thing

that cannot be learned from others; and it also

a

sign of

genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive percep-

tion of the similarity of the dissimilar"
Poetics, 1459a).

(Aristotle,

Bronowski maintains that metaphors and

analogies are the stepping stones of every creative mind.
Kepler's mind, we know, was filled with just such fanciKepler
ful analogies; and we know what they were.
the musito
planets
the
of
speeds
the
wanted to relate
solids
regular
five
the
fit
He tried to
cal intervals.
and
worked,
likenesses
None of these
into their orbits.
they
and
been
they have been forgotten; yet they have
remain the stepping stones of every creative mind.
To us, the analogies by which Kepler listened for the
movement of the planets in the music of the spheres are
.
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farfetched.
Yet are
which Rutherford and
for that atom in, of
(Bronowski, 1975, p.

they more so than the wild leap by
Bohr in our century found a model
all places, the planetary system?
12).

Koestler speaks to the metaphoric process of intersecting
frames of reference common to the creative process of both

scientist and poet:

... I have spoken at length of the close relatedness
between the scientist seeing an analogy where nobody saw
one before, and the poet's discovery of an original
metaphor or simile.
Both rely on the mediation of
unconscious processes to provide the analogy.
In the
scientist's eureka process two previously unconnected
frames of reference are made to intersect, but the same
description may be applied to the poet's travaille--the
discovery of a felicitous poetic comparison.
The difference between them is the character of the frames of
reference, which in the first case are of a more abstract, in the second of a more sensuous nature; and the
criteria of their validity differ accordingly.
But the
difference, as we have seen, is a metter of degree; and
often the two overlap. (Koestler, 1969, p. 320)
While these writers and others have made laudable efforts in

documenting the importance of metaphor as

a

symbolic vehicle

of the creative process they have not provided a comprehen-

sive theory of creativity which adequately explicates the

functional structure and the dialectical dynamics of metaphor.

This dissertation will attempt to explicate the func-

tional structure and the dialectical dynamics of metaphoric

reframing and to show the fundamentally common role it plays
in creative learning, creative production, cognitive devel-

opment and scientific theory change.
Next we shall review three theories of metaphoric com-

prehension:

(1)

comparison,

(2)

tension,

(3)

interaction.

.
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We shall argue that the comparison theory reduces
metaphor
to an explicably trivial novelty and that "tension" and

interaction" are essential functions of metaphor which

account for genuine novelty but are in need of further

explication
Comparison Theory of Metaphor

According to the proponents of the comparison theory
(Aristotle, 1941)

(Henle,

1958)

(Ortony,

1975)

all metaphors

are implicit similes in disguise and may be reduced to di-

rect comparison.

For example the metaphor "society is a

sea" is reducible to the simile "society is like a sea.

"

Thus we may find one-to-one points of similarity between the

pre-existing salient attributes and relations of the primary
referent of "society" and the secondary referent of "sea."
Hence in comprehending this metaphor we transfer the more

familiar attributes and relations of "sea" over to the less

apparent common attributes of "society."

We could entirely

bypass indirect expressions such as "society is a sea" and

replace them with literal paraphrases such as "society is
large."
a

This is the substitution view of metaphor which is

special case of the comparison theory.

The more general

view of the comparison theory states that we may totally
exhaust the meaning of metaphor with direct literal paraphrases of similarity as "society is 'fluid,'

'flexible,'
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'

f u il

'

•

•

•

like the sea."

The weaker version of the com-

parison theory looks for physical attributes of similarity.
The stronger version of the comparison theory looks for

abstract relations and structures of similarity.
case the comprehension of metaphor is

a

In either

systematically rule

governed process of directly comparing the well-defined
characteristics of both referents.

Although the comparison

theory clearly explicates the comprehension of metaphor it
also, no matter how complex and abstract the corresponding

structures, reduces it to a trivial novelty of merely trans-

ferring pre-existing points of similarity.

Tension Theory of Metaphor

According to the proponents of the tension theory
(Beardsley, 1962)

(Khatchadourian

(Berggren, 1962)

,

1968)

(Ricoeur, 1977) non- trivial metaphors are characterized by
an essential tension between the primary and secondary subject.

For example with the metaphor "society is a sea" the

literal identity of "society" with "sea" created by the

copula "is" results in logical absurdity and emotional
shock.

Goodman (1968) calls this

mistake."

a

"calculated category

Beardsley (1962) calls it the "metaphoric twist

of logical opposition.
by incongruity."

Burke (1950) calls it "perspective

Berggren (1962) calls it the essential

tension of "stereoscopic vision."

Ricoeur (1977) calls it
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the tensive "intersection of separate semantic
fields."

primary term,

society," is derived from

a

The

"cultural" cate-

gory while the secondary term "sea" is derived from a

natural

category.

The tension between their identity and

difference suspends the normal rules of comparison and
evokes new meanings not exhaustively reducible by direct
comparison.

While the comparison theory stresses similari-

ties the tension theory stresses dissimilarities which

necessitate restructuring for comprehension.

The literal

meanings of "society" and "sea" are figuratively redefined
and incorporated into a new integrated meaning without

losing their tensive distinctiveness.
As the previous example suggests,

the tension between

the referents can neither be too little or too bland if the

metaphor is to construct

a

surprising novelty.

On the other

hand the paradoxical tension must not be too much for then
For example the metaphoric

it may lose its meaningfulness.

sentence "society is

a

paper" creates an absurd discrepancy

between the referents of "society" and "paper" which is neither very meaningful nor aesthetically pleasing.

within a different context for

a

Of course

particular purpose even

this metaphor may become meaningfully apt.

For example a

newspaper writer may use this metaphor to express
sight about the relation of the media and society.

a new in-

However,

even within this situation the metaphor will depend upon
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some appropriate level of aesthetic tension for
conveying

both meaning fulnes s and the surprise of genuine novelty.
Hence the aesthetic tension must neither be too little for
it lapses into a bland comparison of trivial novelty nor too

great for it ruptures the meaningful relation with

a

freak-

ish novelty.

Because of metaphor's irreducible aesthetic tension it
is able to

express compacted vivid new meanings not expres-

sible by more elaborate direct comparisons or abstract definition.

Through this generative tension metaphors such as

"society is a sea" may spawn new metaphors with divergent

meanings such as "life is an ocean of tribulation" or
"life's brightest treasures are discovered in the dark

depths of the sea.

"

In some fundamental sense the rich aes-

thetic tension of metaphor can never be completely reduced;
it can only be revisioned or reimagined in a different meta-

phoric form.

Hence metaphor begets metaphor and ultimately

can only be understood through its own terms

.

This presents

inherent theoretical limitations for writers trying to

explicate metaphor in the reductionistic terms of direct

comparison or tensionless abstraction.

The theory of ten-

sion accounts for the genuine novelty of metaphor.

However,

the aesthetic tension of the primary and secondary system of

meaning must needs be further explicated in terms congruent
with its rich multi— leveled opposition.

Dialectics offsrs

a
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distinct possibility for explicating the coordination of
these opposites.

Interaction Theory of Metaphor

According to proponents of the interaction theory
(Black, 1954-55)

(Lakoff and Johnson,

1980)

(Ricoeur, 1978)

(Richards, 1936) non-trivial metaphors are comprehended

through an interaction between the primary referent and the

secondary referent.

The weaker version of this theory pro-

poses that the secondary referent acts as

a

"filter," "lens"

or "screen "for reorganizing the meaning of the primary re-

ferent.

For instance in the metaphor "society is a sea" we

may view "society" through the "lens," "screen" or "filter"
of sea's system of meaning.

This "screening" causes certain

aspects of "society" to be suppressed and new insights to be

highlighted in terms of "sea."
comes more like the "sea.

"

In other words

"society" be-

This may produce new insights

into the fluid interrelatedness of "society."

Hence this is

not merely a transference of attributes but rather a fil-

tered reorganization of the primary system of meaning.
The "weaker" filter version of the interaction theory

may be criticized for its static one-way account of interaction.

The "stronger" version of the interaction theory

proposes a mutual interaction between the primary and sec-

ondary system of meaning.

Hence in our example "society"
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becomes more like the "sea" but also "sea" becomes
more like
a

society.'

Hence there is no specially privileged "lens"

or "filter" of detached observation.

The "filter," that is,

the secondary referent, is mutually changed also.

According

to the strong interaction theory the similarity of the

primary and secondary referent is not

a

pre-existing impli-

cit correspondence to be discovered rather the similarity is

synchronously created through interaction.

Burke

(1950)

ex-

presses this interaction as understanding "this" in terms of
"that" and "that" in terms of "this."

Hence "society"

becomes defined in terms of "sea" and "sea" becomes defined
in terms of "society."

This is not a vicious circle of

contradiction or repetition but rather

a

double spiral of

constructive new meaning which is neither completely reducible nor expressible by direct comparison.
The filter theory rightfully emphasizes the asymmetri-

cal relation of tending to view the primary referent in
terms of the secondary referent.

The secondary referent is

usually more familiar and tangible and hence may be useful
in explaining the less familiar or tangible aspects of the

primary referent.

For instance "sea" provides tangibly

familiar attributes and relations through which to vividly

portray "society."

Admittedly this asymmetry is one of

metaphor's fundamental qualities which cannot be reduced to
logical symmetry (de Man, 1978).

However,

the

"strong"
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version of interaction incorporates this and goes beyond it
to include the mutual asymmetry of viewing the secondary

referent in terms of the primary referent also.

While the

asymmetry of explicitly viewing the primary referent in
terms of the secondary term tends to make the unfamiliar or

strange more familiar the asymmetry of implicitly viewing
the secondary referent in terms of the primary referent

tends to make the familiar somewhat strange.

The primary

referent of "society" viewed in terms of the secondary
referent of "sea" tends to assimilate to the more tangible
aspects of "sea," while the secondary referent of "sea" seen
in terms of the primary referent of "society" tends to ac-

commodate to the more abstract qualities of "sea."
mutual contrast of these views creates

a

The

binocular perspec-

tive which goes beyond the one-way monocular view of the

filter or lens theory.

Hence "society" seen in terms of

"sea" takes on the familiar tangible qualities of fluidity

and interconnectedness while simultaneously "sea" seen in
terms of "society" takes on the strange abstract qualities
of communica tional and transporta tional networks.

intersection of contrasting views creates

a

This

two-way asymme-

trical interaction which goes beyond the one-way asymmetry
of filter theory by both making the strange familiar and the

familiar strange simultaneously.
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Gordon (1973) has argued that these are separate functions of metaphor.

Scientific metaphors tend to make the

unfamiliar or strange more familiar and artistic metaphors
tend to make the familiar or commonplace strangely new.

The

strong interaction view of metaphor incorporates the simultaneous interaction of both these functions.

Although the

scientific metaphor may be weighed toward making the strange
familiar its genuine novelty arises from the reciprocal process of making the familiar strange.

The artistic metaphor

may be weighed toward making the familiar strange but its

comprehensible order comes from making the strange familiar.
These are not separate functions but their mutual interac-

tion is necessary to account for both the explicable

order of making the strange familiar and the genuine novelty
of making the familiar strange simultaneously.

Before summarizing the three theories of metaphor we

must consider the meta-cognitive factors of "intention" and
"context.

"

The interpretation and creation of metaphor is

partially a function of "intention" and "context.

"

The

metaphor "society is a sea" will be interpreted differently
according to whether the context

is

the English classroom or

the sociology classroom and whether it is intended as a test

question or a free discussion subject.

For the interpreta-

tion of comparative metaphors "context" and "intention

guide the selection of pre-existing similarity.

For tension
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and interactive metaphors "context" and "intention" play an

even more important role because the metaphor's contrasting

differences lead to

a

restructuring of meaning which is con-

gruent with "intention" and "context."
The theory of comparative metaphor even in its strong-

est version only provides for an explication of the trivial

novelty of pre-existing complex structural similarity.

The

tension theory of metaphor provides a general account of

genuine novelty but is in need of further explication as to

how the irreducible aesthetic tension interacts to provoke

restructuring of the genuine novelty.

a

The interactive theo-

ry in its weaker "filter" version is inadequate to explicate

genuine novelty because of its static one-way interaction.
The stronger version of mutual interaction is adequate to

account for genuine novelty but needs further explication of
how the interaction balances the aesthetic tension.

Thus

both theories of "tension" and "interaction" appear to be

necessary to the fuller explication of genuine novelty.
Furthermore it must be noted that both functional

qualities of "tension" and "interaction" are found in
Piaget's concept of "reciprocal equilibration" leading to

reconstructions (Piaget, 1972)

.

The reciprocal equilibra-

tion of the primary system of "society" and the secondary

system of "sea" would be the reciprocal assimilation and

accommodation of "society" with "sea."

In other words the
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system of meaning of "society" would cross assimilate
and

accommodate the system of meaning of "sea" and vice-versa.
Those points of direct comparison would be readily assimi-

lated to each other.

Those points of dissimilarity would

require mutual accommodation and thus restructuring to

create a new second-order reintegration.

For Piaget this

new integration would be subsumed by logico-mathematical

structures which converge toward formal non-contradiction
(Piaget, 1980, p. 304).

However, metaphor is aesthetically

structured with an irreducible contrasting tension of crosstyped categories.

It will be argued that Piaget’s charac-

terization of cognitive development as converging toward
formal non-contradiction reduces the metaphoric richness of
his own theory and precludes the development of advanced

metaphoric operations beyond formal operations.

While

Piaget's logico-mathematical structures may be appropriate

approximations for closed structures under first-order equilibrium states they are not appropriate for open structures

equilibrating second-order transition.

Thus we will argue

the primacy of metaphoric operations in the genesis of

genuinely novel structures and the constructive advance of

metaphoric operations beyond formal operations.
At this point we may offer

a

preliminary definition of

metaphoric reframing and further elaborate it with examples.
Metaphoric reframing as

a

dialectical process is the

.
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horizontal first-order coordination of the opposition of the

primary and secondary system through which

is

constructed

a

vertical second-order recoordinating of the opposition.
This vertical second-order recoordinating broadens and deep-

ens the world with genuine novelty and an explicable order

which is aesthetically certain and contextually sensitive.
In simpler terms metaphoric reframing is the generation of

unity through diversity since it begins with the paradoxical

diversity of opposites and ends with the metaphoric unity of
opposites
Visual Experiment of the Profiled Vase
We may illustrate the dialectics of metaphoric reframing with the following visual experiment using the equivocal

gestalt of profiled faces and vase (see Figure

13)

.

Within

the context of this simple visual experiment we may perform
a

variety of visual exercises.

Beginning with an initial

visual orientation to the equivocal figure we may then absolutely differentiate the "faces" to the neglect of the "vase
or we may absolutely differentiate the "vase" to the neglect

of the "faces."

Not too difficult a task.

In fact it seems

quite easy to sporadically fixate on one aspect of the equivocal figure to the indifference of the other.

Next we may

actively shift the equivocal figure back and forth between
the mutually exclusive fixations of "either" the faces "or"
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Figure 13.

Visual experiment with profiled faces.

147

_

vase

^-

n

alternation

.

Sense the conflicting tension

which comes with the discontinuous shifting between the

mutually exclusive fixations.

Experimental studies have

shown that self-perceived creative people spontaneously

alternate equivocal figures at

a

higher frequency than non-

self-perceived creative people (Bergum, 1979)

.

Next we may

resolve the conflicting tension by reducing the equivocal
shifting to merely an abstract composite of the collective
set of lines of "both" the faces "and" vase.

After all

isn't the conflicting tension just an illusion in our mind?
The lines are not actually moving on the paper are they?

Isn't it just an abstract pattern of static lines into which
we read the shifting illusion?

Quite rationally we may per-

ceive the equivocal figure as merely an abstract set of
lines devoid of the conflicting tension previously per-

ceived.

Finally for the most difficult task, we may attempt to
resolve the conflicting tension of the equivocal figure not
by rationally reducing it to an abstract composite of lines

merely on the paper but by actively interacting with the
figure to construct an integration of both the faces and
vase shifting into a common space simultaneously.
to Rothenberg

(1979a, p.

274)

According

the metaphoric ability to

integrate equivocal gestalts simultaneously in space exemplifies the type of visual thinking that highly creative

.
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people use in problem solving.

Usually this attempt at best

speeds up the shifting perception to

a

rapid alternation

around their indeterminate point of meeting.

We hover back

and forth dialectically through the indeterminate visual gap
of a shifting illusion.

Yet the common ground of their

intersection eludes us.

The simultaneous recoordination of

the equivocal gestalt is "neither" in the faces shifting to

the vase "nor" in the vase shifting to the faces but rather
is

generated through the co-reflexive intersection of their

cross-shifting (see Figure 14)

Through the co- reflexive

intersection we see what is neither in the vase reflecting
the faces nor the face the vase but rather is constructively

imaged through the allusory interference pattern mutually

reflecting both

.

Through the common point of an indetermi-

nate visual intersection arises the genuinely novel percepWhat was an illusory

tion of a metaphoric integration.

shifting point becomes the pivot of
tion

a

metaphoric recoordina-

.

If you feel defeated by the

"normally" impossible vis-

ual exercise of the last task then try recontextualizing

your expectations of the rigid rules of the experiment with
the flexible rules of an imaginative game.

equivocal gestalt as "twins kissing

a

Imagine the

flower vase."

Through

this metaphoric image the shifting illusion is brought into
a

coherent focus (hopefully!).

Through the

neither

.

149

Faces

Figure 14.
faces

Vase

Co-reflexive intersection of profiled
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foreground "nor" background point of the kisses the elusive
illusion is transformed into an enduring allusion.

metaphoric transformation is

a

The

dialectical shift from a

vaguely felt indeterminate gap of perception to the felt-

meaning of

a

focal moment.

Within the context of

meta-

a

phoric thought experiment new metaphoric meanings are

constructed through the co-reflexive intersection of

a

shifting illusion.
The visual experiment of constructing a metaphoric

image may be developmentally summarized and elaborated

according to five dialectical steps of progressive coordination:

(1)

global perception,

of faces and vase,

faces "and" vase

integration.

,

(3)
(5)

(2)

absolute differentiation

"either" faces "or" vases

(4)

,

"both"

"neither" faces "nor" vase metaphoric

The "global perception" is the initial visual

orientation to the strange figure.

The "absolute differen-

tiation" is the disjoint fixation on one aspect of the

equivocal figure to the indifference of the other.

From

this one-side indifference we dialectically move to the more

complete coordination of "either" faces "or" vase

.

At this

level of perception we confront the conflict of the discon-

tinuous shifting between the mutually exclusive fixation
points.

The equivocal inconsistency of this perception dia-

lectically leads to the rational consistency of "both" the
faces "and" vase as merely an abstract composite of lines on
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the paper.

However the abstract class inclusion of this

level is statically incomplete because it lacks the dynamic

interaction between the "vase" and "faces."

The

"vase" and

"faces" have become objectively detached lines buried in the

paper.

A more sophisticated extension of the "both/and"

coordination attempts to account for the interaction by
reducing the discontinuous gap between the two opposing
fixations to a continuous sequence of intervening static
positions.

The additive summation of these successive posi-

tions becomes a more sophisticated composite of discrete

degrees by which to view the equivocal figure.

However this

more sophisticated composite is still statically incomplete
because it does not capture the dynamic unity of the interIt is merely

secting differences of the "faces" and "vase."

rationalistic overlay of

a

static grid for reducing the

conflicting differences to

a

bland consistency.

a

The dynamic

unity is "neither" in the faces "nor" in the vase taken

singly or as an additive composite.

Rather the dynamic

unity is metaphorically displayed as

a

"quivering kiss"

which takes place through the intimate intersection of
"twins kissing a flower vase."

The

"quivering kiss" is

continually regenerated anew to repeatedly remake the un-

making of the contrasting differences and not to continuously reduce the conflicting differences to
tency.

a

bland consis-

The unity of this dynamic intersection is generated
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because of" the contrasting differences and not merely
"in
spite of" as with the "both/and" coordination.

Next we may interpret the literary metaphor "Society
is a sea"

according to the metaphoric dialectic as we did

for the previous visual metaphor.

At the global level of

coordination we initially orient ourselves to the new sentence.

Next we may absolutely differentiate the subject of

"society" to the neglect of "sea" and/or vice-versa.

Soon

the incompleteness of this interpretation leads to the more

complete but inconsistent literal interpretation of "either"
society "or" sea in discontinuous interaction.

At this

level the logical absurdity of the literally fused identity

created by the copula "is" provokes the search for hidden

similarities to reduce the conflicting differences.
search for

a

This

reduction of the conflicting differences leads

to the next level of consistent similarities between "both"

society "and" sea
a

.

At this level we reduce the metaphor to

simile "Society is like

a

sea" in order to find common

points of correspondence and degrees of resemblance.

With

the "both/and" interpretation we successively view society

from the relative perspective of sea and then sea from the

relative perspective of society searching for

established continuity between the two.

a pre-

However, this is

like shifting from viewing the world with one eye to the

other in rapid succession trying to behold the greater

.

153

dimension of binocular depth.

This relative oscillation of

the two monocular perspectives is not enough to additively

generate the extra dimension of the binocular perspective.
The incompleteness of the flat consistency of the "both/and"

level leads to the next level.
is

The meaning of metaphor

"neither" in the perspective of viewing society in terms

of sea "nor" in the complementary perspective of viewing the

sea in terms of society

Rather the generation of metaphor-

.

ic meaning takes place through the co-reflexive intersection

of the two contrasting perspectives simultaneously

Figure 15)

.

(see

Through the focal coordination of both first-

order perspectives integrated simultaneously we construct
the second-order co-reflexive perspective.

This is analo-

gous to binocular vision which allows us to construct the

extra dimension of depth which is invisible to either eye
alone

Co-Reflexive Perspectives
The distinction between "relative" perspectives and a
"co— ref lexive " perspective may be further clarified.

Thus

far we have indicated that the "relative" perspectives of

monocuthe "both/and" level are like an alternating double
the
lar vision while the "co-reflexive" perspective of

"neither/nor" level is

a

single binocular vision.

Thus the

"relative" perspectives are temporally dependent and

"
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Figure 15.
a Sea.

Co-reflexive intersection of "Society is

.
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continuously summed for consistency while the single coreflexive perspective is structurally interdependent and

constructively multiplied for fuller coherence.

The "co-

reflexive" perspective generates irreducible tensive inter-

pretations such as "the sea is submerging society's ever
emerging reefs" while the "relative" perspective merely
reveals "society's" pre-existing "fluid" like attributes.

While the "relative" perspective reveals

a bland,

flat,

tensionless abstraction of attributes and static relations
the "co-reflexive" perspective displays a rich, textured,

tensive image of opposites uniting through their contrasting

differences
The concept of "co-ref lection " may be further differ-

entiated by contrasting it with the related mathematical
concept of "reciprocity."

In mathematics given a group the

reciprocal of an element is its opposite which when combined
with it produces the identity element.

Furthermore, the

reciprocal operation is closed under transformation, that
is,

it always comes back to the original identity.

For

example given the group of rational numbers with the transformational operation of multiplication we may pick any rational number such as "five" and multiply it by its reciprocal of "one-fifth" to result in the original identity ele-

ment of "one."

Given the visual system of the equivocally

profiled vase we may begin with the vase and shift to the
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faces.

The reciprocal of this transformational shift
is the

reverse shift from the faces back to the vase, that is,
back
to the origin or identity.

The reciprocal operation is a

first-order operation closed under transformation.
always comes back to where it began.

it

At the "both/and"

level of coordinating the relative perspective and its

reciprocal perspective there is the ongoing oscillation of

perspectives which shifts back and forth through their indeterminate intersection yet always returning to the origin.
The reciprocal transformation confirms and maintains the

identity of the first-order system but it is not productive
of a new second-order identity such as the visual metaphor
of the "twins kissing the vase."

The relative perspective

and its reciprocal shift back and forth through their inde-

terminate intersection yet they miss the essential point of
their focal coordination

.

The co-reflexive perspective is

neither the relative perspective nor its reciprocal rather
it is their simultaneous focal coordination through which is

generated

a

new second-order identity.

Co-ref lexivity may be further clarified by explicating
the "reflexive" quality.
to itself, that is,
p.

129)

A system is reflexive if it refers

it is self-referential

(Hughes and Bruecht,

1979, p.

1).

(Bronowski, 1966,
For example some

direct tautological examples of ref lexivity are:

"This sen-

tence has five words," "This is a sentence," and "This is

a

.
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true sentence."

A paradoxical form of reflexivity is

exemplified in the following form, "This sentence

is

false."

While the tautological examples are self-evident truths the

paradoxical form is more thought provoking.

If the sentence

is false then it is true by virtue of what it says

"about"

itself and if it is true then it is false by virtue of what
it says it "is"

(Gardner,

1982,

p.

5)

.

The original form of

this thought provoking "reflexivity" is the classical para-

dox stated by Epimenides of Crete in 5th century B.C.,

Cretans are liars."

As Watzlawick states,

"All

"If it is true

that all Cretans are liars, then Epimenides spoke the truth,
but then the truth is that he is lying.

He is therefore

truthful when he lies and lying when he is truthful" (Watzla-

wick

,

1974, p.

66

)

Some have argued that this type of paradox is a mean-

ingless absurdity which should be eliminated (Russell 19 25)

Others have argued that it is

a

meaningful indeterminacy

which serves to dereify our rigid concept of an absolute
two-value logic ((Brand, 1974).
xv)

Spencer-Brown (1979, xiv-

has shown that "imaginary" numbers in mathematics have

the same logical form as this reflexive paradox.
the imaginary number equation x =-l.

Consider

Just as the Liar's

paradox may be assigned the following mutually exclusive
truth values of "true," "false" and "meaningless" the equa2
x=-l/x may
tion x =-l in its translated equivalent form of

.
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be assigned the mutually exclusive numerical values
of "1,"
-1

and

cal.

ment

0.'

If x=l then +1=-1/+1=-1 is clearly paradoxi-

This is equivalent to saying if the paradoxical state"I

am a liar" is true then it is true that

I

am lying.

On the other hand if x=-l then -1=-1/-1=+1 which is equiva-

lent to saying if the paradoxical statement

false then it is false that

I

a

am

a

am telling the truth.

thermore mathematicians consider setting x=0

deadend which creates

"I

a

liar" is
Fur-

nonproductive

faulty division by zero.

This is

equivalent to assigning the truth value of "meaningless" to
"I

am a liar" and creating a nonproductive resolution which

is

faulty.

Of course mathematicians did not prohibit equa2

tions such as x =-l just because none of the ordinary values
Rather they constructed

worked.

a

new class of numbers

called "imaginary" numbers which are essential to the solution of many electrical engineering and quantum mechanics

problems.

Just as mathematicians constructed

a

new class of

"imaginary" numbers logicians are beginning to construct new
systems of logic which utilize reflexivity
1979)

(Spencer-Brown,

(Varela 1975).

While the previous versions of the Liar's paradox are
direct one-level forms we may consider an equivalent indirect two— level form of the Liar's paradox which is closer to
the co-reflexive form of metaphor.

imaginary conversation:

Consider the following

"
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Aristotle:
Plato:

"What Plato is saying is false."

"What Aristotle is saying is true.

This is a "two-level" statement because of the two different

speakers and it is "indirectly" reflexive because each

speaker refers to their self through the other.

Hence we

term this mutual reflexivity a "co-ref lexivity " because it
is the indirect self-reference of two or more terms

.

Fur-

thermore, this co-reflexive statement is "paradoxical"

because they are conflicting opposites

.

It is

important to

note that they are not merely saying what each other is saying is false, a mutual denial, rather they are both denying

their affirmation and affirming their denial of each other
(simultaneously)

.

More specifically this "imaginary" co-

reflexive conversation implies,

"It is true that what

Aristotle is saying through Plato is false and false that

what Plato is saying through Aristotle

is

true.

"

They must

be talking about the paradox of creativity or better yet

their dialectical dialogue exemplifies the paradoxical quality of the creative process.

Next we may consider how this form of paradoxical coref lexivity is exemplified in metaphor.

In metaphor the

primary system is becoming defined in terms of the secondary
system and the secondary system is becoming defined in terms
of the primary system.

For example in the metaphor,

ety is a sea," the primary system,

Soci-

"Society," is becoming
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defined in terms of the more familiar, tangible secondary
system of the "sea" and the secondary system "sea," is be-

coming defined in terms of the strangely more abstract

primary system of "society."
1973)

In the Gordian terms

(Gordon

of how metaphor serves to make the "strange familiar"

and the "familiar strange" we may eavesdrop on the following

imaginary conversation between the primary and secondary

characters of the metaphor,
Sea:

"What ’Society'

Society:

"What 'Sea'

"society is a sea,"
is

saying is strange."

is

saying is familiar."

This imaginary co-reflexive conversation implies that,
is familiar that what
is

'society'

is saying through the

"It
'sea'

strange and it is strange that what 'sea' is saying

through 'society' is familiar."

In the creative process of

constructing new meanings for the metaphor, "society

is a

sea," the primary system, through interaction with the sec-

ondary system, sea, becomes "strangely familiar" and the
secondary system, sea, through interaction with the primary
system, society, becomes "familiarly strange"
16.

(see Figure

Hence the meaning of the metaphor is deepened and

broadened simultaneously.
In the Piagetian terms of "assimilation" and "accommo-

dation" we may imagine a similar metaphoric conversation as
before.

Jimenez (1976) has explained that "assimilation"

essentially

a

metaphoric process of making the "strange

is
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Figure 16.
Co-reflexive coordination of metaphor,
"Society is a sea" in Gordian terms.
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familiar
the

and that "accommodation" is a process of making

familiar strange."

In the following imaginary conver-

sation both functions of "assimilation"
ity)

and "accommodation"

(strange familiar-

(familiar strangeness) are co-

reflexively coordinated.
"What 'Society'

Sea:

Society:

is saying is accommodating."

"What 'Sea' is saying is assimilating."

This imaginary co-reflexive conversation implies that,
is very

the

"It

assimilating that what 'society' is saying through

'sea'

is oddly accommodating and it is oddly accommodat-

ing that what 'sea'

assimilating."

is saying through

'society'

is very

In the creative process of constructing new

meanings for the metaphor, "Society is

a sea,"

the primary

system, society, through interaction with the secondary

system, sea, becomes "accommodatingly assimilated" and the

secondary system, sea, through interaction with the primary
system, society, becomes "assimi lating ly accommodated"

Figure 17)

.

(see

Thus genuinely new metaphoric meaning is

reconstructed through the co-reflexive interaction of the
reciprocal opposites of the primary and secondary system.
The co-reflexive coordinating of reciprocal opposites
is a

"dialectical double spiral" of the primary system

becoming "accommodatingly assimilated" through the secondary
system and the secondary system becoming "assimilatingly

accommodated" through the primary system simultaneously (see
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Primary System, Sea
in background

Secondary System,
Society in background

Figure 17. Co-reflexive coordination of metaphor,
"Society is a sea" in Piagetian terms.
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Figure 18).

(The author is indebted to Pratt (1979)

concept of the "dialectical double spiral.")

for the

This "dialec-

tical double spiral" broadens and deepens the solidity of

knowledge as opposed to

a

single vertical spiral which is

ever ascending to greater heights of abstract knowledge.

While the abstract spiral constructs general forms independent of context the metaphoric spiral constructs aesthetic
forms which are increasingly sensitive and integrated with
the context.

For instance the metaphor "society is a sea"

shifts meaning depending on whether the context is

classroom or a sociology classroom.

a

poetry

The formula E=mc

has

the same static general form regardless of the context.
The paradoxical co-ref lexivity of metaphor is very

difficult to explicate because it cannot be reduced to the
analytical concepts of isomorphic comparison, relativity or
reciprocity.

Rather metaphor with its own explicable form

of co-ref lexivity encompasses and dereifies these static,

rationalistic terms in order to go beyond them to express
the germ of an ambivalent form in the process of becoming

integrated.

The creative process as a form in the process

of becoming bursts through all static forms.

Furthermore even "set- theoretic " relations of union,
intersection, subset and supraordinate set are inadequate

because their relational boundaries are relatively fixed.
The relational boundaries of metaphor are indeterminantly
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Secondary System

Broadening

«<-

}

Primary System

sy

Broadening

Secondary System

Deepening

Dialectical double spiral which broadens
Figure 18.
and deepens knowledge simultaneously.
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co reflexive.

vase.

Consider the visual metaphor of the profiled

Is the set of points which constitutes

the boundary

line a subset of the area of the profiles or a subset of the

area of the vase?

If we perceive the profiles in the fore-

ground then the boundary is

a

subset of the profiles.

If we

perceive the vase in the foreground then the boundary is
subset of the vase.

a

However, with the metaphoric integra-

tion of the profiled vase the boundary line is neither

subset of the vase nor a subset of the profiles.

a

Rather the

indeterminate boundary lines become superimposed in

a

second-order, co-reflexive superspace which Rothenberg
(1979a, p.

268)

characterizes as homospatial thinking.

At

this higher level the vase and profiles are metaphorically

united through the mutually opposing intersection of their

contrasting differences and not merely in spite of their
differences as in the mutually consistent intersection of

overlapping sets.
At this point we may further note the perplexity which

"reflexivity "

(self-reference) caused Russell in his attempt

to construct a universal set theory to encompass all of

mathematics.

According to Hofstadter (1979,

p.

20)

the

basic paradox stems from the inherent ambiguity of "run-ofthe-mill sets" and "self-swallowing sets."

The run-of-the-

mill sets" are the vast majority of sets which are not

members of themselves.

For example, the set of walruses is
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not a walrus.

However, some sets are self-swallowing since

they contain themselves such as the set of all sets or the
set of all things except walruses.
a

"run-of-the-mill set" or

both.

a

Clearly

a

set is either

"self-swallowing set" but not

However, when we consider the logical possibility of

the "set of all run-of-the-mill sets" we are confronted with
a

paradox.

a

"self-swallowing set."

This set is neither a "run-of-the-mill set" nor
If it is a

"run-of-the-mill set"

then it cannot contain itself and if it is

a

"self-swallow-

ing set" then how can it be the "set of all run-of-the-mill

sets."

Russell eliminated the hierarchical inconsistency of

this paradox by fiat of the Theory of Logical Types which

essentially states that a class cannot be

a

member of it-

self, that is, a class cannot be self-reflexive.

The Theory

of Logical Types appears to have eliminated the known para-

doxes of set theory but only at the expense of self-

reflexiveness and the original goal to reduce all mathematics to set logic.

For instance imaginary numbers incorpo-

rate self-ref lexivity

.

Many mathematicians have criticized

the Theory of Logical Types for its lack of logical necessity and the questionable complications it creates
1980, pp.

222-229).

(Kline,

Even Russell, according to Brown, later

in his career admitted the arbitrariness of position.

"The

Theory (Theory of Logical Types) was, he said, the most

arbitrary thing he and Whitehead had ever had to do, not

.
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really a theory but a stopgap
p.

..."

(Spencer-Brown, 1972,

However, as it stands classical set theory does not

ix)

allow for "reflexivity" and thus cannot explain metaphoric
structures which thrive on it.
The co-reflexive superspace of metaphor can be vividly

portrayed in terms of the functional process of constructing
a

hologram.

The hologramic image of for instance a "red"

apple is constructed by splitting a laser beam into two

beams with

a

half -mirror and allowing one of the diffused

beams, the reference beam, to go straight to the photo-

graphic plate and the other diffused beam, the working beam,
to detour by reflecting off the "red apple" and then onto

the photographic plate.

The two laser beams intersect at

the photographic plate creating an interference wave pattern

that is recorded on the photographic plate.

By illuminating

the photographic plate with a normal laser beam a three

dimensional hologram of the red apple may be constructed in
midair.

The construction of the metaphoric image is similar

to the resulting interference wave pattern created by the

intersection of the reference and working beam.

However, in

the construction of the metaphoric image there is no abso-

lute reference beam by which to independently contrast the

working beam.

By viewing the primary system through the

perspective of the secondary system and the secondary system
through the perspective of the primary system two working
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beams become co-ref lexively coordinated through

a

focal

metaphoric image which recoordinates each perspective
through the tensive intersection of their interference
pattern.

The holographic metaphoric image constructs the

greatest common coherence through

a

synchrony of contrasting

views while monocular images at best represent the least

common inconsistency of additive monocular views.

The meta-

phoric image surpasses formal representations as much as

three-dimensional holographic construction surpasses

a

a

col-

lection of two-dimensional snapshots of the same object
No additive amount of two-dimensional

pasted together.

snapshots can in itself construct the greater dimension of
the holographic image.

Bohm (1980)

,

Pietsch (1981) and Pribram (1981) have

proposed holographic models of the mind which have profound
psychological implications.
(1960)

In reply to Lashley's search

for the missing memory engram Pribram (1966) has

employed the holographic model to explain the holistically

distributed nature of memory traces in the brain.
despaired of finding

a

Lashley

localized memory trace because of the

resilience of learned behavior to brain damage.

According

to Pribram the hologram has the special property that it,
".

.

.

can be injured or cut up into small pieces, and an

image can still be reconstructed from any of the pieces
thus the name hologram; every part contains sufficient

—

"

.
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information to characterize the whole"
147).
is,

The holographic property of

(Pribram,

1981, p.

"self -ref lexivity

,

that

each part reflects the whole has allowed the mathema-

tically precise construction of

a

new technological reality,

the hologram, which is highly suggestive of the metaphorical

reality that the universe is contained in

a

grain of sand.

Because of the co-reflexive property of the modified holographic model we are now able to coherently account for the
compact, vivid richness of metaphoric images.

vividness is not

a

This compact

preformed "seed" part containing the sta-

tic whole in miniature but is a dialectical

"seed" part

which recursively constructs the dialectical whole through

a

recoordination of the co-reflexive tendency toward greater
coherence
Metaphoric Example of Escher's
"Day, Nignt" Print
Since metaphoric reframing cannot be adequately expli-

cated in rationalistic terms less than its own we shall sum-

marize our comments thus far in terms of two metaphors which

explicitly reveal the latent structure and process of metaphor in general.

Consider the visual metaphoric image of

Escher's "Day, Night" print (Locher, 1971,
Figure 19)

.

p.

14)

(see

This visual metaphor explicitly exemplifies the

co-reflexive coordination of opposites.

The right and left

sides of the print are co-reflexive negative and positive
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print.

Night"

"Day,

Escher's

19.

Figure
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mirror images of each other.

However, this is not

dichotomous mirroring of inverse images.

simple

a

Rather the dichot-

omy of night and day is brought into metaphoric unity

through the co-reflexive tesselation of night birds flying
into daybreak and day birds flying into night fall.

The

hidden "twilight" expands into the metaphoric flight of

night and day birds separated yet united through their co-

reflexive intersection.

Consider the left to right diagonal movement of the
day birds emerging from the light patches of the field

tesselating through the night birds and finally ascending
into the night fall sky.

Through this reflexive movement of

day birds the familiar daylight earth is transformed into
the strange unknown heights of the night fall sky.

This

results in the strange familiarity of day break birds

streaking through the night fall sky.

Next consider the

right to left diagonal movement of the night birds emerging
from the dark patches of the field tesselating through the
day birds and finally ascending into the daybreak sky.

Through this reflexive movement the strange hidden dark
earth is transformed and transported into the familiar sight
of the day sky.

This results in the familiar strangeness of

nightfall birds streaking through the daybreak sky.
But where is the twilight of the meeting of these two

diagonally intersecting flights?

Is the

twilight in the
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ascending movement of the daybreak birds uniting
with the
nightfall sky or the ascending movement of the
nightfall
birds uniting with the daybreak sky.

Dialectically we coor-

dinate our understanding of these two co-reflexive movements.

At the "either/or" level of perception we are equi-

vocally torn between the conflicting alternation of two

mutually exclusive movements.

At one moment we are at-

tracted to the strange familiarity of the day birds flying
into the night to the mutual exclusion of the night birds

flying into the day.

Next in discontinuous alternation we

are attracted to the familiar strangeness of nightfall birds

flying into the daybreak to the mutual exclusion of the day

birds flying into the night.

The inconsistency of the

"either/or" level drives us to the relative consistency of
the "both/and" level.

At the "both/and" dialectical level

of perceptual coordination we continuously oscillate the

relative dominance of the two successive movements.

At

first the daybreak birds may predominate with the nightfall

birds remaining subdominant.

Then in continuous succession

we reverse the relative dominance with the nightfall birds

predominating and daybreak birds subdominant.

However, this

relative oscillation of dominance is inadequate to fully
express the simultaneous coordination of the co-reflexive
twilight.

The unity of the co-reflexive twilight is neither

in the relative dominance of the daybreak birds nor the

-

.
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nightfall birds but rather both are synchronized through the

co-reflexive intersection of the "twilight birds."
"twilight birds" constitute

a

The

new second-order metaphoric

reframing of the dialectical opposites of night and day, and
earth and sky.

Through the pregnant intersection of con-

trasting movements the "twilight birds" metaphorically unite
the enriching differences without losing their distinctiveness.

What was hidden to the "day" and "night" perception

is constructively revealed through the

metaphoric intersection.

"twilight" of their

The "twilight birds" are neither

"literally" on the paper nor "absolutely" in the mind of the

observer but are
shyn

,

1981).

a

metaphoric intersection of both

(

Romany

This metaphoric perception of the "twilight

birds" is just as real as our metaphoric perception of

binocular depth which reveals

a

greater dimension hidden to

either eye alone or when additively combined.

Metaphoric Example of Mooney's
"Fitting One" Poem
Next we shall consider Mooney's poem of the "Fitting
One"

(Mooney, 1969, pp.

72-73)

This poem exemplifies the

co-reflexive coordination of the opposites of earth and sky
knit together through

a

metaphoric tree.
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The Fitting One
as it is with a tree
whose fitting task

it
to
in
of

is

interknit the earth and sky
one will drawn togetherness
soil and sun
as, from the deepest root,
a bit of earth is chosen
taken, transformed, transported far
into the topmost tendril tip
to texture there
a newborn leaf,
joining into sky;
a motion matched,
in fitting need,
as from the highest leaf
a bit of sun-lit air is chosen,
taken, transformed, transported far
into the deepest fibrit tip
to textine there
a newborn root,
join into earth
to make the living tree
symbol of
The Fitting One
that inter-living earth and sky
gives birth to wholeness on the way
and gives me a birthplace too,
for emerging life in me,
as I stand among the trees
and let them knit
a universe
on a Sunday afternoon.

Through the metaphor of the "inter-living tree" the co-

reflexive opposites of earth and sky, soil and sun, and new-

born root and leaf are all drawn together into the "Fitting
One."

A bit of earth is taken, transformed,

transported

into the topmost tendril to texture a newborn leaf joining
the sky.

Through this ascending reflexive movement the

familiar ground of earth is assimilated and transported to
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the strange unknown heights to become
accommodated to the

open sky.

This reflexive movement results in the assimilat-

ing accommodation of a newborn leaf.

Co-ref lexively coordi-

nated with the ascending movement joining earth with sky is
the descending movement joining sky with earth.

A bit of

sunlet air is taken, transformed and transported to the

deepest fibril tip to texture

a

newborn root.

Through this

descending reflexive movement the strange unknown heights of
the open sky are accommodated and transported to familiar

ground of earth to become assimilated.

accommodating assimilation of

a

This results in the

newborn root.

Where is the creative growth of the living tree that

metaphorically knits earth and sky?
roots,

Is it in the earth,

the

the ascending movement or the sky, leaves, descending

movement?

Where does the earth and sky meet; the roots and

leaves join, the ascending and descending movements inter-

penetrate?

It is through the co-reflexive ascending and

descending movements that we dialectically coordinate the
central act of creativity.

The central act of creativity is

not an "ordination of place" but rather a "coordination

which takes place

.”

At the "either/or" dialectical level of

coordination the co- reflexive opposites are mutually excluded.

We are equivocally torn between the mutually exclu-

sive movements of either the ascending movement or the

descending movement.

Hence the creative growth appears to

177

draw on either the material sustenance of the earth or
the

sun-lit air of the sky in discontinuous alternation.

The

conflicting inconsistency of the "either/or" level drives us
to the consistency of the "both/and" level.

At the "both/

and" dialectical level of coordination the opposites are

relatively coordinated.

Both the ascending movement and the

descending movement oscillate relative dominance through
time.

Hence at time one the ascending movement may be

predominant and the descending movement subdominant and at
time two the descending movement predominant and the ascending movement subdominate.

However the "both/and" level is

insufficient to sustain creative growth for it lacks the

higher order wholeness of the simultaneous coordination of
co-reflexive opposites.

At the "both/and" level there is a

symmetrical competition for the unity of metaphoric integration.

However, at the "neither/nor" dialectical level of

metaphoric coordination neither the ascending movement nor
the descending movement is successively dominant.

Rather

both become synchronously coordinated through the focal

"inter-section" of the "inter-living tree.

"

What was a

competition between the fittest movements becomes the finest
possible fit of the "Fitting One."

neither a simple monism nor
reflexive nonduality.

a

The "Fitting One" is

dualism but rather

a co-

The "Fitting One" is the "inter-

living tree" which metaphorically integrates both earth and
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sky into a higher order unity through
the aesthetically con-

trasting contribution of both.

Definition of the Metaphoric Dialectic
Thus far we have explicated the process of metaphoric

reframing in terms of the visual gestalt of "twins kissing

a

flower vase," the literary expression of "society is a sea,"
the mathematical expression of an "imaginary number," the

paradoxical expression of an "imaginary co-reflexive conversation," the technological expression of the "holographic

construction" of intersecting perspectives, the graphic

expression of

a

"dialectical double spiral," the visual

print of the "twilight bird" and the poetic expression of
the "inter-living tree.

"

Utilizing this new information we

may now further elaborate our preliminary definition of
metaphoric reframing.

Metaphoric reframing as

a

dialectical

process is the "horizontal" coordination of mutually exclusive first-order opposites which are equally essential to a

fuller "vertical" recoordination of their second-order inte -

grated differences

.

Moreover, this metaphoric reframing

develops through five dialectical levels of coordinating the

central co-reflexive act of creativity toward greater levels
of coherence.
I.

Global Coordination of the Co-reflexive Act
At this preliminary level the co-reflexive act is

a

:

.
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^i-ff use

global differentiation of the subject from the

environment (e.g., the person perceives the anomalous

profiled vase" as

a

global entity diffusely differen-

tiated from the background)
11

•

Absolute Differential Coordination of the Co-reflexive
Act
At this level the co-reflexive act becomes absolutely

differentiated into disjoint polar opposites with

a

fixed dominant pole indifferent to the other (e.g.,
the person singly fixates on the image of the "vase"
to the neglect of the background image of the "pro-

files
III.

"

)

.

"Either/Or" Coordination of the Co-reflexive Act

:

At this level the co-reflexive act becomes lateralized

into mutually exclusive opposites with "either" the

primary "or" secondary system predominantly opposed to
the other.

The coordination at this level is a dis -

continuous alternation of incompatible opposites
Hence there is

without central coordination.

a

ten-

dency to ambivalently fixate on "either" one "or" the
other of the mutually exclusive opposites (e.g., the

person perceives the "profiled vase" as

a

discontinu-

ously opposed shifting between "either" a vase fixa tion "or" a profile fixation)

.

.
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IV

*

"Both/And

11

Coordination of the Co- reflexive Act

:

At this level the co-reflexive act of mutually exclu-

sive opposition becomes relatively coordinated with
"

both " the primary "and" secondary systems continuous -

ly shifting the relation of predominance/subdominance.

The coordination at this level is a contiguous sequential movement of relative opposites temporally oscil-

lating central coordination.

Hence there is

a

tenden-

cy to sequentially shift fixation in a linearly con -

tinuous movement (e.g., the person may perceive the
"profiled vase" as merely an abstract composite of
lines on the paper or may extend this perception to

rationally include a continuous composite of intervening positions between the faces and vase)
V.

"Neither/Nor" Metaphoric Coordination of the Co-

reflexive Act
At this level the co-reflexive act of complementary

opposition becomes synchronously coordinated with
"neither" the primary "nor" the secondary systems pre-

dominant but rather simultaneously recoordinated.

The

coordination at this level is a simultaneous movement
of co-reflexive opposites synchronizing central coor-

dination.

Hence there is a tendency to simultaneously

de fixate through a nonlinear,

movement.

second-order vertical

This is the "creative leap" commonly
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associated with the creative process.

At this second-

order level of recoordination genuinely new constructions which focally integrate differences without

losing their distinctiveness become possible.

Fur-

thermore, the novel construction of the "neither/nor"
level may serve as the beginning "global" coordination
of another series of dialectical movements

(e.g.,

the

"profiled vase" is "neither" vase foreground/profiles

background "nor" profiles foreground/vase background
but rather is simultaneously reintegrated through

second-order synchrony of "twins kissing
vase."

a

a

flower

This in turn opens up the possibility of new

possibilities at
ploration)

a

higher level of dialectical ex-

.

Visual Display of the Metaphoric Dialectic
We may visually summarize these five levels of the

metaphoric dialectic as the progressive construction of

a

hierarchically reintegrated metaphoric space (see Figure
20).

The first level is a global coordination which dif-

fusely differentiates the foreground from the background.
In the "figure" of level one the dotted circle indicates the

diffuse differentiation of the foreground from the background.

The second level is an absolute differentiation

which polarizes the global coordination of the previous
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I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

Global Coordination

Absolute Differential
Coordination

Either/Or Coordination

Both/And Coordination

Neither/Nor Coordination

Figure 20.

Visual display of the metaphoric dialectic.
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level into static disjoint poles with

The

a

fixed dominance.

figure" of level two is indicated by the homologous

polar halves of

a

circle.

The third level is an "either/or"

coordination of temporally discontinuous, mutually exclusive
opposites.

At this level the opposites are discontinuously

lateralized into negative mirror images of right and left.
The "figure" of level three is indicated by the lateraliza-

tion of the homolateral sides of "q
"b"

"

with "d" and "p" with

into mirror reflections of each other.

is a

"both/and" coordination of temporally continuous,

complementary opposites.

At this level the opposites are

diagonally cross-integrated through
tion.

The fourth level

a

continuous oscilla-

The "figure" of level four is indicated by the con-

tralateral criss-crossing of the "q" with the "b" and the
"p" with the

"d.

"

The fifth level is a "neither/nor" meta-

phoric coordination which temporally collapses the previous
level into a second-order simultaneous reintegration of co-

reflexive opposites.

This final

level

hierarchically rein-

tegrated all the previously differentiated opposites at

higher level of global unity.

a

The "figure" of level five is

indicated by the collapsing of the contralaterals to the

center of their intersections to construct
tegration of their differences.

a

circular rein-

..
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The Metaphoric Dialectic of
Creeping Coordination

Perhaps we may most personally summarize the five

dialectical levels of coordination with the prototypical

exemplar of the baby's developmental coordination from
creeping to walking (Cohen, 1979)
107)
I

(Le Winn,

1969, pp.

96-

.

Global Coordination of the Co- reflexive Act:
The baby's creeping movement begins with the lifting
of the abdomen from the ground to a stationary balance

and the global coordination of random undulations of
the spine.
II

Absolute Differential Coordination of the Co-reflexive
Act

:

At this level the baby demonstrates a "homologous"

creeping pattern which polarizes the forward movement
of the hands from the forward movement of the feet.
The baby extends the hands and then the feet in

a

frog

like movement.
III.

"Either/Or" Coordination of the Co-reflexive Act

:

At this level the baby demonstrates a "homolateral"

creeping pattern which lateralizes the body's forward

movement into a discontinuous alternation of the right
and left side.

The baby moves either "the right hand

and the right foot" or "the left hand and left foot.
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IV.

"Both/And" Coordination of the Co- reflexive Act

:

At this level the baby demonstrates a "contralateral"

creeping pattern which continuously cross-alternates
both the "right hand/left foot" and the "left hand/

right foot."
V.

"Neither/Nor Coordination of the Co- reflexive Act

;

At this level the baby makes a "creative leap" from
the prone position to the vertical position.

The baby

neither cross-alternates the "right hand/left foot"
nor the "left hand/right foot" but simultaneously

pushes himself up into the vertical standing position.
If he can keep his coordinated balance at this second-

order level

whole new world of possibilities is

a

opened with the freeing of his hands and the higher
vantage point.
In a study of children's cognizance of how they walk

on all four Piaget's

(1976, pp

.

1-11)

interviews reveal that

"walking" children's developmental description of their
"creeping" patterns recapitulates the baby's actual

creep-

At the age of four most children de-

ing" development.

scribed their "creeping" as

a

homologous "Z" pattern.

At

the age of five and six the children primarily described

their creeping as

a

homolateral

"N"

pattern.

Finally at the

their
age of seven to eight the children primarily described

creeping as a contralateral "X" pattern.
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The Star Structure of the Metaphoric Dialectic

We propose that the baby’s developmental coordination
of creeping patterns through physical space exemplifies a

common metaphoric dialectic also shared by the child's

developmental coordination of mental patterns through mental
space.

Furthermore just as the baby's movements in space

are generally initiated by the senses in the head, which

create or manifest the purpose of the movement, the guiding

purpose of the metaphoric dialectic is the attraction to the

greater context of meaningful coherence.

The greater con-

text of meaningful coherence intermediates the co-reflexive

interplay of opposites toward greater levels of unity
through diversity which are not reducible to the bland con-

sistency of direct comparison.

The integrative purpose of

the greater context is the child's nonconscious intention to

relate with the environment in more meaningful coherent ways

which resolve the first-order oppositional limitations at

a

second-order aesthetic level of the synchrony of opposites.
To the criss-cross figure of the co-reflexive intersection

of oppositional differences we add an apex for the greater

context of meaningful coherence (integrative purpose) by
which the inherent indeterminacy of the co-reflexive inter-

section can be determined and directed.

The resulting "star

structure" indicating the child's developmental coordination

.
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s ^all

be used as the prototypical symbol of the metaphoric

dialectic (see Figure 21)
In summary the metaphoric dialectic acts as a double

spiral which broadens and deepens the field of the interactional world with genuine novelty and an explicable order of

aesthetic certainty (coherence) and contextual sensitivity.
Moreover, we propose that the metaphoric dialectic is the

irreducible tensive heart beat of the creative process.

It

dialectically coordinates mutually exclusive first-order opposites which are equally essential to

coherent understanding.

a

fuller second-order

It is a dynamic process which

delineates the coordination of opposites in the process of

becoming recoordinated.
a

This recoordination of opposites is

second-order recreating of new possibilities by reframing

the field of inquiry.

This reframing of the field of

inquiry invites and directs the formulation of new questions
and hypotheses for further elaboration and evaluation.

The

metaphoric dialectic is not reducible to well-defined logical,

analogical or literal formulations.

These rationalis-

tic formulations play a complimentary but secondary role of

elaboration and evaluation to the primary creative role of
the metaphoric dialectic.

In the next chapter we shall

apply the metaphoric dialectic to various examples of creative problem resolving.
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Head

Prototypical "star structure" of locomoFigure 21.
tive coordination and metaphoric dialectic.

CHAPTER

V

INTERPRETIVE APPLICATION OF THE METAPHORIC DIALECTIC
TO CREATIVE PROBLEM RESOLVING
In order to indicate the utility and generality of the

metaphoric dialectic we shall apply it to seven different
problems which represent
adults and children.

a

wide range of activities for both

For the most part these problems are

taken from naturalistic settings as opposed to contrived

settings which tend to control out opportunities for meta-

phoric reframing in their attempt to arrive at closed ended,

reductionistic solutions.

Thus for each of the following

situations we shall retrace the genesis of the paradoxical

problem and its metaphoric reframing (resolution)
dren's pictorial problem of how to stop

a

:

a

chil-

dog and cat from

fighting, a children's computer problem of how to draw

circle with turtle geometry,

a

a

child's communication problem

of how to resolve a conflicting verbal message, an adult

community development problem of how African villagers and

western community developers resolve their conflicting
expectations and develop the community together, an adult
industrial problem of how researchers produce more effective

synthetic paint brushes, an adult housing problem of how
squatters and housing authorities with conflicting expectations improve housing, and Darwin and Salk's biological
189
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problem of how to adequately conceptualize the conflicts of
evolution.
De Bono's Problem

The first example of creative problem resolving is

taken from De Bono's Children Solve Problems (1974, pp. 1344).

De Bono reviews a variety of pictorial solutions drawn

by children five years to thirteen years for an open ended

problem of "show how you would stop
fighting."

a

dog and cat from

The author of this dissertation has also col-

lected with the aid of public school teachers first and

second grade solutions to this problem.

The posing of this

problem already assumes an ongoing "either/or" level of dog
Some children recoor-

and cat in antagonistic conflict.

dinated the "either/or" opposition of the dog and cat with
an "absolute differential" coordination of distracting them

from each other with toys and food.

nated the "either/or" opposition with

Other children coordia

"both/and" coordina-

tion of physically limiting their interaction by walls,

cages and chains.

This solution allowed a restrictive co-

existence without interference.

Both solutions stopped the

fighting but did not really resolve the underlying antagon-

ism of the dog and cat.
A more advanced metaphoric reframing of "either" the
dog "or" cat fighting resulted in "neither" the cat "nor"
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the dog fighting but rather a mutual friendship with inter-

dependent transactions.

Examples of the "neither/nor" level

of metaphoric reframing were the dog and cat kissing, teach-

ing the dog and cat to play a friendly game of ball to-

gether, dressing the cat in

a

dog's mask and tail so they

would be attracted to each other, and putting

a

trough of

the dog's favorite food on the side of the cat and a trough
of the cat's favorite food on the side of the dog so they

would simultaneously sidle up to feed each other and become
friends.

These metaphoric integrations of the opposites of

dog and cat not only stopped the fighting but transformed

their antagonism into the new second-order possibilities of
a

mutual friendship with interdependence.
Papert's Problem
Next we shall consider how

a

child metaphorically

learns to draw a circle using Turtle Geometry (Papert, 1978,
pp.

117-118)

.

Turtle Geometry is an invention of Papert for

teaching elementary school children about computers and
geometry.

The turtle is a mechanical toy which is pro-

grammed to trace out different paths by children using the

LOGO computer language.

In the beginning the child learns

how to command the Turtle to move forward in the direction
that it is facing and how to pivot the Turtle around its
axis a number of degrees.

With these commands the child can
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command the Turtle to stop and go in a countless variety of
linear geometric patterns such as "line," "triangle,"
"square," "parallelogram," etc.

However there comes a time

when according to Papert
the child poses the question:
"How can I make the
Turtle draw a circle?"
In Turtle Geometry we do not
provide "answers." Learners are encouraged to use their
own bodies to learn to find a solution.
The child
begins to walk in circles and discovers how to make a
circle by going forward a little and turning a little.
Now the child knows how to make the Turtle draw a circle:
simply give the Turtle the same commands one would
give oneself.
Expressing "go forward a little, trim a
little" comes out in Turtle language as REPEAT [FORWARD 1
RIGHT- TURN 1]
once the child knows how to place
circles on the screen with the speed of light, an unlimited palette of shapes, forms, and motion has been
Thus the discovery of the circle (and, of
opened.
course, the curve) is a turning point in the child's
ability to achieve a direct aesthetic experience through
mathematics. (Papert, 1978, pp. 117-118)
.

.

.

.

.

.

We may further interpret this discovery of the aesthetics achieved through mathematics in terms of the metaphoric

dialectic.

In the beginning explorations the child "global-

ly" coordinates the computer commands of "forward" and

"turning" without clearly differentiating between them.
Thus the Turtle drawings are totally random.

At the "abso-

lute differential" level of coordination the child uni-

laterally differentiates the commands of "forward" and
"turning" as isolated movements.

Hence the child can draw

extended straight lines but only in random directions.
the "either/or" level the child coordinates the negative

independence of "either" forward

or

turning in

At
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discontinuous alternation.

Hence the child can discontinu-

ously shift what is perceived as contrary directional com-

mands for the Turtle but cannot yet continuously combine
"both" the forward "and" turning commands into a coherent

linear figure.

Since both movement commands belong to the

same Turtle the continued exploration of the perceived

contrary commands eventually leads to

a

continuous combining

and coordinating of the commands sequentially.

This "both/

and" level of sequential coordination allows the child to

make coherent linear figures such as the square, rectangle,
triangle, parallelogram, etc.

When the question of how to

produce a curvilinear figure such as the circle arises the
child is directed to make the circle first with their own
body.

In the beginning the child merely sequentially coor-

dinates the "both" forward a little "and" turn a little

movements.

Through and beyond this sequential coordination

the child eventually constructs the second-order reframing

with their body that the circle is "neither" in the forward

movement "nor" in the turning movement separately or sequentially but rather it is the simultaneous coordination of
both movements in synchrony that produces the qualitative

difference between the circle and the polygon.

The child

transfers this personal metaphor of moving with his body as
the turtle does to the Turtle geometry and a whole new world
of aesthetic curvilinear patterns is opened up.

Furthermore
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the children

s

metaphoric resolution occurred within the

greater context of responding to

a

teacher's encouragement

that they find a personal resolution with their own body to

their self-posed question.
(1980)

(See Forman,

Fosnot and Hoffman

for a similar developmental process of "circle"

construction using blocks.)
Cronen's Problem

Next we shall consider how a young boy metaphorically

transforms

a

into humor.

conflicting verbal statement made by an adult
Cronen (1982,

p.

98)

cites a situation from

Olson (1972) in which Olson shared a close friendship with a
five year old boy who told him that he didn't like girls.

Olson responded to the contrary by saying he didn't like
boys.

The small boy after a momentary perplexity enthusias-

tically replied,

"You're teasing."

In this episodic situa-

tion the boy metaphorically transformed the ambiguously con-

flicting message with the positive connotation of teasing.

Both the young boy's message of "not liking girls" and the
adult's conflicting message of "not liking boys" became met-

aphorically integrated and reframed as harmless humor.

This

metaphoric reframing of the conflicting messages was made
possible through the understanding of the greater context of
a

"close friendship" with the adult.

(1982,

p.

107)

According to Cronen

the management of ambiguous reflexive levels
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of communication seems to require the
mediation of a higher

order context sealed off from the ambiguity.

Furthermore

creative responses may emerge from the shifting of levels of

communication as the young boy's response indicates.
Interpreted according to the metaphoric dialectic we

may retrace the genesis of this paradoxical message and its

metaphoric resolution.

Initially at the "global" level the

boy was confused by the adult's message.

Next at the "abso-

lute differential" level he experienced a tendency to ignore

or deny the incongruous message.

Next at the "either/or"

level he fully confronted the conflicting messages of

"either"

I,

the little boy, don't like little girls "or"

you, my adult friend, don't like little boys

.

Next the

"both/and" coordination of the conflicting "either/or"

merely resulted in an attempted rationalized explanation or
compromise for tolerating the conflicting message but was
not sufficient for fully resolving the conflict.

Finally at

the "neither/nor" level with a metaphoric reframing the

message resulted in "neither"

I,

the little boy, don't like

little girls "nor" You, my adult friend, don't like little

boys but rather the second-order simultaneous reintegration
of both messages as playful teasing.

appeared as

a

Thus what at first

paradoxical message metaphorically became,

within the greater context of
means of opening up

a

a

"close friendship," the

new level of communication.

.
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Ewert's Problem

Next we shall consider a problem concerning community

development and how it was resolved using metaphor (Ewert,
1981, pp.

32-43)

The villagers of Zaire, Africa given a

.

past history of outside intervention conceived of community

development as

a

free gift from external sources and the

community developers as being like parents who would solve
the problems of their children, the villagers.

The commu-

nity developers on the other hand conceived the goal of

development to develop internal resources and self-reliance.
However the villagers initially resisted the community
After one discussion the chief spoke:

developers' goals.

Children cannot take care of themselves. A father has
to take care of them.
A father tells his children what
they must do.
We have cried out our inpashi (troubles)
You tell us
to you.
You are our father and mother.
what to do. (Ewert, 1981, p. 35)
As time progressed the conflict between the community expec-

tations and the community developers' philosophy became
Several people asked "Why do you ask us our problems

acute.

if you don't give us what we need?"

clared:

Another angrily de-

"You are playing games with us.

If you want to

play games, we will not come to your meetings and we will
not sit with you.
(Ewert,

1981, p.

We will not talk about our problems"
35)

The villagers insisted,

what we can do about them.

"

"you tell us our problem and

The community developer finally
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responded with the following metaphoric story:
A man from southern Zaire was walking down the road to
this village.
Later in the afternoon, ho became very
thirsty and wanted a drink of water.
Two men were sitting under a tree along the road.
One lived in this
village and the other was visiting from Eastern Zaire.
Whom did the traveler from southern Zaire ask for directions to the stream with good water? (Ewert, 1981, p.
36)

After

a

momentary silence, the village leader replied:

have spoken well.

We have heard you.

Wait here."

"You

Without

further comment the group of villagers adjourned into an informal discussion in another part of the village without the

community developer.

Later they returned with

their own problems to discuss further:

carrying water from

a

a

list of

the difficulty of

distant stream, the epidemics of New-

castle disease that regularly killed their chicken flocks,
and the lack of agricultural tools in the community.

Ewert states,

"the initial demands to

were replaced with
could be met"

a

(Ewert,

As

‘give us your program'

discussion of how locally defined needs
1981, p.

36).

Interpreted according to the metaphoric dialectic we

may retrace the genesis of the community development problem.

In the beginning at the

"global" level the villagers

passively accepted their community development problems

without clearly differentiating the factors over which they
had control.

With the coming of the community developers

the problem of how to work on community development advanced
to the "absolute differential" level.

At this level the
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villagers perceived their problem in terms of

dependency on the developers, that is,

a

a

unilateral

child to parent

relation without considering their own internal resources
and self-reliance.

Furthermore the developers initially

ignored the villagers' demands and expected cooperation.
a

As

result of these incongruous expectations a competitive

power struggle eventually developed at the "either/or"
level.

The opposing expectations provoked an extreme later-

alization of positions into "either" the developers provide
a

free program "or" the villagers become totally self-

reliant.

The competitive "either/or" conflict was metaphor-

ically reframed with "neither" a free program "nor" total

self-reliance but rather with

a

metaphoric choice of asking

for water from someone locally or not locally which provoked
a

discussion of how locally defined needs could be met.

This discussion opened up the possibility of a new level of

collaboration with greater interdependency between the
villagers and the developers.

Thus within the greater

context of improving the community the developers came to

provide ongoing guidance and educational seminars for resolving local problems which the villages defined and worked
on themselves.

Schon 's Problem #1

With the next example Schon (1979, pp. 255-283) provides a technological example of the making of

metaphor which led to the invention of

a

generative

a

new paint brush.

According to Schon:
Some years ago, a group of product-development researchers was considering how to improve the performance
of a new paintbrush made with synthetic bristles.
Compared to the old natural-bristle brush, the new one delivered paint to a surface in a discontinuous, "gloppy"
way.
The researchers had tried a number of different
improvements.
Nothing seemed to help.
Then someone observed, "You know, a paintbrush is a
kind of pump!" He pointed out that when a paintbrush is
pressed against a surface, paint is forced through the
spaces between bristle onto the surface.
The paint is
made to flow through the "channels" formed by the
bristles
The researchers tried out the natural and synthetic
They nobristle brushes, thinking of them as pumps.
ticed that the natural brush formed a gradual curve when
it was pressed against a surface whereas the synthetic
They specubrush formed a shape more nearly an angle.
the
might
account
for
lated that this difference
How then
"gloppy" performance of the bristle brush.
might they make the bending shape of the synthetic brush
into a gentle curve?
This line of thought led them to a variety of inven(Schon, 1979, p. 257)
tions
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

In this example the researchers were perplexed by the

differing performance of the two brushes.

Merely observing

the brushes more closely and accurately was not enough to

inform them of the functional differences between the
brushes.

What they needed was

a

new metaphoric way of view -

ing the observed differences which would reform and inform

their way of looking for functional differences

.

We may

"
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hypothetically retrace the generative steps of coming to
view the "paintbrush-as-pump" and generating genuinely new

hypotheses for testing.

In the beginning at the

"global"

level the rich ambiguity of the differing performances of
the paint brushes was under determined by the researchers'

current understanding of painting with

a brush.

At the

"absolute differential" level they began to differentiate

painting with

a

brush as "wiping" while neglecting the

alternative possibilities suggested by the richly ambiguous
performances of the paint brushes.

At the "either/or" level

they pre-analytically supposed that painting with a brush

might be suggestively viewed as "pumping" or as "wiping.
However, the overt attempt to directly map the attributes

and relations of "pumping" onto "wiping" and vice-versa

resulted in conflicting differences irresolvable at the
"either/or" level.

Furthermore, at the "both/and" level

painting with the brush as both the complementary functions
of "wiping" and "pumping" did not provoke any genuinely new

insights because it was merely the composite sum of the two

pre-existing functions.

It was only with the suspended

judgement of "neither" wiping "nor" pumping along with the
second-order reintegration of both as metaphoric correlates

which enabled them to compare the two brushes and see the
functional difference in the curving of the two fibers.

Through the metaphoric reframing new perceptions were
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generated which did not exist in the familiar direct comparison or the additive composite of the assumed functions.

These new metaphoric perceptions allowed them to simultane-

ously perceive both the relevance of the negative space between the fibers as channels for pumping and the solid space
of the fibers as bristles for wiping

.

This metaphoric

reframing of the paint brushes transformed the perplexing

differences of their performance into testable hypotheses
some of which did improve the synthetic brush.

This is an

excellent example of how metaphoric reframing generates new

perceptions and questions, inviting the experimenter to
formulate and test new hypotheses.
These new questions and hypotheses were

a

derivative

function of the new field of possibilities opened up by the

metaphoric reframing in accordance with the greater context
of the inquiry.

Within the context of an industrial plant

intent on improving its products the newly generated hypotheses were biased toward money-making inventions.

within the context of an art studio the metaphor of
brush-as-pump" might generate
tation.

a

However,

paint

whole new line of experimen-

Regardless of the greater context of inquiry the

of
dialectical process of broadening and deepening the field

inquiry is functionally the same.

,
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Schon's Problem #2
In the next example we shall examine Schon's presenta-

tion (Schon, 1979, pp

268-280) of how metaphoric reframing

.

was used to creatively resolve

veloping country of Caracas.

a

housing dilemma in the de-

For municipal governments and

housing agencies "squatter settlements" are "an eyesore,

a

mass of debris which has been established by illegal, indeed
criminal, action, in violation of property rights, housing
codes, and zoning laws"

(Schon,

1979, p.

However, the

271).

public housing projects which the housing authorities provide, even though they are clean and lawful, are far too few
for the poor masses.

The partisans of the squatters rights

furthermore argue that,

"...

self-help construction, in

the context of squatter settlements, provides an environment
of amenity, community, and economic viability"
p.

(Schon,

1979,

271).

The housing authorities perceive the settlements as

debris and crime while the squatter rights partisans per-

ceive the squatter settlements as legitimate initiative.
These conflicting "perspectives" or what Schon also calls

conflicting "stories," "frames" or "metaphors" present

a

dilemma
How is one both to protect property rights maintain
standards of construction and sanitation, and keep total
costs within bounds, while at the same time providing
housing services to those who need them, allowing people
to get shelter at prices they can afford, accommodating
,
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the changing needs and capacities of families, and leaving initiative and control in the hands of the users?
(Schon, 1979, p. 272)
In other words is it possible to integrate the con-

flicting frames?

Schon describes a metaphoric reframing of

the conflicting frames in terms of a new program called

"sites and services."

Such a program grows out of a complex coordination of
the two perspectives held by municipal officials and by
partisans of squatter settlement.
The squatter's
behavior is seen neither as criminality nor as selfsufficiency, but as initiative that may be both supported and controlled within the constraints of a government program.
Individual settlers are seen neither
as passive recipients of government services nor as
independent violators of governmental regulations, but
as responsible participants who can be trusted both to
repay loans and avoid being cheated on the purchase of
materials. (Schon, 1979, p. 273)
This metaphoric reframing of the conflicting frames inte-

grated both the perspectives of the housing authorities and
the squatter partisans without violating their distinctive

needs and rights.

Metaphorically reframed as "sites and

services" the squatter settlement was no longer the scene of
a

competitive game of municipal officials seeking to control

and punish while squatters seek to avoid control but was

transformed into, "a collaborative game in which officials
and settlers both win when houses are built and loans re-

paid"

(Schon, 1979, p.

273).

This new metaphoric reframing

can
of the original dilemma raised the new question of how

formal government intervention best complement the informal
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support system that grows up in

a

squatter settlement.

This

new question in turn led to a reframing of roles with
the

housing authorities providing large-scale infrastructure and
the construction loans, while individual squatter families

constructed their own dwellings, and local associations

organized the processes of supply and distribution.
Interpreted according to the metaphoric dialectic we
may retrace the genesis of this paradoxical problem and its

metaphoric resolution.

At the "global" level inadequate

housing for the poor began to be vaguely felt as

a

problem without any clearly differentiated factors.

growing
At the

"absolute differential" level it became apparent that the

homeless poor were fast becoming passively dependent on
governmental housing services.

At the "either/or" level

conflict between the housing authorities and the squatters

without governmental housing began to become
lem.

a

major prob-

The government perceived the squatters as violating

property rights and creating an "eyesore" while the squatters perceived the housing authorities as trying to unfairly

control them and displace them from their self-constructed
homes.

Hence neither group was able to directly understand

the other perspective in terms of their own perspective be-

cause they appeared mutually exclusive and diametrically
opposed.

No attempt to coordinate the conflicting positions

at the "both/and" level was reported.

A coordination at the
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both/and

level would have taken the form of a temporary

compromise in which the rights of both positions were reduced to maintain
den situation.

a

conditional tolerance in

a

tension rid-

Schon writes:

The new description
"site-and-services " is also not a
"compromise," an average or balance of values implicit
in the earlier descriptions.
One cannot say, for example, that sites-and-services strikes a balance between
values attached to "government control" and to "settler
initiative"; rather, in the new description, there is a
shift in the meaning of these terms, and along with
this, a shift in the distribution of the redescribed
functions of initative and control. (Schon, 1979, p.
(

)

279)

With the metaphoric reframing in terms of "sites-andservices" the squatters' settlement became "neither" the
scene of debris and crime "nor" uncontrolled freedom of

initiative.

Rather at the "neither/nor" level the housing

authorities and settlers collaborated in an integrated pro-

gram of structured and supported initiative.
Darwin's Problem

Finally we shall consider the metaphoric image of an

"irregular branching tree" which played

a

germinal role in

Darwin's scientific theory of the origin of the species.

According to Gruber (1978, pp. 122-124) the metaphoric image
of an "irregular branching tree" reflected a central dual

theme which characterized Darwin's whole life work.

believed organic change was

a

Darwin

tangled web of shifting rela-

tionships characterized by disturbing irregularity and
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imperfection.

In the closing paragraph of the Origin of the

Species Darwin metaphorically imaged this shifting complexity as a "tangled bank."

On the other hand Darwin also be-

lieved that this complex organic change was governed by

a

few simple laws of nature which gave order and progressive

perfection to the imperfections.

In an early notebook prior

to the appearance of Origin of Species Darwin poetically

wrote

:

The delight one experiences in such times bewilders the
mind; if the eye attempts to follow the flight of a
gaudy butter-fly, it is arrested by some strange tree or
fruit; if watching an insect one forgets it in the
strange flower it is crawling over; if turning to admire
the splendour of the scenery, the individual character
of the foreground fixes the attention.
The mind is a
chaos of delight, out of which a world of future and
more quiet pleasure will arise. (Darwin, 1934)
The metaphoric image of the "irregular branching tree"

of nature expresses the "chaotic delight" of the richly

complex multi-paths of evolutionary development which Darwin

analytically exploited to conceptualize his theory of evolution.

Gruber states:

In short, the branching model, the image of the irregularly branching tree of nature played a pivotal role
It captures
very early in his thinking about evolution.
many points: the fortuitiousness of life, the irregularity of the panorama of nature, the explosiveness of
growth and the necessity to bridle it "so as to keep
number of species constant." And most important, the
fundamental duality that at any time some must live and
others die. (Gruber, 1978, p. 127).

Gruber goes on to write that it took about fifteen months
from the inception of this germinal image until Darwin
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formulated the operating principle of natural selection

which gave form to the "irregular branching tree" of life.
Although many of Darwin's earlier ideas changed over time
twenty years later when he wrote Origin of Species the "ir-

regular branching tree" remained

a

central theme which he

included as the only diagram in his book.

Throughout the

book it is referred to as he exploits its theoretical richness

.

The irreducible metaphoric image of the "irregular

branching tree" of life opened up and vividly portrayed

a

vast field of inquiry for Darwin which he continued to con-

ceptually exploit throughout his life.

This metaphoric

image simultaneously integrated the opposites of the "explo-

siveness of growth" and "the necessity to bridle it" and
"some must live" and "others die."

Furthermore it reflected

Darwin's personal quest to find the quieter pleasures of the

mind through the chaotic delight of nature.
Gruber describes this type of metaphoric image as an
image of "wide scope," a master schema, which serves to as-

similate and give general form to a wide range of perceptions, actions and ideas.

Gruber documents four other meta-

phoric images of wide scope,

"tangled bank," "wedging,"

"war" and "artificial selection," which were used in devel-

oping Darwin's theory of evolution.

Gruber speculates that

the creative scientist may generate four to five

wide

.
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images" that serve as leitmotifs for an entire life and

fifty to one hundred images which elaborate the thematic

organizers
Interpreted according to the metaphoric dialectic we

may hypothetically retrace the genesis of Darwin's theory of
evolution.

Initially at the "global" level Darwin became

attracted to the "chaotic delight" of the evolutionary
forces.

In Rothenburg's terms

he was able to

(1979a)

tacitly sense the Janusian forces of evolution.

At the

"absolute differential" level he began to one-sidedly dif -

ferentiate the diffuse janusian forces.

Hence he began to

differentiate the factors of "the explosiveness of growth"
and "the necessity to bridle it (nature)

"

and "some must

live" and "others die" as dis jointly and randomly related

.

At the "either/or" level Darwin constructed the homospatial

image (Rothenburg, 1979) of an "irregular branching tree"

which explicitly embodied and expressed the oppositional
relation of the evolutionary forces.

At this level he began

to understand that the oppositional relation of "either" the

explosiveness of growth "or" the necessity to bridle growth
are inversely related so as to keep the number of species

constant.
a

At the "both/and" level Darwin began to construct

conceptual explanation of the continuous interaction of

the oppositional forces of evolution.

This conceptual

explanation became the theory of natural selection in which
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the fittest survive in spite of the continuous
interaction
of the oppositional forces of evolution.

Darwin does not

develop his theory beyond the "both/and" level of the "survival of the fittest."

Next we shall consider Salk's theory

of evolution (1973) which is constructed at the "neither/

nor" level of the "finest possible fit" of the diverse

forces of evolution.
Salk's Problem
Salk proposes a metaphoric reframing of the "both/and"

continuously interacting evolutionary forces with "neither"
the explosiveness of growth "nor" the necessity to bridle

growth but rather

a

second-order ecological rebalancing of

the diverse evolutionary forces.

This ecological rebalanc-

ing and enrichment would occur because of the diverse evolu-

tionary forces and not in spite of them.

ecological rebalancing would be

a

Furthermore this

construction of the

"finest possible fit" and not merely the "survival of the

fittest."

Salk argues that the competitive conflicts and we

might add even the controlled interactions of nationalistic
countries are no longer adequate to cope with the population

explosion (we might also add other world problems such as
pollution, depletion of natural resources and the threat of

nuclear war) in a civilized way.

We are at the critical

turning point of a second-order exponential explosion of

.
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population growth.

We are faced with the choice of changing

our competitive and controlling values of nationalistic survival into collaborative and unconditional values of intra-

planetary sharing for the entire human species or suffer
serious ecological catastrophe.

With metaphoric transforma-

tion nationalistic differences could be suspended and recon-

structed as interdependencies which create cultural enrichment, symbiotic nourishment and hybrid vigor (Maruyama,
1977)

(Piaget,

1973, p.

67).

The evolutionary process of

metaphoric transformation for the finest possible fit between the dualities of life is indeed timely and profoundly
vital for the earth's continued ecological survival and

development.

Recapitulation
At this point we may briefly recapitulate for each

problem the paradoxical conflict and the metaphoric reframing which opened up a new field of inquiry in accordance

with the greater context.
13-44)

For De Bono's problem (1972, pp

the paradoxical conflict involved the fighting of an

imaginary dog and cat.

Many children metaphorically re-

framed this paradoxical conflict by proposing mutual acts of
friendship which brought the dog and cat together in harmony
such as kissing, playing a friendly game of ball, dressing
up in costumes which reflected the other, and mutually

.
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feeding each other their favorite food.

These metaphoric

resolutions not only stopped the fighting but transformed
their mutual antagonism into the new possibilities of

mutual friendship.

a

These metaphoric resolutions occurred

within the greater context of responding to

a

teacher's

request and encouragement to resolve the conflict in their
own unique way.
For Papert's problem (1978) concerning Turtle Geometry
the initial paradox was how to coordinate the incommensurate

computer commands of "forward" and "rotation."

The children

metaphorically resolved this paradox by reflecting on how
they integrate these two commands to make a circle with

their own body.

By transferring this new personal metaphor-

ic knowledge to Turtle Geometry a whole new field of aesthe-

tic curvilinear patterns was opened.

This metaphoric reso-

lution occurred within the greater context of responding to
a

teacher's invitation to reconstructively answer with their

own body the self-posed question of how to make a visual

circle
For Cronen's presentation (1982) of the communicational problem of a young boy and an adult the paradoxical con-

flict resulted from an ambiguous sequence of messages.

The

ambiguous sequence of the young boy's initial message of
"not liking girls" and the adult's response of "not liking

boys" was metaphorically reinterpreted after a moment of

.
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perplexity (by the boy) as playful teasing.

The metaphoric

reframing of the conflicting messages was made possible
through the understanding of the greater context of "close
friendship" with the adult.

opened up

a

This metaphoric reframing

new level of communication which deepened the

friendship
For Ewert's problem (1981) concerning community devel-

opment paradoxical tension resulted from conflicting expectations between native villagers and external community

developers.

The villagers expected a free program from the

developers and the community developers expected utilization
of native resources and self-reliance on the part of the

villagers.

By one of the developers presenting an open

ended parable the villagers and developers were able to reframe their perception of the conflicting interaction.

metaphoric reframing opened up

a

This

new level of collaboration

and a redefining of roles on the part of both villagers and

developers for achieving the greater contextual goal of
community development.
For Schon's problem (1979) of how to develop a more

effective synthetic paint brush the industrial researchers
were initially perplexed by the differing performance of

synthetic and natural fiber brushes.

voked

a

This perplexity pro-

metaphoric reframing of paint brushes as "pumps."

Initially the paint brushes were perceived as "wipers."

The
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P^^^^oxical tension resulting from the literal interpretation of "the wiping paint brush is

a

pump" was metaphorical-

ly reframed and applied to both the natural and synthetic

paint brushes.

The new metaphoric reinterpretation of the

natural and synthetic paint brushes as "wiping pumps" pro-

duced new perceptions of their functional differences which
could be tested.

Thus the metaphoric reframing generated

new perceptions of hypothetical differences many of which

became practical inventions.

This line of research was

directed in accordance with the greater context of producing
cost efficient industrial inventions.
For Schon's presentation (1979) of the social policy

dilemma of producing adequate housing the paradoxical tension between "squatter settlements as debris and crime" and

"squatter settlements as legitimate initiative" was meta-

phorically reframed with the new social policy of "sitesand-services

.

"

This metaphoric reframing as "sites-and-

services" opened up a new level of collaboration and redefining of mutually supportive roles for squatters and

housing authorities.

This collaboration allowed them to

more effectively achieve their mutual contextual goal of
improved housing.
For Gruber's presentation (1978) of Darwin the para-

doxical problem was how to express the organic conflicts of
bridle
the "explosiveness of growth" and "the necessity to
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it

and "some must live" while "others die" in a theory
of

evolution.

These organic conflicts initially became em-

bodied in the metaphoric image of an "irregular branching
tree."

This metaphoric image served Darwin as a master

schema for organizing and generating new formulations for

testing and building his theory of evolution.

Eventually he

conceptualized the structure of this "irregular branching
tree" as governed by the mechanism of natural selection.
The "irregular branching tree" and his theory of evolution

reflected his personal contextual quest for transforming the
chaotic delight of nature into the quieter pleasure of the
mind.

Although Darwin provided what we would term

a

"both/

and" level rationalistic explanation for his own master met-

aphor of an "irregular branching tree" we would argue that
it was inadequate to fully resolve the paradoxical tension

expressed by his own master metaphor.

Rather Salk (1973)

with his theory of the "finest possible fit" with the dualities of evolution goes beyond Darwin's theory of the "sur-

vival of the fittest" in spite of the dualities of evolution
to provide a second-order resolution which transforms the

paradoxical tension of the "irregular branching tree" into
the creative tension of a "be-fitting" metaphoric "tree of

life."

For Salk the greater context of this creative trans-

formation is the planetary ecosphere itself.

Within the
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greater context of the planetary ecosphere the
second-order
resolution of the paradoxical tension of evolution opens up
the possibilities of a whole new level of creative evolution
in which planetary unity is consciously generated through

the diversity of evolutionary tendencies and group differ-

ences which are wholeheartedly embraced rather than merely

rationalis tical ly tolerated or openly fought over.
In final summary the child's problem of stopping a dog

and cat from fighting, the child's problem of drawing a

circle with Turtle Geometry, the child's problem of ambiguous communication with an adult, the villager and community

developer's problem of how to develop the community, the
industrial researchers' problem of producing more effective

synthetic paint brushes, the squatter and housing authorities' problem of how to improve housing, and finally Salk's

problem of conceptualizing the organic conflicts of evolution all exemplify the common process of metaphorically

reframing within
conflict.

a

greater context an initial first-order

Through this second-order metaphoric reframing

the first-order conflicts were incorporated and resolved

with

a

genuinely novel metaphoric reintegration.

metaphoric reintegration

a

With this

new field of second-order possi-

bilities was opened up for further hypothetical exploration
and experimental testing.
a

Hence we may conclude that within

greater context of meaningful coherence the paradoxical

.
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conflicts of the problems were metaphorically resolved to
open up a new field of inquiry to further explore and test
the greater context.

Furthermore the examples presented in

this chapter concerning metaphoric reframing exemplify the

creative process of dialectically constructing genuine
novelty through the second-order resolution of

a

paradoxical

tension which is otherwise irreducible by rationalistic

means

.

CHAPTER

VI

INTERPRETIVE APPLICATION OF THE METAPHORIC DIALECTIC
TO PIAGET'S THEORY OF CREATIVE DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter we shall apply the metaphoric dialec-

tic to Piaget's theory of cognitive development to further

deepen and expand the basic principles of his theory.

First

we shall give an overview of the five general levels of the

metaphoric dialectic with special emphasis on the Piagetian
concepts of "play" and "imitation" and "assimilation" and
"accommodation.

"

Secondly we shall give two detailed exam-

ples of the five general levels of the metaphoric dialectic

with elaborated recursive sublevels for the development of
"locomotion" and "conservation.

"

Finally we shall examine

the advanced levels of formal metaphoric operations in terms
of the Piagetian INRC group and supporting paradigms of

physics

Overview and Extension of Piaget's Theory

According to Piaget (1977) the central act of creativity is the equilibrating interaction of the person with the

environment.

Piaget characterizes this equilibrating inter-

action as a process of the person "assimilating" the envi-

ronment to the cognitive structures of the "self" and the

cognitive structure of the "self" accommodating to the
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environment.

Piaget (1977) clarifies that assimilation and

accommodation are not two distinct behaviors but two poles
of one interactive process.

The assimilating pole pulls the

child in the direction of egocentric play, fantasy, wishful

thinking and dreaming while the accommodating pole pulls the
child in the direction of imitation, superficial copying and

conformity to the environment (Piaget, 1962).

This bipolar

tension creates cognitive conflict in the child's interaction with the environment which necessitates a constructive

equilibration toward greater levels of coherence.

This

greater coherence is neither limited to the subjective distortions of assimilation nor the blind conformity of accommodation.

Rather it is an elegant balance which is both

more real than the literal copy of imitation and more imaginative than the fantasy of play

pulls imitation away from

a

.

As Forman states,

mindless empiricism and imita-

tion pulls play away from an objectless idealism"
1983)

.

"Play

(Forman,

Play is the predominance of assimilation over accom-

modation and imitation is the predominance of accommodation
over assimilation.
of the other.

However, neither operates in the absence

Both are equally essential to the elegant

balance of their lopsided tendencies.

In the terms of this

dissertation this "elegant balance" is the "genuine creativity which transforms and goes beyond both the "radical

.

.

219

novelty" of pure play and the "trivial novelty"
of pure

imitation
We shall further characterize this bipolar interaction
of the person with the environment as a co-reflexive rela-

tion in which assimilation and accommodation are mutually

exclusive tendencies but equally necessary to the development of cognition.

We may represent this relation as the

co-reflexive implication of the two sides of
Figure 22)

a

"card"

(see

On one side of this card the person implies

"On the other side of this card (the enviromental pole)

an assimilating implication.

ronment implies
'person' pole)

,

"

,

is

Flipping the card the envi-

"On the other side of this card

is an accommodating implication."

(the

Hence ac-

commodation entails assimilation and assimilation entails
accommodation.

We are caught in an equilibrating shuffle

between the assimilating accommodation (imitation) of the

person to the environment and the accommodating assimilation
(Play)

of the environment to the person.

We shall further explicate the broad outline of five

general levels of development for the co-reflexive relation
of play and imitation in terms of the metaphoric dialectic.

I.

Global Coordination of Co-ref lexivity
The baby is born into the environment with a complex set

of primitive reflexes such as blinking, sucking, grasping,

tonic neck response, etc.

These primitive reflexes
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"On the other side of
this card (the person
side) is an accommodating implication."

"On the other side of
this card (the environmental side) is an
assimilating implication "
.

shuffle
The co-implicative (co-reflexive)
Figure 22.
of equilibration.
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constitute the global coherence of the infant's co- reflexive
interaction with the environment.
II.
Absolute Differential Coordination
of Co-ref lexivity

At this level the global coherence of the previous

level becomes perturbed through the child's interaction with

environment.

The reflexes initiate the child's interaction

with the environment but are inadequate to fully coordinate
this interaction.

The attempt to resolve the incoherence of

the inadequate reflexes serves to progressively differenti-

ate the child from his environment.

This is the sensori-

motor stage where the child differentiates himself from the
object.
III.

"Either/Or" Coordination of Ref lexivity
At this level the differentiated relation of self from

the environment becomes lateralized into "either" play "or"

imitation because of the press of inconsistencies and incom-

pletenesses in the interaction of the self with the environment.

Environmental- inconsistencies are resolved through

pretend play and fantasy and environmental-incompletenesses
which demand more accommodation are fulfilled by imitation
and social conformity.

The child discontinuous ly alternates

between a private inner world of pretend play and fantasy
and the environmental world of conformity and imitation.

Hence the child may discontinuous ly transform

a

pencil into

.
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fantastic rocket and then be called back into
the "literal
world by mommy or the demands of gravity. Of
course
a

the

goal of equilibration is neither egocentric fantasy
nor

complete yielding to the environment

a

If the goal were ego-

.

central fantasy then we would have broken our necks trying
to fly from trees and if the goal were a complete yielding
to the environment we would never have constructed the real

rockets of our childhood dreams.

Rather the child is pro-

pelled onward by the mutually exclusive alternating conflict
of assimilating play and accommodating imitation to a higher

integrative level of reciprocity between these lateralized
tendencies.

This is the pre-operational level of egocentric

representative activity which equilibrates toward the

second-order resolution of concrete operations with reciprocity (see Figure 23)
IV.

"Both/And" Coordination of Reflexivity
At this level the pre-operative "either/or" coordina-

tion of the previous level is transformed into the concrete

operations of "both" assimilative play "and" accommodative

imitation reciprocally coordinated.

The simultaneous affir-

mation of both assimilation and accommodation provokes paradoxical conflict because of the discrepancy between the subjective distortions of assimilation and the superficial copy
of accommodation.

This leads to the cross-diagonal recipro-

city of both complementary tendencies.

This cross-diagonal
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The Meta-Context
of 2nd order coherence

A
/
/

\

\

incompleteness)

Figure 23.

The star structure of equilibration
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reciprocity creates

a

"figure eight" continuously alternat-

ing cycle between the accommodating assimilation of play and
the assimilating accommodation of imitation.

Assimilatory

play imaginatively extends the field of interaction and

accommodatory imitation adjusts this extension to fit the
copy of the environment.

Piaget states:

it is clear that the new assimilation plays the
constructive role (extension of the scheme field,
introduction of new articulations, etc.) and the new
accommodation plays the compensatory role (new adjustments in reciprocity, inversions of the object's unforeseen characteristics)
Each of these orientations is
bound up with the other in an indivisible whole.
.

.

.

.

(Piaget,
In effect the

1977, pp.

39-40)

"figure eight" loop is a cybernetic loop which

imaginatively expands the child's world with play and reci-

procally grounds and deepens these enriching explorations

with the realism of imitation.

"Both" imitation "and" play

are equally necessary members in the equilibratory process.

Neither alone is the cutting edge of equilibration rather
they both continuously oscillate in the equilibratory cut-

ting of development.

We may trace the developmental path of this "both/and"

organismic loop beginning with the self-completeness of
accommodatory imitation.

The extreme pull toward the self-

completeness of accommodation leads to

a

superficial copy or

blind conformity which results in the environmental inconsistency of assimilation.

The environmental inconsistency

selfof assimilation necessitates the move toward the

.
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consistency of assimilatory play.

However, the extreme pull

of assimilation toward self-consistency leads to subjective

distortions which reciprocally result in the environmental
incompleteness of accommodation.

The environmental incom-

pleteness of accommodation necessitates the pull back to the
self-completeness of accommodating imitation bringing the
loop full circuit.

phase

:

The first half of the loop is the play

"self-completeness of accomodation" to "environmen-

tal-inconsistency of assimilation" to the "self-consistency
of assimilation."

The second half of the loop is the

reciprocal phase of imitation

:

"self-consistency of assimi-

lation" to the "environmental incompleteness of accommodation" to the "self-completeness of accommodation."

The

creative tension which propels the continuous alternation of
these complementary phases is the paradoxical conflict

between the affirmation of both the subjective distortion of
play and the superficial copy of imitation.

The reciprocal

equilibration of these complementary tendencies results in
the coordination of concrete operations such as conserva-

tion, seriation and classification (see Figure 23)

"Neither/Nor" Metaphoric Coordination
of Co-ref lexivity

V.

At this level the "both/and

'

coordination of the pre-

vious level becomes fully integrated at a second-order level
of greater balance.

This greater balance is not explicable
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as a regression toward a first-order mean but
rather as a

dialectical progression toward

a

second-order aesthetic bal-

ance of the conflicting differences.

What initially began

with the seed structure of the primitive reflexes and global
coordination dialectically developed to bear fruit at
second-order level of reintegration.
of reintegration creative cognition is

a

At this higher level

"neither" play "nor"

imitation but the synchronous reintegration of both phases
of play and imitation simultaneously.
The initial sublevel of the "neither/nor" level is

characterized by the formal operations of propositional
logic in which the mathematical opposites of both "reciprocity" and "negation" are simultaneously "correlated" in the

nontemporal INRC group.

However, the final goal of creative

development is not the bland, static consistency of propositional logic or a mathematic group as Piaget would propose
(Piaget, 1972, pp

.

1-12).

Development is not merely

a

pro-

gressive convergence toward the more "complete consistency"
of formal logic.

It is also the correlated convergence to-

ward the "consistent completeness" vividly expressed in the
arts

.

The "neither/nor" level is a dual convergence and re -

integration of both the art of playful completeness and the
science of imitative consistency

.

Godel (1970, pp. 83-111) has mathematically demon-

strated that if an axiomatic system capable of subsuming
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ordinary arithmetic is consistent then it is incomplete and
if it is complete then it is inconsistent.

Both consistency

and completeness appear to be reciprocally limiting and

mutually indeterminate.

Hence if an axiomatic system is

consistent then there exists an undecidable proposition "P"

which is true but for which "neither

P nor ^P is

within the axiomatic system itself (Godel, 1970,

provable"
p.

86).

The mathematical fact that "neither P nor vp is provable" is
a

violation of the logical law of excluded middle which

states that every logical proposition is either provably
true or false

(Kline, 1980, p.

264).

We propose that the

undecidability of "neither P nor ^P" creates an inconsistency and that as Godel demonstrates, the problem of unde-

cidability can only be resolved by incorporating the new

proposition as

a

foundational axiom.

However this process

is never complete nor finally consistent because of the in-

herent "undecidability" of all axiomatic systems.
ematical proof of Godel'

s

The math-

limitive theorems has toppled the

best efforts of formalists such as Hilbert and Russell to
create "the consistent foundation of formal axioms" on which
to erect a towering superstructure for all of mathematics.

We propose that the ultimate criterion of creative con-

structions in mathematics and other scientific disciplines
is

neither the blandness of consistency nor the boredom of

completeness but the aesthetic balance of their integrative
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coherence

.

At this advanced level of metaphoric operations

the art of play and the science of imitation become syn-

chronously correlated as in Leonardo Da Vinci's artistic
drawings of the scientific flight of birds.
In order to further explore the formal metaphoric

operations which go beyond Piaget's formal operations we may

consider the self-reports of creative scientists and mathe-

maticians such as Poincare, Dirac, Schrodinger, Heisenberg,
and Einstein.

Poincare states that, "Pure logic could never

lead us to anything but tautologies; it could create nothing
new; nor from it alone can any science issue"

Poincare further explains:

19).

1958, p.

(Poincare,

It may appear surprising that sensibility should be introduced in connection with mathematical demonstrations,
which, it would seem, can only interest the intellect.
But not if we bear in mind the feeling of mathematical
beauty, of the harmony of numbers and forms and of geoIt's a real aesthetic feeling that all
metric elegance.
mathematicians recognoze, and this is truly sensibility.
The useful combinations are precisely the most
(Poincare, 1908, p. 59)
beautiful
.

.

.

.

.

.

Elsewhere Poincare states, "Aesthetic sensibility plays the
part of the delicate sieve" (Wechsler, 1978. p. 1).

Reinforcing Poincare's trust of aesthetic judgment,
Dirac commented on Schrodinger

'

s

not publishing his first

version of the wave equation because it conflicted with
empirical data:
think there is a moral to this story, namely that it
is more important to have beauty in one's equations than
to have them fit the experiment. ... It seems that if
one is working from the point of view of getting beauty
I
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in one's equations, and if one has really a sound insight, one is on a sure line of progress.
If there is
not complete agreement between the results of one's work
and experiment, one should not allow oneself to be too
discouraged, because the discrepancy may well be due to
minor features that are not properly taken into account
and that will get cleared up with further developments
of the theory.
(Dirac, 1963, p. 47)

Heisenberg recalls commenting to Einstein on the unifying certainty he associated with the aesthetic experience:
You may object that by speaking of simplicity and beauty
I am introducing aesthetic criteria of truth, and I
frankly admit that I am strongly attracted by the simplicity and beauty of the mathematical schemes which
nature presents us.
You must have felt this too:
the
almost frightening simplicity and wholeness of the relationship, which nature suddenly spreads out before us.
(Heisenburg, 1971, p. 68)

Explaining his own creative thought process Einstein
states

:

Words or language, as they are written or spoken, do not
The
seem to play any role in my mechanisms of thought.
elements
in
serve
as
which
to
seem
psychical entities
thought are certain signs and more or less clear images
which can be voluntarily reproduced and combined.
This combinatory play seems to be the essential feature
in productive thought--bef ore there is any connection
with logical construction in words or other kinds of
convensigns which can be communicated to others
for
sought
be
have
to
signs
other
tional words or
laboriously only in a second stage, when the mentioned
associate play is sufficiently established and can be
reproduced at will. (Hadamard, 1945, pp 142-143)
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

This "combinatory play" is not reducible to the combi-

natorial logic of Piaget's formal operations because as
Einstein reports it occurs prior to the formal application
of logic.

Rather we propose that this "combinatory play"

along with the other aesthetic combinations reported were

:
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the result of an advanced form of metaphoric thinking
in

which different concepts and images were metaphorically
combined to produce aesthetic coherence.

This "combinatory

play" of different psychical entities functioned to open up
the second-order possibility of new possibilities not avail-

able to the first-order possibilities of combinatorial
logic.

This is similar to Godel's proof of the inherent

unprovability of certain second-order propositions within
the first-order axiomatic system.

As Bronowski states

there is no logical way in which we can know, or
can formalize the pregnant decision.
The step by which
a new axiom is added cannot itself be mechanized.
It is
a free play of mind, one invention outside the logical
processes.
This is the central act of imagination in
science, and it is in all respects like any similar act
in literature; it can in fact be taken as a definition
of imagination. (Bronowski, 1971, p. 127)
.

.

.

Thus formal metaphoric operations are "neither" the

radical imagination of flights of fancy "nor" the trivial

block building deduction of combinatorial logic but rather
the imaginative realism of constructive creativity.

Hence

neither the art of play nor the science of imitation is the
sole cutting edge of this new development.
a two

point.

Rather both form

edged sword which comes to a penetrating metaphoric
Through this metaphoric penetration new levels of

knowledge are broadened and deepened simultaneously.
The creative process begins with the wonder of the

newborn infant and ends with the wonder of an Einstein.
each stage transition the child finds new problems to

At
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explore.

In the final stage of development the
infant

turned Einstein finds that the new problem is "finding
the
problem.
a

This is not a problem solving process so much as

metaphoric process of questioning and redefining the

formal assumptions of logical problem solving itself.
This advanced stage of formal metaphoric operations

inspires child-like wonder at a more profound level of so-

phistication.

In the likes of Einstein we find neither the

overconfidence of the fool nor the extreme caution of the
timid but the quiet courage of one who knows he doesn't know
and stands in awe of the mysterious beauty of creation.
"The most beautiful experience we can have is the mysteri-

ous.

It is the fundamental emotion that stands at the

cradle of all art and true science" (Einstein, 1979).

The

goal of creative development in science is not to reduce

away the mysterious beauty of creation to

a

rationalistic

conception but rather to enhance the mystery with more
beaut iful metaphoric theories

.

Metaphoric theories reveal

the simple unity of form throughout the diverse domains of

human endeavor.

The constructive cross-validation of this

experience of aesthetic unity becomes the new criterion of
acceptability.

The experience of aesthetic unity is the

fuller coherence which metaphorically reintegrates the

diverse views of the artist and scientist into

ocular vision.

Maruyama states that:

a

new poly-
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the Japanese think in poly-ocular vision.
Americans who believe in the existence of one truth will
inevitably ask: if you have different views which one is
But consider the following:
in the binocular
vision it is irrelevant to raise the question as to
which eye is wrong.
Binocular vision works, not because
the two eyes see different sides of the same object, but
because the differential between the two images enables
the brain to compute the invisible dimension. (Maruyama,
1977, p. 84)
.

.

.

Thus through the dialectical differential of the artistic

and scientific views we are better able to metaphorically

construct

a

glimmering reflection of the invisible beauty of

the creative process itself.

Detailed Outline of the Recursive Sublevels
of the Metaphoric Dialectic
Thus far we have considered the broad outline of the
five levels of cognitive development in terms of Piaget's

general organismic concepts of assimilatory play and accom-

modatory imitation.

Next we shall consider a more detailed

delineation and exposition of the five levels.
tive development is defined as

a

Since cogni-

general reflexive movement

each specific level of development will holographically reflect the whole pattern of the five levels

.

This is not a

simplistic self-reflexive model in which the static part
reflects the preformed whole in miniature but rather this is
a

dynamic co-reflexive model in which the dialectical pro-

cess within each stage recursively reflects the dialectical

process across all the stages.

(See Fischer

(1980)

for

232

another model of recursive development.)

We outline the

recursive sequence of the reflexive model as follows:
1*

11

•

Global Coordination (Fruit)

Absolute Differential Coordination
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

III.

Either/Or Coordination
1.
2.
3.
4

.

5.

IV.

global coordination (Seed)
absolute differentiation
either/or coordination
both/and coordination
neither/nor metaphoric coordination (Fruit)

Both/And Coordination
1.
2.
3.
4

.

5.

V.

global coordination
(Seed)
absolute differentiation
either/or coordination
both/and coordination
neither/nor metaphoric coordination (Fruit)

global coordination (Seed)
absolute differentiation
either/or coordination
both/and coordination
neither/nor metaphoric coordination (Fruit)

Neither/Nor Metaphoric Coordination
1.
2.
3.
4

.

5.

global coordination (Seed)
absolute differentiation
either/or coordination
both/and coordination
neither/nor metaphoric coordination (Fruit)

This elaborated outline of the recursive dialectic of cogni-

tive development is a constructive pattern which broadens

and deepens each successive level toward greater levels of

constructive coherence.

The beginning general level of

global coordination is the second-order fruit of the infant's birth which becomes the "seed structure" for the

.
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first sublevel of "(I) Absolute Dif ferentation.

"

This "seed

structure" dialectically develops through the five sublevels
to a "second-order fruition at the "neither/nor" sublevel.

This

"second-order fruition" of the previous level becomes

the "seed structure" for the next general level of global

coordination.

This recursive transitional pattern of the

"

second-order fruition " of the previous level becoming the

"

seed structure of global coordination " at the next level

continues to develop until the final fruition at the meta-

phoric Neither/Nor (neither/nor)

level.

Application of the Metaphoric Dialectic
to the Development of Locomotion
Before applying this developmental dialectic to the

detailed study of the Piagetian concepts of conservation and
formal operations we shall exemplify the five recursive

levels in terms of the child'
Gesell et al

locomotion.

.

s

developmental coordination of

describe the child's development

of neuromotor coordination as a consolidative process of

"reciprocal interweaving," which is similar to the first
four levels of the metaphoric dialectic, but they do not

constructively account for the fifth level of second-order
transitions
The facile operation of the nervous system depends upon
balance and counteraction between antagonistic compoBilateral, unilateral, ipsilateral and
nents.
contralateral members must be brought into parallel and
This is accomplished through a
diagonal coordination.
.

.

.
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kind of cross -stitching or reciprocal interweaving
in
the structural growth of the networks of the
nervous
system. (Gesell et al
1974, p. 194).
.

,

Gesell goes on to explain that the child does not develop on

installment plan" but by the "expansion of
action system.

"

a

unitary re-

a

"homogene-

However this expansion is not

ous balloon-like expansion" nor a "hierarchical stratifica-

tion," but rather a "process of reincorporation and consoli-

dation with progressive corticalization.

The neurologic

result is an interwoven structured texture which expresses
itself in the progressive patterns of behavior"
al.

,

1974

,

194)

p.

Gesell'

s

(Gesell et

.

general process of "reciprocal interweaving"

may be functionally explicated in terms of the metaphoric
dialectic which also constructively accounts for secondorder transitions rather than relying on critical periods of

maturation as Gesell does.
Gesell'

s

Reinterpreting and extending

maturational principles in terms of metaphoric dia-

lectic we may say that development is neither the trivial

creativity of a "homogeneous balloon-like expansion" nor the
radical creativity of "hierarchical stratification" but

rather is a second-order process of "reincorporation" which
is

constructed through the first-order consolidation of the

"reciprocal interweaving" of the child's bilateral interaction with the environment.

This constructive reinterpreta-

tion of Gesell in terms of the metaphoric dialectic allows

.

:
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us to constructively elaborate on the rich tapestry
of the

child

reciprocal interweaving with the environment.

s

Drawing upon LeWinn (1969) and Cohen’s (1979) research

concerning the child's locomotive development from global
reflex movement through walking we offer the following outline and extend it through the second-order level of "flowing" interaction.

three levels are

It is important to note that the first
a

phylogenetic recapitulation of ontogeny.

According to LeWinn (1969, pp. 98-100), the infant's "global
undulation," "crawling" and "creeping" patterns phylogenetically recapitulate the movement of "fish,
and "reptiles."

"

"amphibians"

Hence it appears we are addressing

a

funda-

mental principle concerning evolution as well as developThe following outline of the child's developmental

ment.

locomotion is organized according to the five levels of the

metaphoric dialectic
I

II.

movements and reflex actions in
Global undulating
prone position

Absolute Differential Coordination (Crawling)
1.
2.
3.
4

.

5.

—

Global coordination global undulating movements and reflex action
Absolute differential coordination--homologous crawling
Either/or coordination homolateral crawling
Both/and coordination contralateral crawling
Neither/nor metaphoric coordination pushing
up to the knee level with stationary balance

—
—

—
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III-

Either/or coordination (Creeping)

—

1.
2.

3.
4

.

5.

IV.

—

Both/and coordination (Walking)
1.
2.
3.
4

.

5.

V.

Global coordination maintaining knee level
position with stationary balance
Absolute differential coordination homologous creeping
Either/or coordination--homolateral creeping
Both/and coordination--contralateral creeping
Neither/nor metaphoric coordination--pushing
up to standing position with stationary balance

Global coordination--pushing up to standing
position with stationary balance
Absolute differential coordination--homologous walking
Either/or coordination homolateral walking
Both/and coordination--contralateral walking
Neither/nor metaphoric coordination secondorder transition to "flowing" movement

—

—

Neither/Nor Metaphoric coordination (Flowing)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Global coordination--global flowing
Absolute differential coordination homolgous
flowing
Either/or coordination homolateral flowing
Both/and coordination contralateral flowing
Neither/nor metaphoric coordination--dynamic
stillness

—

—
—

The first four general levels represent the idealized

developmental sequence.

At the first general level of

Global Coordination the infant exhibits diffuse undulating
spinal movements without mobility which are phylogeneticall^

reminiscent of fish movements.

Through this movement the

infant differentiates the opposing front and back sides of
the body.

At the second general level of Absolute Differen

tial Coordination the infant crawls with the abdomen in con-

logenetically
tact with the supporting surface which is phy
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reminiscent of amphibian movements.

Through this movement

the infant differentiates the opposing polarity of the upper

and lower body with the weight biased toward the lower half.
At the third general level of "Either/Or " Coordination the

infant creeps with the abdomen unsupported which is phylo-

genetically reminiscent of reptilian movement

.

Through this

movement the infant lateralizes the mutually exclusive right
and left sides of the body.

At the fourth general level of

"Both/And" Coordination the infant learns to walk in an upright, bipedal cross-pattern.

Through this movement the

polarized opposites of front and lower and the lateralized
opposites of right and left are diagonally cross- integrated
in sequential movement.

Within each general level the five general levels are

recursively recapitulated with five corresponding sublevels.
For example within the third general level of "Either/Or

Coordination for creeping the child begins with

11

a global

coordination of stationary balance at knee level and proceeds to the absolute differential coordination of homologous creeping, then the "either/or" coordination of homo-

lateral creeping, then the "both/and" coordination of con-

tralateral creeping and finally the "neither/nor" metaphoric

coordination of pushing up to standing position with
stationary balance.

For a more detailed exposition of the

sublevels of creeping in terms of the metaphoric dialectic

.
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see the prototypical example developed toward the end of

Chapter III.

We may further note that every child does not

necessarily go through every sublevel in
quence.

a

lockstep se-

An individual child may not exhibit all the sub-

levels but on the whole most children tend to follow this

developmental sequence.

The fifth general metaphoric level

is proposed as a natural construction developing out of the

previous levels.

This final level is a second-order type of

movement and as such it

is not just a more

extension of what preceded.

sophisticated

Running would merely be a more

sophisticated extension of walking.

The second-order coor-

dination is more concerned with the qualitative way the
person moves rather than the actual mechanics.

exemplified with the movements of

a

This may be

performing dancer in

which the first-order movements are concerned with the basic
techniques and mechanics of coordination while the secondorder movement is concerned with the aesthetic flow of the
dance
To explain this second-order way of moving we shall

draw upon the research of Csikszentnihalay i (1975) who has
found that many people when they are totally immersed in

their activity experience an altered state of being which
they describe as "flowing."
55 chess players,

30

In a study of 30 rock climbers,

rock dancers, and 40 high-school bas-

ketball players Csikszentnihalay i found through

a
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questionnaire and interview format that when these people
were most enjoying their activity they were in

a

qualita-

tively altered state of being which they self-reported as
"flowing."

The enjoyment gained from this experience of

"flowing" was ranked higher than prestige, reward or gla-

mour

.

We shall briefly summarize six interdependent vari-

ables of the "flow" state (Csikszentmihalyi
48)

,

1975, pp

38-

.

.

1.

Merging of action and awareness

.

In the flow

state the participant has no dualistic perspective.

aware of his actions but not of awareness itself.
rock climber reports

He is

An expert

"You are so involved in what you are

:

doing [that] you aren't thinking of yourself as separate
from the immediate activity.

.

.

separate from what you are doing"
chess player reports,

.

You don't see yourself as
(p.

39).

An outstanding

"The game is a struggle and the con-

centration is like breathing--you never think of it.

The

roof could fall in and, if it missed you, you would be

unaware of it"
2.

field

(p.

39).

Centering of attention on

a

limited stimulus

The immediate field of activity is brought into

.

greater focus to the exclusion of extraneous factors.

A

university professor in science who climbs rocks reported,
"When

I

start on a climb, it is as if my memory input has

240

been cut off.

All

onds, and all
(p.

I

I

can remember is the last thirty sec-

can think ahead is the next five minutes"

Various chess experts report,

40).

exciting,

"When the game is

don't seem to hear nothing--the world seems to

I

be cut off from me and all there is to think about is my

game "

(p

.

40

)

.

Loss of ego

3.

.

In the flow state the participant

experiences "self-forgetfulness" or the "loss of selfconsciousness" and when the flow is deepest

"transcendence

a

of individuality" and "fusion with the world."

A majority

of participants also experience an altered sense of time in

which time is either speeded up or "does not exist"
87).

A rock climber reports,

(pp.

65,

"One tends to get immersed in

what is going on around him, in the rock, in the moves that
are involved

tion of body

.

.

— so

.

search for handholds

.

.

proper posi-

involved he might lose the consciousness of

his own identity and melt into the rock"

chess player reports,
In this sense,

.

(p.

43)

.

An expert

"Time passes a hundred times faster.

it resembles the dream state.

can unfold in seconds, it seems.

A whole story

Your body is nonexistent--

but actually your heart pumps like mad to supply the brain"
(p.

44)

.

4.

Control and congruence with the environment.

In

the flow state this may vary from the feeling of omnipotent

control over the activity and/or opponent to feeling

a
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secure sense of oneness with the activity and/or
opponent.
A rock climber reports,
an animal.

It's pleasant.

involvement.
rock"

.

43).

(p.

"You become a robot--no, more like

.

.

There is a feeling of total

You feel like a panther powering up the

A few chess players report:

tyrannical sense of power.
though

I

I

"I

get a

feel immensely strong, as

have the fate of another person in my grasp.

want to kill!";

"I

I

like getting lost in an external situa-

tion and forgetting about personal crap--I like being in

control";

"Although

I

am not aware of specific things,

have a general feeling of well-being, and that

plete control of my world"

(pp.

44,

am in com-

45).

Clarity of feedback and goals

5.

I

I

In the flow state

.

the participant experiences an enhanced clarity of response
in which the rightness of each movement is immediately

sensed.

This clarity of response is greatly increased by

the degree of structure that the activity provides.

In

sports the player immediately knows whether they have scored
In mountain climbing a wrong move can be fatal.

or gained.

In chess the rules are precisely defined.

reports,

A rock climber

"When things are going poorly, you start thinking

about yourself.

When things go well, you do things automa-

tically without thinking.

You pick the right holds, equip-

ment, and it is right"

86).

feel as if

I

(p.

couldn't do

a

A chess player reports,

wrong move.

Very, very happy

"I

"

:

.
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feeling

—

feel smarter, clever.

I

Sadistical as it is,

can't stop a grin from breaking out on my face"

Motivation is "autotelic

6.

I

64).

(p.

In the flow state

.

motivation is intrinsic to the activity and in need of no
external rewards to itself.

A young poet who is also

a

seasoned rock climber reports
The mystique of rock climbing is climbing; you get to
the top of a rock glad it's over but really wish it
would go forever.
The justification of climbing is
like
the
justification of poetry is writing;
climbing,
you don't conquer anything except things in yourself.
Climbing is
The act of writing justifies poetry.
The purpose
recognizing that you are a flow.
the same:
of the flow is to keep on flowing, not looking for a
It is not a
peak or utopia but staying in the flow.
moving up but a continuous flowing; you move up only to
There is no possible reason for
keep the flow going.
climbing except the climb itself; it is a selfcommunication (pp. 47-48)
.

.

.

.

A chess player reports,

"Nothing comes close to chess in

providing beauty and pleasure"

(p.

67)

In summary there are six interdependent variables

which characterize the flow experience:
action and awareness,
ited stimulus field,

(2)

(3)

(6)

merging of

centering of attention on
loss of ego,

gruence with the environment,
goals,

(1)

(5)

(4)

a

lim-

control and con-

clarity of feedback and

intrinsic motivation of the activity.

A general

factor which is related to all six of these variables

is

the

parrelative difficulty of the activity in relation to the

ticipant's capability.

If the activity is too demanding it

may produce stress and anxiety from worrying.

If the
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activity is too easy it may produce boredom and anxiety
from
lack of any challenge.

The flow experience goes beyond both

the anxiety of stress and boredom to produce a meaningful

challenge which keeps the participant on the cutting edge of
their development.

The flow state is a productive form of

play in which the participant's awareness is co-reflexive

with the environmental activity.
Next we shall define and exemplify the five sublevels
of the second-order coordination of the "flowing" movement
in terms of the flow experiences recorded and analyzed by

Csikszentmihalyi.

Specifically we shall define the sub-

levels in terms of the locus of control involved in the co-

reflexive relation of the participant's awareness and environmental activity.
1.

Global flowing

.

The participant experiences a

global sense of diffuse flow without awareness or differentiation of the locus of control.

The participant receptive-

ly experiences the flow without directing it.
2.

Homologous flowing

The participant experiences

.

the initial differentiation of the controlling self from the

environmental activity.

The participant begins to take an

active role in directing the flow movement.
3.

Homolateral flowing

.

The participant experiences

the locus of control in the self as opposed to the environ-

ment and/or opponent.

The self and environment are related

.

.
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in an

either/or" competitive relation of mutual exclusion.

The participant experiences an omnipotent sense of control

over the environment.

As one rock climber reported,

feel like a panther powering up the rock"
4,

Contralateral flowing

(p.

"You

43)

The participant experi-

.

ences the locus of control in the reciprocal interaction

between the self and environment or opponent.

environment are related in
dependence and respect.
self-catalyzing.

.

.

.

a

The self and

"both/and" relation of mutual

One rock climber reported,
The moves

.

.

.

"It's

create each other.

The move you're planning to do is also the genesis of the

move you're going to do after you're done that one.

indefinite interrelationship,
(p.

85)

a

kind of crystalline hookup"

Another rock climber reported,

"You aren't really

That's part

the master, but are moving with something else.
of where the really good feeling comes from.
in harmony with something else,

the weather and scenery.

You are moving

the piece of rock as well as

You're part of it and thus lose

some of the feeling of individual separation"
5.

It's an

Dynamic stillness

.

(p.

46).

The participant experiences

the locus of control in neither the self nor the environment

but releases control to the simultaneous integration of both
self and environment.

The deep numinous flow at this level

both "elevates and humiliates simultaneously"
p.

154).

(Jung,

1963,

Nicolson (1959) in her study of the "sublime"
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records the reports of mountain climbers simultaneously

experiencing both the awesome gloom and the awe inspiring
glory of the mountains.

Through the dynamic stillness of

sublimity the participant experiences the transcendent

heights by virtue of an abased grounding.

At this level the

flow experience is both as transcending and grounding as the

mountain itself.

The participant's kinesthetic perception

becomes simultaneously infinitesimally small with the awe some gloom of the mountain and infinitely expansive with the

awe inspiring glory of the mountain

.

becomes focused into the eternality of
(Robinson, 1969, p.

9)

.

The temporal sensation
a

single moment

The self is confronted with both

its own limitations and its immense potentiality.

Robinson

describes this heightened vision of the mountain climber as
the "oceanic feeling of the supreme sufficiency of the

present," "oceanic feelings of clarity, distance, union, and
oneness"

(Robinson,

1969, pp.

6,

8).

Csikszentmihalyi also records comparable experiences
of the "dynamic stillness."

One rock climber reported:

After one prolonged climb in bad weather without food, I
had this experience of having always climbed, always
Once on top I felt as if I could open my arms and
will.
I felt part of the
merge with the whole surroundings.
greater whole-oneness, (p. 92)

Another reported,
the moves,

"You could get so immersed in the rock, in

the proper position of the body,

that you'd lose

and
consciousness of your identity and melt into the rock

.
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the others you're climbing with"

(p.

Another reported:

92).

The only religious feelings I ever have stem from the
mountains.
I feel that the mountains make one aware of
spiritual matters. ... I'm fortunate because I can
appreciate these places where you can appreciate nature,
the minisculeness of man and his aspirations, which can
“
elevate one. Cp"i 92
)

Another reported:
You're climbing yourself as much as the rock. ... if
you're flowing with something, it's totally still.
There's no possibility of judging from the inside of a
car whether the car is moving or the freeway.
So you're
not quite sure whether you are moving or the rock is,
for the same reason, being inside yourself as you usually are.
So it becomes very still
(p. 93)
.

.

.

.

.

.

In summary of the five sublevels of the flowing move-

ment the locus of control develops from

a nondif f erentiated

global flow to the initial differentiation of the controlling self from the global flow to omnipotence of the self

over the environment to the complementarity of the self with
the environment to finally the aesthetic unity of sublimity.
It is a thesis of this dissertation that both physical

coordination and mental coordination share
phoric dialectic.

a

common meta-

The physical coordination of physical

space is isomorphic with the mental coordination of mental
space.

Csikszentmihalyi

'

research supports this thesis in

s

that rock climbing and chess playing share the same basic

elements of second-order flow.

Maslow (1968)

into the distinctive cognitive patterns

(1971)

of "self-actualizers

Furthermore, research by

"

and

"

transcenders

with the second-order flow experience.

"

is also congruent
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Application of the Metaphoric Dialectic to the
Development of Conservation
Next we shall apply the recursive metaphoric dialectic
to the detailed study of "conservation."

We shall hypothe-

tically retrace Leibnitz's childhood construction of the

conservation of

a

clay ball through Forman's six levels as

previously discussed in the literature review on Piaget.
From the attainment of the conservation of the clay ball at
the concrete operations we shall continue Leibnitz's devel-

opment into the young adolescence of formal operations with
the proportional conservation of a rectangular volume.

At

this point we shall retrace Leibnitz's historical construc-

tion of infinitesimal calculus which goes beyond the formal

operations of the proportional conservation of rectangular
volume to the advanced formal metaphoric operations of

infinitesimal calculus which allow the formulation of the
volume of spheroids.

Thus we shall span Leibnitz's develop-

ment from the childhood play with

a

clay ball to productive

play of a brilliant mathematician constructing the infi-

nitesimal calculus of spheroids.

I.

Global Coordination (Sensori-motor stage)
At this beginning level baby Leibnitz playfully per-

ceives an absolute correspondence (resemblance) between all
the states of the clay ball.

In other words he globally

.
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fuses or confuses the identity of the various shapes of the
clay.

II.

Absolute (Sensori-motor stage)
1.

Global coordination

.

The previous level becomes

the seed structure for the next set of recursive develop-

ments

.

2.

Absolute differential coordination (Forman's

Absolute Difference).

Young Leibnitz's global coordination

dialectically leads to the more coherent construction of
absolute differentiation.

At this level little Leibnitz is

able to differentiate only the difference of "tall" to the

neglect of any correspondence with "not tall."
3.

Either/Or coordination (Forman's Opposition).

Young Leibnitz's absolute differentiation of the clay ball

dialectically leads to the more coherent construction of
"either" tall "or" not tall in opposition.

At this level

little Leibnitz perceives the tall shape of the clay as the

mutually exclusive opposite of the not-tall flat shape of
clay
4.

Both/And coordination (Forman's Discrete Degrees).

Young Leibnitz's either/or coordination of the clay ball

dialectically leads to the more coherent construction of
"both" tall "and" not tall in discrete degrees.

At this

level little Leibnitz begins to fill in the gap between the
two mutually exclusive extremes of "tall" and "not tall
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with the discrete degrees of

"a

little tall."

The continu-

ous overlap of the discrete degrees gradually leads to the

contradiction of how can

a

discrete difference be both

"a

little tall" and "a little not tall" simultaneously in the

middle spherical range of the continuum.
5.

Variation)

Neither/Nor Metaphoric coordination (Forman's
.

Young Leibnitz metaphorically resolves the

contradiction of the previous level with the transformation
of "neither" a little tall "nor" a little not tall but the

absolute and necessary correspondence of both through

a

second-order continuum of variation.
II.

Either/Or Coordination (Pre-operational Stage)
1.

Global coordination

.

The absolute correspondence

of the previous level becomes the seed structure or starting

point of the next set of recursive developments.

At this

global level of variation little Leibnitz has not yet dif-

ferentiated "direct functional variation" from "inverse
functional variation."

The direct function is the more

height the less width.

The inverse function is the more

width the less height.
2.

Absolute differential coordination (Forman's

Direct Function)

.

Young Leibnitz's global coordination of

the clay ball dialectically leads to the more coherent

construction of absolute differentiation.

At this level

little Leibnitz is able to differentiate only the function
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of direct variation to the neglect of any
correspondence

with the inverse function.
3.

tion)

Either/Or coordination (Forman's Inverse FuncYoung Leibnitz's absolute differentiation of the

.

direct function dialectically leads to the more coherent

construction of "either" the direct function "or" not the
direct function (inverse function) in mutually exclusive
opposition.

At this level little Leibnitz understands that

the functional variation of height to width is negatively

defined in opposition to the inverse function.
4.

Both/And coordination

.

Young Leibnitz's function-

al either/or coordination of the clay ball dialectically

leads to the more coherent construction of "both" direct

functional variation "and" inverse functional variation in

discrete degrees of mutual dependence.

At this level little

Leibnitz begins to fill in the mutually exclusive gap between the independent variations of the direct and inverse

function with temporally discrete perceptual judgments of
the clay ball having "both" more height and less width at

time tl "and" less height and more width at time t2

.

In

other words Leibnitz can understand that the continuous

variation of the ball's direct and inverse functions are

mutually dependent through time but cannot yet make the
necessary atemporal correspondence of exact compensation.

Furthermore the continuous variation of both the direct and

.
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inverse function leads Leibnitz to the crossover point
of
the sphere where the direct function contradictorily turns

into the inverse function.

Neither/Nor Metaphoric coordination (Forman's

5.

Exact Compensation)

.

Young Leibnitz metaphorically resolves

the contradiction of the previous level with the transforma-

tion of "neither" the discrete variation of the direct func tion "nor" the discrete variation of the inverse function
but the absolute and necessary correspondence of both

through the second-order integration of exact compensation.
In other words Leibnitz now understands that the direct and

inverse functions "reciprocally" compensate their interde-

pendent variation to conserve the quantity of the clay ball.
IV.

Both/And Coordination (Concrete Operational Stage)
1.

Global coordination

.

The absolute correspondence

of the previous level becomes the seed structure for the

next set of recursive developments.

While we have outlined

the development of compensation by reciprocity parallel to

this little Leibnitz also develops the notion of compensa-

tion by inverse

(negation)

(Piaget,

1970, pp.

703-732)

The

inverse (negation) is defined as the equivalent correspon-

dence between what is negatively displaced from one part of
the clay ball and what is positively replaced some other

place on the clay ball.

ported

a

In the literature review we re-

successful conservation learning experiment by
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Inhelder et al.

(1975) which incorporated the notion of the

inverse equivalence by correspondence.

Hence we have two

concrete operational indicators of compensation:

(1)

little

Leibnitz indicates that the transformed clay corresponds
to
the original by the inverse

(negation);

(2)

little Leibnitz

indicates that the height and width of the clay are recipro -

cally conserved.

At the global level of compensation these

two parallel developments are diffusely related.
2.

Absolute differential coordination

sation by the inverse (negation)
is

.

Since compen-

usually develops first it

the first to be differentiated to the neglect of recipro-

city.
3.

Either/or coordination

.

Young Leibnitz's absolute

differentiation of compensation by inverse (negation) dialectically leads to the more coherent construction of
"either" compensation by inverse "or" not compensation by
the inverse

(compensation by reciprocity) in opposition.

At

this level little Leibnitz understands reciprocity is not
the inverse and that both are mutually exclusive.
4.

Both/And coordination

.

Young Leibnitz's "either/

or" coordination of conservation dialectically leads to the

more coherent construction of "both" inverse "and" recipro city as mutually dependent compliments necessarily to
fuller understanding of conservation.

explain their absolute correspondence.

a

However he cannot yet

.
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5.

Neither/nor metaphoric coordination

.

At this

level the young adolescent Leibnitz understands that "nei-

ther

inverse

nor

rec ip roc ity as mutual ly dependent com-

plements are adequate for to the fullest understanding of
conservation.

Rather both become interdependent at the

second-order level of absolute correspondence or correlation
in the INRC group

(Piaget, 1970, p.

727)

In other words

the young adolescent Leibnitz attains an understanding of

the proportional volume of rectangular solids.

Given two

wooden blocks one with the marked off surface dimensions of
6x6 and the other an unmarked block of 4x9 dimension Leib-

nitz is able to compare the two blocks and mentally deduce
that the displaced proportions of the unmarked 4x9 block

inversely correspond to the 6x6 marked block by the reciprocity of the multiplication formula.

Thus the conservation

of proportional volume involves the absolute correlation of

both inverse (negation) and reciprocity.

Piaget expresses

this in terms of the group formula I=CNR where I=the con-

served identity, C=correlation

R=reciprocity (Piaget, 1970,
V.

,

p.

N=negation (inverse) and
727).

Formal Operations
1.

Global coordination

.

The absolute correspondence

(correlation) of the previous level becomes the seed struc-

ture for the next set of recursive developments.

At this

level the proportional rectangular solids serve as first-
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order approximations of the second-order spheroids
which re-

quire a calculus of the infinitesimal.

The calculus of the

infinitesimal as developed historically by Leibnitz demonstrates the "absolute correlation" of the differential and

integral operations in constructing the volume formula for
spheroids.

Intuitively the differential is the directional

flow of a curve at each point and the integral is the sum of
such points extended over the projected plane of the curve.
2.

Absolute differential coordination

.

Leibnitz

first develops the differential to the neglect of the integral

.

3.

Either/Or coordination

.

Leibnitz's absolute

differential coordination dialectically leads to the more

coherent construction of "either" the differential "or"
not the differential
terms of each other.

(integral)

as

negatively defined in

At this level Leibnitz was historical-

ly able to formulate the fundamental theorem of calculus

concerning the inverse relationship between the differential
and the integral

(Boyer,

1949, p.

206).

In other words

the

integral was defined as the anti-differential (e.g., the

differential of x

is 2x and the integral of 2x is x

)

.

Although the static inverse relationship between the integral and differential was understood at this level the

dynamic reciprocal interaction of the two operations in the
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construction of the volume of

spheroid was yet to be

a

attained.
4.

Both/And coordination

Leibnitz's either/or coor-

.

dination of the differential and the integral leads to the

more coherent construction of "both" the differential "and"
the integral as mutually dependent complements necessary to
a

fuller understanding of the volume of spheroids.

At this

level Leibnitz comes to understand the dynamic reciprocal

interaction of both the differential and integral in the

construction of the volume of the spheroid.

However,

Leibnitz's definition of the differential and integral in
terms of the "infinitesimal" and "infinity" resulted in

a

historical paradox which has perplexed mathematicians till
this very day

(Kline, 1980, p.

273).

Leibnitz mathematical-

ly reasoned that a spheroid could be regularly packed with

rectangular solids which upon calculation would give

a

first-order "discrete degree" approximation of the volume of
the spheroid.

By making the rectangular solids smaller and

smaller the error of the first-order "discrete degree"

approximation could be indefinitely reduced.

However, the

paradox is how is it possible for an infinite number of

infinitesimally reduced rectangular figures to amount to the
definite magnitude of

a

spheroid.

If the rectangular fig-

magnitude
ures are infinitesimally reduced to an actual zero
zero
then even an infinite number of zeros still amounts to

.
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5.

Neither/nor metaphoric coordination

.

At this

level Leibnitz developed the understanding that the volume
of the spheroid is neither the discrete finite summation of

the integral nor the discrete finite degrees of the differ -

ential in a mutually dependent relation but rather both are

interdependent and absolutely correlated as the differential
is

reconstructed with the second-order limit of an infini -

tesimal

(relative zero)

.

Hence the differential and the

integral are no longer two dependent aspects reciprocally

interacting in discrete degrees but with the second-order

construction of the infinitesimal the differential and
integral become absolutely correlated as two aspects of one

identity displayed through the "form" of

a

spheroid

Thus

.

through Leibnitz's infinitesimal calculus we are able to

integrally differentiate the hyper- infinite expanse of the

infinitesimal to construct the general form-ula of spheroids.

At this final level of conservation of volume Leib-

nitz is able to fully reconstruct the conserved form of the

multitudinous spheroid shapes of all the clay balls he
originally played with or might have played with as

a

baby

Explication of the Formal Metaphoric Operations
Next we shall examine the last three sublevels of the
formal metaphoric operations in terms of the INRC group,

temporality, variability and related paradigms of physics.

,

259

We shall further term the last three sublevels of the gen-

eral formal level:

dination)
(3)

,

(1)

metaphoric fission (either/or coor-

metaphoric flow (both/and coordination)

(2)

metaphoric fusion (neither/nor coordination).

The

appropriateness of these labels shall become apparent as we
explicate the levels.
At the "either/or" level of metaphoric fission we may

depict the formal coordination in terms of the Piagetian
INRC group where I=identity, N=inversion or negation,

R=reciprocity

,

and C=correlation

.

At this level of formal

coordination the two types of reversibility, negation and
reciprocity, which were separate in concrete operations
We may exemplify the

become correlated in the INRC group.

INRC group in terms of a person's "either/or" coordination
of a double reference system which Piaget claims is indica-

tive of Piagetian formal operations

(Piaget,

1970, p.

727)

.

Utilizing an example given by Piaget we may let one of the
relative frames of reference be the movement of

either left or right.
is a mobile board

a

snail to

The other relative frame of reference

(on which the snail moves) which can also

move to either left or right.

Both the snail and the board

are positioned on a table which serves as an absolute un-

movable frame of reference.

We may display the INRC group

of this double frame of reference coordination in terms of a

"square of opposition"

(see

figure 24)

(Piaget (translator's

Figure 24.

Piaget’s INRC group.

.

.

i
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note), 1970, p. 727.

opposition

We term this diagram a "square of

because of the double criss-crossing negation.

Quoting from the translator's note on an article by Piaget
We can define C to be the rule that reverses the movement of the snail: C (L, L) = (R,L)
for example [where
(R,L) means the snail (first coordinate) is moving
right, and the board moving left]
Then we can define R
to be the rule that reverses the second coordinate, for
example, R(L,L)=(L,R) (this reverses the movement of the
board)
N (N reverses both movements) is the
product of R and C. (Piaget's translator's note, 1970,
,

.

.

.

.

.

727)

p.

Hence we may begin with both the snail and the board
to the right side of a mid-point on the table

operation of correlativity

(C)

left end of the board

.

reciprocity

(R)

(

L R)
,

(R,R).

By the

we can move the snail to the

Next by the operation of

we can move the board to the left (L,L)

Finally by the operation of negation

(N)

we may reverse both

of the previous two movements back to the identity state or

origin

(

R R)
,

.

The identity may be defined as the operation

that changes any coordinate into itself.

Hence we may

formulate the previous set of movements as I=NRC.

By chas-

ing around the "square of opposition" we may verify the

following formulations:
(a)

RC=N, RN=C CN=R, and all couples are commutative,
that is, RC=CR,

(b)

2
2
2
C=N=R=I,

(c)

RNC=I

,

At the "either/or" level of metaphoric fission the
INRC group is depicted as a "square of opposition" in which
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the criss crossing diagonals are mutually
exclusive nega-

tions.

The application of the INRC "square of opposition"

to the double reference system is based on the assumption

that the two frames of reference are separately independent
of each other and externally referenced to an absolute

unmoveable frame of reference.
opposition" is descriptive of

Thus the INRC "square of
a

Newtonian mechanical uni-

verse in which all movements are part of an absolute

Euclidean frame of reference to which the absolute variable
of time is independently related.

At the "both/and" level of metaphoric flow the INRC

group previously depicted as a "square of opposition" is

transformed into

a

"cybernetic loop of reciprocity."

While

the "square of opposition" is a static system of mathematical relations the "cybernetic loop of reciprocity" is a

dynamic system of complementary relations.
"square of opposition" is

a

While the

system of negatively independent

variables the "cybernetic loop of reciprocity" is
of mutually dependent variables.

a

system

Consider the example of

the "profiled vase" as a double frame of reference system.
The "profiled vase" is a co-reflexive system which may be

dialectically interpreted according to three levels of
perception.

We may perceptually coordinate the movement of

the "profiled vase" as an "either/or" metaphoric fission, a

.
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both/and" metaphoric flow or a "neither/nor"
metaphoric
fusion
At the level of metaphoric fission the "profiled vase"
is perceived as

"either" profile "or" vase in negative

independence of each other.

The movement between the pro-

file and vase is perceived as a discontinuous mirror opposition.

We may represent this "either/or" metaphoric fission

in terms of the INRC "square of opposition"

(see Figure 25)

.

Hence we may interpret the "profiled vase" as "either"
the profiles discontinuously correlated with the vase by

negative reciprocation "or" vice-versa the vase discontinu ously correlated with the profiles by negative reciprocation

In other words starting with the

.

foreground we can with

"profiles" in the

static, discontinuous correlation

a

take the negation of the "profile" to equal the "not vase"
in the background and reciprocate the "not vase" to equal
the "vase" in the foreground (N^R^=C^)

.

In reflexive oppo-

sition to the previous relation we can with a static, dis-

continuous correlation take the negation of the "vase" in
the foreground to equal the "not profile" in the background

and reciprocate the "not profile" to equal the "profile" in
the foreground

(

N R =C
2

1

)

.

The extreme opposites of this

1

discontinuous cycle are symbolically represented by
and n R =C
2

1

1

res P ectivel y and the complete discontinuous

cycle by N R 2 N 2 R 1 =C 1 C 1 =C 1 =I where
1

1

is the ori 9 inal identity

"
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Figure 25.
Reciprocity.

(a)

"Square of Opposition."

(b)

"Loop of
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of the profile in the foreground.

Both the double frame of

reference systems of the "profiled vase" and
the "snail and
board" share the equivalent "either/or" relations as
de-

picted by the INRC "square of opposition."
At the level of metaphoric flow the "profiled vase" is

perceived as

both" profile "and" vase in mutual dependence.

The movement between the profile and vase is perceived as a

continuous reciprocal flow.

We may represent this "both/

and" metaphoric flow in terms of the INRC "loop of recipro-

city"

(see Figure 25b).

Two major differences between the

"cybernetic loop of reciprocity" and the "square of opposition" are that the operations of reciprocity and negation
are transposed and the dimension of time is inherent to the

"loop of reciprocity" while the "square of opposition" rep-

resents static mathematical relations with time separated
In terms of the

out.

"loop of reciprocity" we may interpret

the "profiled vase" as both the profiles continuously corre -

lated with the vase by reciprocal negation and the vase con -

tinuously correlated with the profiles by reciprocal negation

.

In other words starting with the

foreground we can in

a

"profiles" in the

continuous "correlative" oscillation

negate the "profiles" into the background as "not profiles"
and reciprocate the "not profiles" into the foreground as
the vase (N R =C
1

2

2

)

and complementarily negate the "vase" in

the background as not "vase" and reciprocate the "not vase"
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into the foreground as the "profiles"

(t^R^C^) returning

full cycle to the original identity.

Thus the two recipro-

cal complements of the cycle are symbolically represented by

^^^2 =<“i anc^ ^2^1 = ^'l res P ec ti vely and the full, continuous
2

cycle by N R N R =C C =C =I
2 2 1
1 1
]_

*

1

Although both the "square of opposition" and the "loop
of reciprocity" share the same symbolic formulations of the

INRC group their interpretations of reciprocity and negation
are transposed and the "movement" of the former is statically discontinuous while the former is dynamically continuous.

Furthermore the "variables" of the "square of opposition"
are negatively independent while those of the "loop of reci-

procity" are mutually dependent.

Hence the either/or

"square of opposition" appears to be descriptive of the

relatively independent frames of reference of

a

Newtonian

universe and the both/and "loop of reciprocity" appears to
be descriptive of the relatively dependent frames of refer-

ence of an Einsteinian Universe.
At the "neither/nor" level of metaphor fusion the INRC

group previously depicted as

a

"square of opposition" and

"loop of reciprocity" is transformed into

relation."

a

"circle of cor-

At the level of metaphoric fusion the "profiled

vase" is perceived "neither" as profile "nor" vase in con-

tinuous oscillation but rather both are absolutely correlated in the reintegrated image of "twins kissing

a

flower

.
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vase.

At the

neither/nor" level what was previously mutu-

ally dependent and temporally oscillating in and out of
the

foreground becomes interdependently fused into

a

single

metaphoric image with two simultaneously correlated complements, the profile and vase, both brought together in

second-order unity.

a

This second-order construction of meta-

phoric fusion is "neither" in the foreground "nor" in the

background but takes place through
al operation

a

higher order homospati-

(Rothenburg, 1979a).

We may depict the construction of this higher order

relation in terms of the temporal collapse of the "loop of
reciprocity" and the second-order expansion of the new identity of the "circle of correlation"

(see Figure 26a, b)

With the temporal collapse of the "loop of reciprocity" the

oscillating loop shrinks to the indeterminate point of
intersection where the "profiles" and "vase" may become synchronously correlated in the second-order identity of "twins

kissing

a

flower vase."

As the figure of the ""circle of

correlation" depicts the new second-order identity is

a

simultaneous fusion of the three operations of negation,

reciprocity and correlation, and not merely
original first-order identity.

a

return to the

Thus while the INRC group is

spatially and temporally "closed" under the dialectical

transformations of metaphoric fission and flow it becomes
"open" to a new meta-spacetime identity under metaphoric

"

.
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Cl

A.

C2

Rl

Reciprocity."
(a) Collapse of "Loop of
Figure 26
the "Circle of
of
identity
(b) Expansion of the 2nd order
Correlation.
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fusion.

The visual figure of the circle
of correlation is
indicative of a second-order metaphoric process
which cannot
be displayed literally.

Dobbs (1972, pp

.

272-292) has argued that the continu-

ous transformation between the three-dimensional counter-

parts of a reversible necker cube requires at least

dimensional manifold.

a

four-

Furthermore he has argued that the

fourth dimension of this continuous transformation is an

"imaginary time" dimension, that is,

"imaginary" in the

mathematical sense of a complex number.

We suggest in an

analogous way that the continuous transformation between the
"vase" and "profiles" of the "profiled vase" requires a

higher-order dimensional manifold than either alone.
Furthermore, the metaphoric fusion of the "profiled vase"
requires a higher order manifold than the continuous transformation.

Hence we theorize that the "either/or" discon-

tinuous perception of the "profiled vase" requires no more
than a three-dimensional manifold, the "both/and" continuous

perception no more than a four-dimensional manifold and the
"neither/nor" metaphoric fusion no more than

dimensional manifold.

a

five-

In addition we theorize that the

three-dimensional manifold of the "either/or" level portrays
a

Newtonian universe with space and time as separate vari-

ables.

Hence at the "either/or"level the alternation be-

tween the vase and profiles appears to be an infinitely
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fast, discontinuous leap between two static states.

The

four-dimensional manifold of the "both/and" level portrays
an Einsteinian universe with a relative "spacetime continuum.

The spacetime continuum is defined by the causally

"

"determined" region of the Minkowski light cones
bach, 1958, pp

.

(Reichen-

184-185) which demarcates the limiting speed

of light for all "material objects" and thus their boundary
of visual detection.

Hence at the "both/and" level the

psycho-physical pulsation between the vase and profiles

is

a

continuous relative movement which may not exceed the speed
of light as defined by the spacetime continuum of the light
The five-dimensional manifold of the "neither/nor"

cones.

metaphoric level portrays

a

Bohmian quantum universe (1980)

in which objects according to Bell's theorem may be simulta -

neously correlated across long distances faster than the
speed of light (d'Espagnat, 1979, pp. 158-181)
pp.

(Stapp,

1971,

1303-1320) and/or a Whiteheadian universe in which all

events participate in one organismic event (Whitehead,
1960)

.

The posited meta-spacetime continuum of this uni-

verse includes both the causally determined and indetermi—
nant regions of the Minkowski light cones where speed exceeds that of light (Jones, 1983, pp

.

100-113)

.

Hence the

indeterminant point of pulsation integrating the vase and
profiles is included in the meta— spacetime where both are

simultaneously correlated in

a

single metaphoric image.
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In order to further exemplify
the formal operations of

metaphoric fission, flow and fusion we shall
apply the metaphoric dialectic to the developmental understanding
of the

multi-referential movement system of the "natural hydrological cycle.

At the "either/or" level of metaphoric fission

we may depict the hydrological cycle in terms of the INRC

"square of opposition"

(see Figure 27).

At this level the

hydrological cycle is understood in terms of

a static dis-

continuous set of mathematical group relations between the

independently opposed’ hydro-movement systems of the atmosphere (sunclouds and rainclouds) and the earth (ocean and

mountain range)

.

Hence there is the understanding of the

negative relationship that what goes up must be equal to

what inversely comes down.
At the "both/and" level of metaphoric flow we may de-

pict the hydrological cycle in terms of the INRC "loop of

reciprocity."

At this level the hydro-movement systems of

the atmosphere and earth are no longer discontinuously

opposed but are continuously reciprocated through time.

hydrological cycle is perceived as

a

The

reciprocally interac-

tive cycle in which the "sun clouds" are continuously

correlated with the "mountain range" through the "cloud
stream" and "condensation" and the complementary correlation
of the "mountain range" with the "sun clouds" occurs through

the "earth stream" and "evaporation."

Hence the reciprocal

Figure 27.

(a)
(b)

Metaphoric Fission for the Hydrocycle.
Metaphoric Flow for the Hydrocycle.
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ratio of evaporation to condensation is understood
as

a

function of the time of interaction.
At the "neither/nor" level of metaphoric fusion we may

depict the hydrological cycle in terms of the temporal collapse of the "loop of reciprocity" and the second-order ex-

pansion of the new identity of the "circle of correlation"
(see Figure 28a, b)

.

With the temporal collapse of the "loop

of reciprocity" the oscillating loop shrinks to the indeter-

minate point of interaction where both evaporation and
condensation are simultaneously equilibrated.

The hydro -

cycle is no longer merely understood as the interactive de -

pendence of the atmospheric and earthly hydro-system but
rather both are metaphorically understood as interdependent
subsystems of a greater self-regulating system with

ordinate identity

.

a supra-

Furthermore the conceived locus of

control of the hydrological system is neither in the atmosphere nor earthly hydro-systems but rather it takes place

through the second-order interdependence of both in relation
to the greater context of the solar system.

unified hydro-system of the earth's sphere is

Hence the
a self-

regulating system because of its openness to the greater
context of lunar and solar influences.
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Rl

(a) Collapse of Metaphoric Flow for HydroFigure 28.
(b) Expansion of Metaphoric Fusion for Hydrocycle.
cycle.

275

Summary of the Chapter
In final summary of this chapter on development we

have attempted to deepen and extend Piaget's fundamental

concepts of "play," "imitation," "assimilation," "accommodation" and "equilibration" through the constructive applica-

tion of a metaphoric dialectic.

We have provided

a

general

overview of the five developmental levels of the metaphoric
dialectic:

(I)

Global Coordination --ref lex and global

interaction with the environment,

(II)

Absolute Differential

Coordination - -differentiation of self from the environment
with person and object permanence in the sensori-motor
period,

(III)

"Either/Or" Coordination

— discontinuous

alter-

nation between the conflicting inner world of pretend play
and the environmental world of imitation during the pre-

operational period,

(IV)

"Both/And " Coordination

— reciprocal

interaction of play and imitation during the period of
concrete operation,
tion

— synchronous

(V)

"Neither/Nor" Metaphoric Coordina -

correlation of the science of imitation

and the art of play in the aesthetic constructions of the

advanced levels of the formal metaphoric transformations.
Beyond the general overview we have provided two detailed examples of the five general levels of the metaphoric

dialectic with elaborated recursive sublevels for the development of "locomotion" and "conservation."

We have proposed

that the physical coordination of physical space and the
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mental coordination of mental space share

a

common meta-

phoric dialectic which becomes totally integrated in the

advanced developmental levels of second-order "flow" activity.

Furthermore at this point we note the congruence

between the mountain climber's experience of "sublimity" as
a

kinesthetic perception of being "infinitesimally" small

and "infinitely" expansive simultaneously and Leibnitz's
final conception of the conservation of the volume of

spheroids as the integral differentiation of the "infinite"

expanse of "infinitesimals."

Finally in consideration of the advanced formal levels
of metaphoric fission,

flow and fusion we examined the

developmental indicators of the INRC group, temporality,

variability and supporting paradigms of physics.

In summary

of these indicators and others for the advanced formal level

we present a table for the reader's perusal (see Table 1).
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
In this concluding chapter we will briefly summarize

and further clarify the main points of the dissertation.

We

are proposing a "Metaphoric Theory" about a "metaphoric

process" of creative change which is genuinely novel in

structure and self-consistently explicable in genesis.

The

concept of "metaphor" plays the dual role of both being the

explanatory subject about creative change and the object of

explanation in creative change.

This is a bootstrapping

approach in which the theoretical subject

is

self-

consistently explicated in terms of its own objective process.

(For an example of how bootstrapping is successfully

used in atomic physics see Chew (1970).)

bootstraping is neither

a

We argue that this

vicious circle nor an infinite

regress but rather accounts for the self-consistent adequacy
of the theory to explicate itself in its own metaphoric

terms which are irreducible to any lesser explanatory form.
The epistemological price we pay for this is to admit the

limits of rationalistic explanation and to metaphorically

embrace paradox.

Bohr suggested

a

similar approach when he

told Heisenberg "that even when one had the final answer,
there will remain a completely paradoxical situation which
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could not be handled by any of the usual concepts"
(February 25, 1963)

,

and,

"that it was such a reasonable step to

take to introduce some paradox to the very beginning"
(July 12, 1963)

(Rothenburg, 1983, p.

We conclude

108).

that the goal of the study of creative change is not to reduce away the paradox of the creative process (Reducionism)
nor to leave it unexplicated (Holism) but rather to demon-

strate the metaphoric beauty of the paradox with

a

Metaphor-

ic Theory which is self-consistently explicable in its own

terms.

This metaphoric beauty aesthetically resolves the

paradox by showing the greater hybridized unity of contraries "because of" their contrasting differences and not
just "in spite of" or from the "lack thereof."
In the theoretical study of creative change the con-

traries of Holism versus Reductionism have historically

embroiled researchers in
a

a

false dilemma.

Holism allows for

genuinely novel structure but does not explicate its gene-

sis.

Reductionism explicates novelty but

novel composite.

is

trivially

By limiting ourselves to either Holism or

Reductionism we are caught in

a

false dilemma with the nega-

tive consequence of either "inexplicability"

"trivial novelty"

a

(Reductionism)

.

(Holism) or

Hence the choice of

either Holism or Reductionism is one-sidedly incomplete in
the explication of genuinely novel structures and further-

more fused together they are incons is tent for Holism
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characterizes the creative process as "radically
discontinuous

while Reduct ioni sin proposes "trivial continuity."

Paradoxically neither Holism nor Re duct ion ism taken singly
or fused together is adequate to explicate the generation of

genuinely novel structure.

Bohr (Holton, 1973, pp. 115-161)

in facing an epistemologically equivalent paradox of charac-

terizing "light" as either

a

discontinuous particle or

a

continuous wave proposed that the complementarity of the two
concepts in succession exhausts our conceptual understanding
of light.

Transferring Bohr's level of analysis to the

realm of "bright ideas" we accept complementarity as

a

"both/and" coordination of the contraries of "both" Holistic

discontinuity "and " Reductionistic continuity in succession
which goes beyond the "either/or" coordination of "either"

contrary taken singly "or" fused together

.

Beyond the

"both/and" coordination of complementarity we propose

a

"neither/nor" metaphoric coordination in which "neither"

holistic discontinuity "nor" reductionistic continuity
singly or in succession is fully adequate to explicate the

generation of "bright new ideas."

Rather with "neither/nor"

metaphoric coordination we introduce

a

second-order recon-

struction which simultaneously integrates the contrasting

differences of Holism with Reductionism in

metaphoric theory.

a

genuinely novel

Thus paradoxically "because of" and not

merely complementarily "in spite of" or from the singular

.
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lack of" the contrasting perspectives of
Holism and Reduc-

tionism we can aesthetically construct the greater
cognitive

perspective of Metaphoric Theory.
Having clarified the epistemological status of the
"Metaphor Theory" and demonstrated how it is epistemologi-

cally more adequate than Holism and Reduction we may further

consider the "metaphoric process" which
concern.

is

the object of its

Just as the paradoxical process of constructively

coordinating the mutually exclusive but equally necessary
oppositional theories of Holism and Reductionism to generate
a

second-order simultaneous reintegration of their contrast-

ing differeces gives rise to the "Metaphoric Theory," the

paradoxical process of constructively coordinating mutually
exclusive but equally necessary first-order oppositional
differences to generate

a

second-order simultaneous reinte-

gration of their contrasting differences gives rise to the
"metaphoric process.
a

"

In short creativity may be defined as

paradoxical tension in search of

a

metaphoric solution

both at the subjective theory level and the objective process level.

Furthermore the "explanatory function" by which

"metaphor" resolves the empirical anomalies and theoretical

paradoxes of genuinely novel learning, production, developmental transition and paradigm shift
dialectic

is

the

metaphoiic
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Metaphoric Example of Cinematic Perception
In the following idealized example of "cinematic per-

ception" we shall further clarify the steps in the metaphoric dialectic.

I.

Global Coordination
The co-reflexive tendency is expressed as the confused

differentiation of the past memory of the previous film
frames from the future anticipation of the next film frames.
In other words the cinematic

film is perceived as a rapidly

moving blur.
II.

Absolute Differential Coordination
Further focal coordination of the incoherent blur

leads to a more coherent perception of the sporadic sequence
of the past memory of the previous film frames as discon-

nected from the future anticipation of the next film frames.
Thus the observer begins to recognize various still frames

but perceives no coherent connection between them.

III.

Either/Or Coordination
Further focal coordination of the incoherent percep-

tion of sporadic disconnectedness leads to the confronting
of the radically conflicting differences or gaps between

"either" the past memory of the previous film frames "or"
the future anticipation of the next frames in discontinuous

.
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succession.

Thus the observer is confronted with radically

different perceptions of the same object over time which
appear to be in conflict.
IV.

Both/And Coordination
Further focal coordination of the conflicting gap

between the radically different perceptions of the same
object leads to the more coherent perceptual coordination of
"both" the past memory of the previous frames "and" the

future anticipation of the next film frames as

a

continuous

sequence of gradually varied still frames of the object of
perception.

Thus the object of perception becomes defined

as a static continuum of accumulated still frames.

The

intensive rationalistic analysis of this level leads to

a

paralysis which sacrifices dynamic movement for the pseudo-

precision of an infinitely divisible sequence of still
frames

V.

Neither/Nor Metaphoric Coordination
Further focal coordination of the incoherent static

differences of the sequence of still frames leads to the

more coherent perceptual coordination of "neither" the past

memory of the previous frames "nor" the future anticipation
of the next frames as an infinitely divisible sequence of

still frames but rather the synchronous coherence of their

contrasting differences in the "continuous present.
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Through the synchronous coherence of the "continuous
present" a dynamic focal image is constructed which was para-

doxically motionless to the previous level of static perception.

While the continuity of the "both/and" level is

a

static first-order continuity rationalistically constructed
in retrospect the continuity of the "neither/nor" level is a

second-order continuity repeatedly reconstructed in the perpetual present.

Through the ever shifting intersection of

the past and future the "continuous present" generates a

dynamic image which the infinite division of still frames
recedes from the further it statically divides.

(For a

detailed discussion of the "continuous present" in literature see Kawin (1972).)

Currently much of American developmental theory is

reductionis tically interpreted at the "both/and" level where

developmental transitions are isolated and smoothed out into
an infinitely divisible continuum of still frames in futile

hope of statically framing the dynamic moment of transition.
The rationalistic analysis of the "both/and" level only

leads to a paralysis of the dynamic creative process itself

while the "neither/nor" metaphoric coordination embraces the
dynamic creative process by taking on its dynamic form of

expression through metaphor.

Furthermore the "both/and

level of analysis assumes there is a continuous one-to-one

point correspondence between the still frames while the
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neither/nor" metaphoric level of understanding represents

a

continuous restructuring of the frames through their con-

trasting differences which can only be coupled as wholes.
Thus the attempt to overlay a reductionistic "both/and"

continuum of graduated variations on the metaphoric dialectic for greater rationistic precision only defeats its

creative purpose to break down the shackles of rationalism
and break through to the dynamic creative process which

unites the allusive "charm" of the artist'

s

painting with

the allusive "charm" of the physicist's representation of
the subatomic particle.

Any subdivision of the metaphoric

dialectic only leads to a recursive sublevel of the metaphoric dialectic itself.
ly reflects

The metaphoric dialectic recursive-

itself in each of its sublevels similar to the

way a hologram reflects itself in each of its parts.

The

"both /and" level of analysis is only one step in the ongoing

metaphoric dialectic.
Metaphoric Example of the Blind Man'

s

Cane

Next we shall consider the fundamental source of oppo-

sitional differences in the creative process.
(Miller, 1978, p.

95)

As Bohr

proposes the general difficulty in the

formation of human ideas is inherent in the indeterminate

distinction between the "subject" and "object."

This is

where
clearly the case in understanding the atomic domain
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"subjective" measurements indeterminately interact with
"objective" readings limiting the precise measurement of

both momentum and position simultaneously, and where two
^iff eren t "subjective" measurements of the same phenomena of

light lead to the mutually exclusive but complementary

"objective" readings of the continuous wave and the discon-

tinuous particle.
134)

We shall use Bohr's (Holton, 1973,

p.

vivid example of the "blind man's cane" to show the

indeterminate yet metaphoric relation of our subjective self
to the objective world.

world form one entity.

The blind man,

the cane, and the

The dividing line between the sub-

Consider the following

ject and the object is not fixed.

levels of coordination for the shifting of the indeterminate

dividing line.

I,

Global Coordination
The dividing line between the "subjective" blind man

and the "objective" world fumblingly shifts back and forth

between the diffuse positions of

a

loose subjective grasp of

the top of the cane as a separate explorable object to the

tight grasp of the cane which extends the dividing line of

subjective sensing to the objective bottom of the cane.

blind man playfully fumbles around with the cane.

The
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II.

Absolute Differential Coordination
The dividing line between the "subjective" blind man

and the "objective" world sporadically shifts between the

disconnected fixations of an "absolutely" loose subjective
grasp of the top of the cane as a separate object to the

"absolutely" tight grasp of the cane which extends the di-

viding line of subjective sensing to the objective bottom of
the cane.

The blind man stumbles around disjointedly con-

nected with the world through the cane.
III.

Either/Or Coordination
The dividing line between the blind man and the world

discontinuously shifts between the mutually exclusive positions of an "absolutely" loose subjective grasp of the top
of the cane as a separate object of the world buffering

obstacles to the "absolutely" tight grasp of the cane which
extends the dividing line of the subjective sensing to the

objective bottom of the cane.

The blind man is jarringly

poked by the objective reaction of the cane as he subjectively pokes about the world.

IV.

Both/And Coordination
The dividing line between the blindman and the world

continuously shifts between the successive positions of

a

"relatively" loose subjective grasp of the top of the cane
as a separate object of the world which protectively buffers

.
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^9^i n st obstacles and the "relatively" tight grasp of the
cane which extends the dividing line to te objective bottom
of the cane.

In a successive touch and go of subjectively

sensing with the cane and objectively carrying the cane and
using it as a buffer the blind man tenuously probes the

world
V.

Neither/Nor Metaphoric Coordination
The dividing line between the blind man and the world

is neither in the relatively loose grasp of the cane with

the dividing line at the top nor in the relatively tight

grasp of the cane with the dividing line at the bottom of
the cane but is in the "metaphoric" grasp of "relaxed firm-

ness" where the indeterminacy of the dividing line

tinually redetermined through
world.

a

is

con-

searching probe of the

Through the "metaphoric" grasp of "relaxed firmness"

the blind man continually re-orients his searching probe of

the world to synchronously integrate his subjective aware-

ness "in" the cane with his objective awareness "about" the
cane.

Ironically the shifting indeterminacy of the dividing

line between subjective/objective awareness necessarily

creates both the blind man's vulnerability to fall and his
openness to an expanding world of metaphoric probing.
We propose that we too are "blind" in that we can

never know the world directly.

We are indirectly connected

to the world through our metaphoric probing.

Just as the
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blind man's cane is neither inseparably related to the
world
(subjective monism) nor separately independent of the world
(objective dualism) we are metaphorically coupled with the

world (metaphoric nondualism) in an indeterminate relationship requiring continual reconstruction to bring the two

together in

a

harmonious synchrony.

What we subjectively

expect and objectively observe constitutes an ongoing devel-

opmental conflict which is reducible to neither an idealistic utopia nor a direct perception of the absolute world.

Rather the paradoxical indeterminacy of our "subject/object"

relationship with the world continually provokes new metaphoric reconstructions of reality's rich tapestry of unity

through diversity.

This is the central act of creativity

through which we are metaphorically linked to all of creation as co-creators.

Generative Principles for Creative Teaching
We shall conclude this chapter with three general

principles for creative teaching which guide the child
through the five levels of the metaphoric dialectic toward
the greater cognitive perspective of unity through diversity

Forman and Kuschner (1977) have recommended,
teacher parallel plays near

a

"...

that the

self-directed child for a

while, get a sense of the child's objectives, give the child

sufficient opportunity for

a run of

successful variations in

:
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his/her spontaneous play, and then slip the child

a

comment

or an implement that, when incorporated by the child in the

child's play, creates surprise or paradox"
Fosnot, 1982, p. 203).

(Forman and

Generalizing on this recommendation

we propose the following three guiding principles
1.

Meet the child at his/her world view

principle the teacher develops

a

With this

.

rapport with the child to

match the learning activity with the child's developmental
level according to the steps of the metaphoric dialectic.
In order to meet the child at his/her world view the teacher

listens to and observes the child's needs, interests, questions and activities.

The teacher learns to speak the

child's language, to see through his/her eyes and to mirror

his/her actions when appropriate.

The teacher incorporates

the child's interests and questions into the learning activity.

Through the above interaction the teacher informally

diagnoses the child's cognitive level and matches it with

appropriate learning activities.

Usually the learning

activities will be open ended activities with general themes
which allow the child to enter into the activity at his/her
own cognitive level.

These open ended activities may fur

ther serve as a diagnostic of the child

s

interests and

cognitive level according to the metaphoric dialectic.
2.

Further enrich the child's world view

.

With this

to
principle the teacher allows and encourages the child
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fully explore all the diverse first-order variations
on

his/her particular subject of interest.

The teacher may

introduce open ended activities with general themes to allow

diverse variations on the theme.

The teacher emphasizes the

similarities between the diverse variations.
may encourage variations within

a

The teacher

thematic activity by using

different mediums for expressing the same theme with song,
dance, drawing, painting, or building.

encourage variation within

a

The teacher may

medium by allowing the use of

continuously transformable substances such as play dough,
water, or sand which take on an infinite variety of shapes
and sizes.

Through pretend games the teacher may help the

child imagine multiple functions for an object such as

a

stick or have the child take on multiple imaginary roles.

Through diverse grouping of children the teacher may encourage variations across a theme by following up the thematic

activity with similar thematic activities which flow out of
the first activity.

With this principle the teacher is

helping the child to stretch his/her repetoire and understand the first-order similarities between the diverse

variations on
3.

a

theme.

Lovingly challenge the child's world view

With

.

this principle the teacher shifts from emphasizing the simi-

larities among the diverse variations to focusing on the

conflicting differences in the diverse variations of

a
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theme.

Through the conflicting differences the teacher,

within the greater context of trust and cooperation established with the first two principles

,

conflict and allows the child through

induces cognitive
a

guided process to

reconstruct the first-order conflicting variations with the

greater cognitive perspective of
integration.

a

second-order metaphoric

This second-order metaphoric integration al-

lows the child to perceive the greater unity of the theme

through its contrasting differences which was hidden to the

homogeneous first-order similarity of relative differences.
The teacher may present the child with an unexpected discre-

pancy, a moral dilemma or a controversial issue of personal

interest and through Socratic dialogue expose the inconsistencies in the child's thinking and provide counterviews and

counterexamples to his/her incomplete one-sided thinking.
The teacher may allow and encourage the child to construct

his/her own theories and to make predictions and test out
his/her predictions with observations and thus to explore
the limits of his/her own theories and the need for continu-

ally reconstructing them.

Through diverse groupings of

children according to cognitive level, interests, cultural
background, etc. the teacher may induce conflicting viewpoints which in the context of resolving

a

common problem of

mutual concern may lead to a greater cognitive perspective
which is perceived because of the contrasting views and not
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merely in spite of them.

With this principle the child is

lovingly challenged to confront cognitive conflict both in-

dividually and socially and to metaphorically resolve it
through the greater cognitive perspective of unity through

diversity

.

The important point to remember in working with

this principle is that challenging the child's world view

outside the context of trust, cooperation and mutual concern
may be destructive rather than constructive (Johnson, 1974).
The greater context of trust, cooperation and a mutual con-

cern provides an integrative purpose for metaphorically re-

solving the paradoxical conflicts which are inherent to

creative change (Johnson and

R.

Johnson, 1975)

Hence in

.

the model of education we are proposing education is neither
a

mere transmitter of the child's world view nor

subverter of the child's world view, but rather

a
a

radical

benevolent

transformer of the child's World view.
In final conclusion we have demonstrated that the

Metaphoric Theory is an epistemologically adequate theory
for resolving the paradox of creative change and that it has

many promixing educational applications which the author
invites other researchers to explore with him.
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